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A

COLLECTION

OF THE

MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS

OF

Professor Frisbie,

WITH

SOME NOTICES OF HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER.

BY ANDREWS NORTON,
Dexter Professor of Sacred Literature in Harvard University.

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NOTICES

OF THE

LIFE AND CHARACTER

OF

PROFESSOR FRISBIE.

Memoir.

BY THE EDITOR.

I HAVE made a collection of several pieces, which my friend, Mr. Frisbie, published during his life, and have added some extracts from the manuscript notes of his lectures. These are the few products which now remain of his vigorous and original mind. They seemed to me to belong to the comparatively small class of writings, the sole effect of which is to make their readers wiser and better. I shall now give some notices respecting his life, which I have thought might be interesting.

Mr. Frisbie was born at Ipswich in New England, in the year 1784. His father was a respectable clergyman of that place, distinguished for his conscientiousness, and his sense of religion; a Calvinist. To his instructions and example, Mr. Frisbie may be supposed to have been, in a great measure, indebted for the first implanting of those religious sentiments, which

acquired strength as his character strengthened, and even, early in life, formed an essential part of it. From him, likewise, he derived the belief of some doctrines, which his maturer reason rejected. These doctrines, however, as I have heard him complain, retained an influence over his feelings, especially in moments of despondence, long after they had ceased to be a part of his faith. They tended to throw darkness and discomfort over his views of the character and moral government of God, and of the future condition of man. His father's death took place when Mr. Frisbie was in the 22d. year of his age.

After completing his preparatory studies in Andover academy, Mr. Frisbie was admitted a member of the University in Cambridge, at the Commencement of the college year in 1793. As a student, he was among the most distinguished in his class for his talents and acquisitions, and for correctness of conduct, integrity and manliness. The salary of his father, like that of most of our clergymen, was scanty. He was unable fully to supply the means of defraying the necessary expenses of his son; and Mr. Frisbie, during the whole or the greater portion of the time while he was an undergraduate, provided in part for his own support, by writing as a clerk, several hours

a day during the college terms; and by teaching a school during the vacations in winter. It has been said, that wealth constitutes the only aristocracy in our country. But this is far from being the truth. Talents, united with correct morals, and good manners, pass unquestioned all the artificial barriers of society; and their claim to distinction is recognized more willingly than any other. It has been particularly the case among the young men who form the body of students at our University, that wealth and parentage are of little account; and that standing in their society depends, if not altogether upon qualities intrinsically estimable, yet, at least, upon personal characteristics. The circumstance of poverty, therefore, was of no disadvantage to Mr. Frisbie, except that it led him to occupy, in other ways, a considerable portion of time, which he might have employed for intellectual improvement.

After taking his first degree at Cambridge in the summer of 1802, he removed to Concord in this state, where he resided for a year, teaching a public school. He immediately afterwards commenced the study of the law. From his acuteness, force of mind, skill in argument, and readiness and eloquence of expression, and from the moral characteristics by which he was distinguished, there can

be little doubt, that if he had been able to pursue the profession which he had chosen, he would have been among the most distinguished and honored of its members. But his pursuits were suddenly broken off, and his prospects clouded, by an affection of his eyes, which deprived him of their use for the purposes of study.

From this he never afterwards recovered, except so far as to be able to use them for very short intervals. There can be few severer inflictions of Providence upon a young man of ardent, active, inquiring mind, looking forward to usefulness and honor, and conscious of powers to attain what he desires. It leaves him to go abroad in society; but cuts him off, in a great measure, from all participation in the interests and hopes of his associates. When he retires from them, it is to a melancholy loneliness, without occupation, except what the mind, by a strong and painful effort, may be able to furnish from its own resources. The sufferer appears as other men, but he is fettered by invisible chains, like the magic threads of the sorceress in Thalaba, which prevent him from exerting his strength, though they may sometimes provoke him to an unavailing struggle. In these circumstances, Mr. Frisbie felt and acted like a man and a Christian. He considered his deprivation as a lesson

from God; and derived from it the moral benefits which it was adapted to afford. It served to discipline and form his character, by calling into action, and strengthening his religious sentiments and principles. When his hopes of honorable distinction were apparently blasted, and he was shut out from the scenes of promised activity and usefulness, he submitted patiently to the humbler task which seemed to be assigned to him, and was ready to perform it faithfully. He made use of those means of improvement that were still in his power; and during a great part of his subsequent life he was surrounded by friends, and by others whom he could with propriety call upon, some one of whom was always ready to read to him. He thus heard many books, both in English and Latin. It is consolatory to know, that under the deprivation which he suffered, his virtues, talents and industry gave him power to render so much service to his fellow-men, and to secure so large a share of love and honor.

It was some years after suffering this affliction, that he adopted a very simple means of writing without the use of his eyes. It was suggested to him by an account of a writing-machine for the blind, described in Rees' Cyclopedia. This machine consists of a square frame, to be placed over paper,

in which a ruler is so adjusted as to slide upward or downward, guiding the hand of the blind person to form written lines on the paper, at proper distances, by means of a pencil. It naturally occurred to Mr. Frisbie, that having a great advantage over the blind, it would be sufficient for him to guide his hand by a ruler laid on the paper; and that he could thus write without a painful use of his eyes. Upon trial, something broader than a ruler, as a thin octavo volume, was found more convenient. He accordingly wrote much in this manner during the latter years of his life. I mention the fact, because, simple as the method may appear when pointed out, I do not recollect to have met with a single instance of a person partially deprived of the use of his eyes, to whom it had occurred from his own reflection. Yet it may occasion very considerable difference in the comfort and usefulness of one suffering under this affliction. An important change for the better in the condition of individuals might often be effected by apparently trifling means, which seem to be overlooked from their very simplicity and obviousness.

The familiar letters of a literary man, when used with that scrupulous judgment and delicacy which the case requires, may often afford the means

of giving, in the most pleasing manner, an insight into his character and pursuits. But I have not this resource at command. In consequence of the the weakness of his eyes, Mr. Frisbie was, for many years, not in the habit of writing to his friends. Subsequent to that misfortune, I have seen but two of his letters, and those were addressed to myself. I have read a considerable number written previously. They were very creditable to him, considering the early age during which they were composed, giving a natural and lively view of his feelings, occupations and purposes; such as it would have been delightful to have had drawn by himself, when his mind and his style were more matured. From one of the latest, addressed to his father, I will give two passages, both of which seem to me characteristic; and the latter to be marked with strong good sense. The date is July 31st, 1803.

"When I first came in town, I was rather sober than otherwise, and of course not over polite to any one. This conduct, though perfectly inadvertent, has, I find, been of essential service to me. It established my character, as one not scrupulous in attention to ceremony, nor very familiar in my general intercourse with the world. I have been

able therefore to be as independent as I pleased, without giving offence, or exciting any unpleasant reflections."

* * * * * *

"That is the best education, which fits us best for the stations we are destined to sustain in life. And as this cannot be fully known during the period of youth, it is consequently of much more importance to strengthen the understanding, and assist it to distinguish objects properly, and reason upon them justly, than to crowd the memory with a heap of undigested facts, which most probably will never be of any service. If the mind be early taught to reason on those ideas which it has, and to comprehend them in their several relations, it will easily distinguish what kind of information is wanting, and acquire it, at the proper period, with facility and advantage. In choosing pursuits for a child, I should not so much consider what would be most useful to know when a man, as what was best fitted to exercise the reason, and gradually unfold and invigorate the understanding; because knowledge is easily acquired at any time; but wisdom, unless it early become a habit, never will. If we only learn while young, we shall do nothing else all our lives; and shall hardly know that we are capable of any thing else than merely receiving

the opinions and ideas of others. It is perhaps from the practice of learning children so much, and exercising their minds so little, that we often observe those, who were judged to be possessed of sprightly capacities, and to bid fair for eminence, shortly lose the rank they held in childhood, and sink into insignificance; while those who, at this early period, were considered as dull, afterwards shine forth as their superiors. The original distinction was probably just; but it has been changed by the faults in the education of the former. The fond parent or instructer, delighted with the brilliant readiness of the child, and the child delighted with the approbation lavished upon its genius, mutually engage to destroy it. Every thing must be taught it; the ancient and modern languages, mathematics, geography, history, &c. are all heaped upon each other; till at length the mind breaks down, like a young tree overburdened by a load of fruit. In the mean time, his stupid companion, on whom sentence has been passed, 'Oh he will never be any thing,' is neglected and left to himself. He acquires in consequence few ideas, but what he does acquire, are adapted to his years, for they are of his own acquisition. Leisure and necessity lead him to reason upon the little objects he observes; and this slowly expands and strengthens his mind,

increases his talent for observation, and leads him gradually to exercise his understanding on things of more importance. Thus he outstrips his shining, learned companion; and the world wonders what can have occasioned the change."

* * * * * * *

Being unable to pursue his professional studies, Mr. Frisbie accepted the place of Latin tutor in Harvard University, at the Commencement of the college year in September, 1805. He came into office at the same time with Mr. Nichols, now the Rev. Dr. Nichols of Portland, and Mr. Farrar, now Professor of Mathematics, who accepted different tutorships, and with Mr. Nurse, now the Rev. Mr. Nurse of Ellsworth, who took the office of librarian. The Rev. Dr. Ware had, in the course of the same year, been appointed Professor of Divinity. The whole Immediate Government (as it is called) of the University had, with two exceptions, been thus changed. The gentlemen, whom I have mentioned, found the college in a state of disorder, and great relaxation of discipline, arising from various causes. After a severe struggle, they restored it to a different condition, and gave it an impulse and character which it long retained. There has, probably, never been a set of men, to whom it has been more indebted.

It was in the year 1807, while residing as a graduate at Cambridge, that I formed that acquaintance with Mr. Frisbie, which subsequently ripened into intimacy and friendship. I found him in a society, in which I, afterwards, spent many pleasant and many useful hours. It was composed of the younger officers of the University, and of one or two other gentlemen residing at the institution for the purposes of study. I have mentioned the names of Mr. Nichols and Mr. Farrar. The place of Mr. Nurse was shortly after this time supplied by one, whose memory dwells in the respect and affection of all who knew him, the Rev. Samuel Cooper Thacher. For several years, some of us who formed this society were together almost every day, and every evening. There was among us an intercourse of mind and feeling, the most unrestrained and grateful. We were too familiar, and there was too much of good-humored raillery, for any one to suffer himself to indulge in pretension, or artificial display. Our manners towards each other were formed only on mutual regard and respect. Some others of our number, as well as Mr. Frisbie, were more or less unable to use their eyes for study; and it was not uncommon therefore for one gentleman to read aloud to us when together. We afterwards, perhaps, engaged in

conversation, suggested by what had been read; and often in animated discussions of different topics of taste, morals, metaphysics, and the evidences and doctrines of religion. It was a play of mind in which great dexterity was displayed by some of the combatants; but in which it was rare indeed that the feelings of any, the least skilful, were wounded. It was an admirable intellectual discipline, well adapted to strengthen those habits of acute discrimination and facility of expression, for which Mr. Frisbie was distinguished. May I add likewise, that there was in the society of which I have spoken, a high moral tone and a correctness of principle, which, acting reciprocally upon its members, were favorable to the growth of such a character as he displayed.

After thus forming an acquaintance with Mr. Frisbie, I was absent for some time from Cambridge. Upon his return thither, after a vacation, I received a lively and pleasant letter from him, dated October 13th, 1809; of which I will give a short passage, as showing how he himself thought and felt respecting the society I have described.

"Here I found ———, with whom I could be tolerably well pleased; could I forget whom we might have had in his stead. I hate this succession of strangers; I hate to make a turnpike of my heart,

where every traveller just throws down his toll of ceremonious civility and passes on. We had begun to feel so harmonious and united, that it was provoking to have our circle broken by the loss of any of its parts. It was like taking a key-stone from an arch, which has been nicely adjusted and cemented, and introducing another, that it is ten chances to one can never be made to suit the place. However, we go on very smoothly as yet, and I am glad to find that ——— will be the firm advocate of vigorous measures."*

In a letter which I lately received from the Rev. Dr. Nichols, he says:

"My recollections and impressions concerning Mr. Frisbie, as a member of that social circle in which you first met him at Cambridge, are similar, I am persuaded, to your own. I deem it a great privilege to have been so long in the society of one, who possessed such resources for the entertainment and instruction of his friends in the native fertility of his mind. He was usually ready for all subjects; if not in every instance with a thorough knowledge of them, yet with great acuteness and strength of mind, and with that habitual good sense and freedom from sophistry, without which I apprehend that it were hardly possible that intelligent men should

* As an officer of the College government.

be long gratified with the mere display of intellectual powers. It were difficult to say too much of his talents in conversation, especially his habitual clearness, fluency and elegance of expression."

During the period of which I have been speaking, Mr. Frisbie wrote the following lines in the form of an epitaph upon himself. They have never been published; but were circulated among his friends, who thought them a spirited and amusing, though very extravagant caricature. The Postscript was written by him in the character of his friend, Professor Farrar.

Here lies an odd fellow as ever was seen,
A compound of folly, of sense, and of spleen;
Dogmatical, positive, ne'er at a stand,
The affairs of the state, he'd decide out of hand:
Nice points in the schools he would settle at once;
Who his reasons saw not, was put down for a dunce.
Yet, ofttimes, the veriest trifle about,
He would doubt and consider, consider and doubt;
And at last, having acted, would fret for an hour,
That to change but once more, was now out of his power.
In company too, if he ever came there,
Now polite as a lord, now uncouth as a bear;
Now his compliments flew, very fine and well hit,
Yet 'twas not to please others, but shew his own wit:
Sometimes he was pleasant and cheerful enough;
Then for hours he did nothing but scowl and take snuff.

Now he talked you to death, with high spirits half mad;
Then mute as a fish, he sat moping and sad;
If sitting it might be, for still at the best,
He would sprawl himself out over three chairs at least.
Though eccentric in all things, yet like a mill-horse,
It made him quite sick to go out of his course.
All strangers alike were his utter aversion;
Because they compelled him to make an exertion.
And though all their censures, in truth, he despised,
There was nothing on earth like praise that he prized.
If it seemed but sincere, though 'twas never so gross,
His vanity such, he would swallow the dose.
Then to crown all his folly, and let the world know it,
He took in his head to set up for a poet:
Conundrums and ditties he jingled in rhyme;
And when love fired his muse, he was quite the sublime.
So tender his heart, if the truth I must speak,
He would fall in love four or five times in a week:
Yet, it being so soft, very slight was the pain,
For the wound, soon as made, closed together again.
In short, Sir, his fancy was folly disjointed;
His feeling, mere gloom, grown from pride disappointed;
His talk through extravagance loomed into sense,
As an ant seems an elephant, seen through a lens.
You have heard he was frank; no mistake can be greater;
He had something of impudence mixed with ill-nature.
He made for his friends so much trouble while here,
I'm afraid now he's gone, they will scarce shed a tear.

POSTSCRIPT.

But 'tis possible still, that there yet may be one,
Who will say with a sigh, as he leans o'er this stone;
It is true he had faults, but he ne'er would defend them,
And what is still better, at least wished to mend them.
He rarely meant wrong, if he rarely did right;
But what sprung from caprice, was oft set down to spite.
"Dogmatical, positive":—true, I must own it;
But then he'd acknowledge an error, when shown it.
"In company," though he was rather uneven,
Yet there too his ratio was full four to seven;
His spirits amused, and to give him his due,
When we laughed at his follies, he laughed at them too.
But to lounge at his ease, oh! how truly he loved;
My books and my glasses full often have proved.
If to strangers averse, yet his friends were all dear;
For his heart was as warm, as his tongue was sincere.
I confess he loved praise, yet "his vanity such!"—
This epitaph-maker, no doubt, had as much.
As to fancy, I'm certain of that he'd enough,
For half of his notions were made of her stuff.
"His feelings," alas! they might gloomy appear:
Once his prospects were bright, his horizon was clear:
If his eye, here and there, a thin cloud might behold,
Hope played on its edges, and tinged them with gold:
But darker they grew, and still wider they spread,
Till hope sunk to earth, and the prospect all fled.
No more shall I hear him come tumbling up stairs;
Or see him stretched out over three or four chairs:
When my crackers and apples all roll o'er the floor,
Or my maps rattle down, I shall scold him no more.

Though he grieved me much here, still I wish him here yet,
And, now he is gone, all his faults I forget.
When I sit all alone, and the night is so still,
He crosses my mind, let me do what I will.
I lean on my hand, and I half heave a sigh,
And I feel a tear starting to moisten my eye.

From 1805 to 1811, Mr. Frisbie discharged the duties of Latin tutor. He was then appointed Professor of the Latin language; his duties, however, continuing nearly the same. The latter office he retained till 1817.

As an officer of the college, he habitually felt the importance of strict and steady discipline, as essential to its respectability and usefulness. At our colleges, a large number of young men are brought together at the most hazardous period of life. They are trusted very much to themselves, at a time when the habits are unformed; and when the passions, "the glory and disgrace of youth," are putting forth their strength, and most need direction and control. They have just been released from the restraints of a school, and the immediate personal superintendence of parents and masters. A great pressure has been taken off, and the operation of new and strong motives must be brought to bear upon the mind in order to supply its place. They are commonly at an age, when

little can be expected from the influence of merely prudential considerations, derived from just and far-sighted views of life; unless these are strengthened by intimate connexion with others of a different kind. It is the duty, therefore, of the governors of such institutions, to give a moral and religious character to the whole establishment, by the influence of their example, by discountenancing and expelling vice, and by those direct and indirect appeals, which may be made effectually to the best sentiments and feelings of the young. They should keep constantly in view the object of the institution, and suffer no one to remain a member, who is not fulfilling the purposes for which he was sent to it. Enlarged conceptions of learning, of its extent and utility, and a disinterested love of literary labor and intellectual improvement, should be communicated to those under their care. Full occupation should be provided for that youthful activity and restlessness of mind, which there is so much danger will waste itself in folly and mischief. There should be in our colleges, a watchful, ever-active principle of progression and improvement. The continually increasing demands of our country should be fulfilled and anticipated; and, at the present day, it should be esteemed but ill-judged praise of such an institution, to say, that it has not

degenerated. The governors of our colleges should know, that they have more to answer for than other men; that to them is committed

> "a nation's trust,
> The nurture of her youth, her dearest pledge."

Such establishments should be consecrated ground, inspiring thoughts of study and seclusion, and bearing throughout a moral and intellectual aspect. They must be pervaded by a strong literary spirit, which shall make every member feel its influence; throwing off those who are incapable of feeling it. This is required not for its own sake merely, but as a barrier to the moral evils, which, without it, will be continually pressing in and spreading corruption. It constitutes, in great part, the best discipline of a college, its preventive discipline. Without it, it is scarcely possible that such an institution should not be a seat of disorder, extravagance, dissipation, and vice. Then it will be a fountain continually pouring bitter waters through the land. What ought to have been a source of good will become a source of evil. The corruption will fall upon those who are the hopes of society; and the next blighted generation will suffer; though perhaps they may not trace the mischief to its cause.

It was with such sentiments, and the feeling of responsibility which they produced, that Mr. Frisbie acted as an officer of the college. He was always solicitous, that the college should be governed by that firm, vigilant, regular, unintermitted discipline, which may, in a great measure, prevent offences, without the dread of severe punishment. But when any circumstances rendered severe punishment necessary, he did not shrink from his share in the duty of inflicting it; though I believe that the performance of this duty has seldom cost any one so much. I have known it to affect seriously his spirits and health.

In 1817, Mr. Frisbie was married to Miss Catherine Saltonstall Mellen, daughter of John Mellen, Esq. of Cambridge. This lady is still living; and I will therefore only say, that in her he found a most dear and valued friend. Mr. and Mrs. Frisbie had but one child, a daughter, who died in infancy.

In 1817, likewise, Mr. Frisbie was inaugurated as Professor of Moral Philosophy. I will not here add any thing to what may be found elsewhere, respecting his peculiar qualifications for the office. In the subsequent part of this volume, I have given some extracts from the manuscript notes of his lectures. These may afford an imperfect notion of

his modes of thinking, and style of lecturing; but it should be understood that they appear under very great disadvantages. From the inconvenience which he always suffered in using his eyes, he, in general, wrote only the heads of his lectures; and this very briefly, so as even to furnish but an imperfect synopsis. He habitually expressed himself on abstract subjects, as well as others, with so much fluency and correctness, that these short notes were sufficient for his purpose; and his lectures were heard with additional interest, on account of their possessing so much of the freshness and animation of extempore speaking. On some topics, however, he occasionally wrote his thoughts more at length on loose papers. These papers are what I have principally used; sometimes combining together what I found on separate pieces, written at different times. I should hardly have been able to execute the task at all, but from my familiarity with his opinions and reasonings; the subjects on which he was reading and meditating being often discussed by us in conversation. Whether I have judged wisely in preparing what I have done for publication, must be determined by others. I was desirous, and I found it was the wish of many, that, if possible, some few fragments should be preserved of lectures which were heard with so much interest.

Beside the two courses of lectures from which I have given some passages, Mr. Frisbie delivered two others, one on natural theology, and the other on the principles of government, and on the constitution of the United States. I particularly regret that the notes of this last course were too imperfect, for me to venture to make use of them for the present work. These lectures were distinguished by original and striking views, and a just exposition of principles which it is important should be well understood in our country. Mr. Frisbie, himself, had thought of giving them to the public.

There was a resemblance between the opinions and reasonings of Mr. Frisbie on the subjects of morals and those of Professor Brown. The lectures of the latter were read by Mr. Frisbie during his last sickness,* having but just before been received in this country. I found him one day engaged in their perusal, and asked him how he was pleased with them. His answer was; 'I ought to be pleased with them; for he has what I considered some of my best thoughts.' The religious sentiment, and fine moral eloquence of some portions of these lectures, could not but be delightful to such a mind as Mr. Frisbie's. But I do not

* It was a symptom of this disease, that Mr. Frisbie was able to use his eyes much more than he could while in health.

think that he esteemed their author very highly, as a writer of what may be called *pure* metaphysics. I had formerly read to him Professor Brown's first pamphlet on Cause and Effect; and he had afterwards heard his later enlarged work, on the same subject. He thought his style too diffuse, and his expressions not unfrequently obscure; and he regarded the latter circumstance as arising, in a great measure, from the notions of the writer not being well defined and settled in his own mind.

In the autumn of 1821, I returned to fix my residence in Cambridge, after having been for some months absent. I had looked forward to enjoying again, under peculiarly pleasant circumstances, the society of a friend, with whom I had been, for many years, intimately connected. But I was struck by the change in Mr. Frisbie's appearance, and pained by the account which he gave me of his health. His friends, however, did not for a long time subsequent apprehend that his life was in danger. His disease, which was a consumption of the lungs, was indicated by such obscure symptoms, as not to be clearly ascertained till a few weeks before his death.

But from the period which I have mentioned, he, on the whole, was gradually declining; his disease giving his friends those alternations of hope

and fear, which leave so much to be remembered, and so little to be told. For some months before the close of his life, he was aware of the uncertainty of his recovery. While in health, he had felt rather more than common apprehension of death, partly from some accidental circumstances, partly from his high notions of duty, acted upon by those gloomy religious impressions, of which I have before spoken, and partly from a tendency to depression, produced by physical causes. But death, as it appeared more distinctly in view, lost its terrors. When his disease assumed an alarming character, he spoke to me openly of its probable termination; and asked, if knowing his former feelings, I should have expected him to be able to look forward to it so calmly. He was ready and desirous to converse upon all those high themes of speculation, which relate to the realities beyond the grave. He looked forward to them with a calm feeling of certainty. His mind was at once tranquillized and awed by the distinct apprehension of the fact, that in a few weeks, separated from the present objects of his affections, he might be existing in a far holier and happier state, with new powers and enlarged capacities of enjoyment.

A few days before his death, he rode out, for the last time, with Professor Farrar; and called

upon a gentleman in the neighbourhood. The principal object of his visit was to express his sense of obligation for some favors which he had received from this gentleman, early in life. He then asked to see a portrait of Mr. Thacher, which is in his possession. After looking at it for some time, he observed, 'I shall probably soon be with him.' This was on Saturday.

During the night between Saturday and Sunday, an abscess broke upon his lungs. I saw him for the last time on Sunday morning, and heard him, for the last time speak of his resignation to the will of God. He died on Tuesday, July 9th. The last act of his life was an expression of affection to his aged mother, who was adjusting his pillow.

To the preceding account, I am permitted to add the following extract from a long letter, with which I have been favored by a gentleman who knew Mr. Frisbie most intimately; and to whom I applied for information.

Extract

FROM

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

It is not in my power, I conceive, to add materially to your information respecting Mr. Frisbie. Though I had the happiness of enjoying his friendship earlier, and for a longer period, than you did; yet the principal events of his life are probably better known to you than to me; and from your frequent means of observation, the distinguishing traits of his mind and character must have been more accurately marked by you. Yet if you should be able, in any important respect, to extend your views of him by any thing which it is in my power to suggest, I would not willingly omit giving you some of the recollections, which occur to me, especially as to those portions of his life, which did not fall under your observation.

My acquaintance with Mr. Frisbie commenced after he was admitted to the University. The relation, which I sustained to his class, led me to attend with more interest to his literary progress, and laid the foundation of a friendship, which I have ever regarded as among the blessings of my life. His religious and moral principles, as well as habits, appeared to have been formed before he

left home. He was blest with a father, who was in all respects qualified to lead his mind to wisdom and virtue. I believe he had all the sensibility of conscience and purity of life, which distinguished his son, who always seemed conscious of a tribunal within, that led him scrupulously to avoid, not only whatever appeared to be wrong, but every thing which he did not feel assured was right.

The love of virtue, and regard to duty, which rendered Mr. Frisbie an object of universal respect among his companions at College, were associated with such candor and frankness of disposition, and generosity of conduct, that he equally gained their affection and confidence. Nor was his influence, at this early period of his life, lost upon the University. Alone, he might not have produced any visible effect, but together with others of similar dispositions, he contributed essentially to diffuse just sentiments, and to raise the standard of character among the students. It is well remembered by those who were then members of the College government, that the class to which he belonged, and in which he held a preeminent rank, acquired a reputation at that time unexampled, for their ardor in the pursuit of literary and moral excellence, and for uniting with a manly independence of conduct, an honorable respect for the authority of College.

Mr. Frisbie was, at this time, remarkable for his attainments in classical learning, and for the taste and elegant fluency of language, which he displayed in rendering the Greek and Roman authors into English. His natural eloquence, indeed, early manifested itself, and added to his reputation as a scholar. He was truly respectable in every department of learning; and with his clear perception, discriminating judgment, and strong reasoning powers, he was capable of excelling in any of the sciences. But being richly endowed with imagination and sensibility, he was perhaps inclined to regard the works of the material world, to the beauty and grandeur of which he was so susceptible, rather as objects of taste, than as subjects of minute science. And in his estimate of the comparative importance of the different branches of knowledge, he appeared to place those, first in dignity and usefulness, which more immediately respect the mind, the means of moral and intellectual improvement, the social nature, duties and destination of man. In this preference, he concurred in opinion with the great British moralist, and exemplified in himself the truth of the sentiment, contained in the following passage from the Life of Milton. "The knowledge of external nature, and the sciences which that

knowledge requires or includes, are not the great or the frequent business of the human mind. Whether we provide for action or conversation, whether we wish to be useful or pleasing, the first requisite is the religious and moral knowledge of right and wrong; the next is an acquaintance with the history of mankind, and with those examples which may be said to embody truth, and to prove by events, the reasonableness of opinions. Prudence and justice are virtues and excellencies of all times and of all places; we are perpetually moralists, but we are geometricians only by chance."

Few, I believe, ever acquired clearer ideas on the subjects of knowledge here recommended, or were better provided for action or conversation, for giving pleasure or being useful, and for all the great purposes of life, than Mr. Frisbie. To become thus accomplished, appeared to his mind to be the highest object of education. That honor alone was dear to him, which follows genius and virtue, employed in promoting human happiness. Pursuing with ardor and diligence the studies in which he delighted, while he treated none with neglect, he succeeded in gratifying his honorable ambition, and qualifying himself to be a benefactor and ornament to society.

Mr. Frisbie was determined to devote himself to the study of the law, and had his health allowed him to pursue a profession, for which he was so eminently fitted by his talents and education, he might have looked forward with confidence to the highest rewards of distinguished excellence. The first year after leaving college, he passed in the town of Concord, where he sustained the same high character he had already manifested. I have heard the most respectable individuals of that place bear testimony to the purity of his moral principles, and to the enlightening influence of his conversation and example. But the most particular information respecting Mr. Frisbie, during this period, I derived from one of his friends, residing in Concord at the time, capable of fully appreciating his excellence of mind and heart, and who listened to his conversation with all the interest which a similarity of taste inspires. His mind often took a delightful range in the regions of literature, taste, morals, and theology; and he appears to have been alike judicious in the topics he selected and in his observations and reflections, all tending to moral or intellectual improvement. When it is considered that he was not yet twenty years old, this is no ordinary praise. A single reflection subjoined to some slight notices of Mr. Frisbie's conversation,

by the intelligent friend whom I have mentioned, show the deep impression, which he made upon the minds and hearts of those who best knew him at this time. It appears so just, that I will not withhold it from you. "August 1803. When I reflect on his youth, I am struck with astonishment at the knowledge he has acquired, at the maturity of his judgment, and the strength and perspicuity of his reasoning, at the purity and stability of his principles, at the grandeur, beauty, and excellence of his whole character. Beholding him, I cannot suppress an apprehension that he is not destined to remain long on earth. He appears to have been lent to our admiring view a short time, to serve as an example of piety without ostentation or enthusiasm, pure morality without self-sufficiency, and talents without vanity."

From Concord Mr. Frisbie went to pursue his legal studies at his native village, Ipswich. These, you know, he was compelled to relinquish, on account of the distressing state of his eyes. This was a severe trial to him, but he sustained it as became his christian faith. The most inviting prospect of usefulness, that now opened to him, was presented by his appointment to an office in the instruction and government of the University. His friends rejoiced in his acceptance of it; for

they believed him to be peculiarly fitted for such a station. Nor did he fail to fulfil their expectations; although from the painful weakness of his eyes, which sometimes could not endure the light of day, he often failed to satisfy himself. I need not speak to you of his integrity and faithfulness in the discharge of his various duties, and his enlightened zeal in studying to promote the true objects of education, and the solid interests of the College; nor need I speak of the confidence which the friends of learning and religion always felt, that his whole influence upon the University would be in aid of just views of education and discipline, and of correct principles, sobriety of manners, and christian morals.

During Mr. Frisbie's last sickness, which obliged him for so long a time to discontinue his College duties, I was favored with frequent visits from him, and saw him under circumstances the most interesting and impressive. There was every thing in his situation to bind his warm and generous affections to life; domestic happiness, admiring friends, duties in which he delighted, and the animating hope of promoting, by the performance of these duties, the advancement of moral truth and pure religion. At the same time, he felt with the deepest sensibility his accountableness to God. His

standard of christian purity was high, and his religious feelings, which penetrated his whole soul, had been tinged in early life with the gloom of Calvinism. It is not surprising, therefore, if in certain moments of depression, the prospect of death should have been awful to him. In conversing on the subject, he once expressed to me, in very strong terms, his dread of death; and said, that he considered it as the effect of his early religious associations, adding, that although these associations had long been opposed by the clearest convictions of his reason; yet he could not wholly avoid their influence on his mind. He then spoke particularly of the happiness of one of his friends, in always having cheerful and consoling views of religion and a future state. But in my last visit to him, the week before he died, I was unspeakably gratified to find, that he enjoyed the same happiness in the highest degree. Immediately upon receiving me, he said, "You know what a dread of death I have had—I can now not only view it with coolness, but the prospect of the future world is delightful to me." His mind never appeared more clear and tranquil than it did, while he proceeded to speak of the world that was opening to him; and he spoke with an energy and sublimity of feeling peculiar to himself, and which no time can weaken in my memory.

Those who knew Mr. Frisbie in the intimacy of friendship, find it most difficult to speak of him as a friend. He has left an image of himself in their hearts, which no language can paint to others. His rich powers in conversation will be remembered by all who shared in any degree his confidence. But he was no less remarkable for the delicacy and propriety with which he exercised those powers, than for the fertility of his mind, in the resources of argument and illustration, and the liberality with which he poured out his intellectual treasures to his friends. With genius and eloquence, that might have made him conspicuous in any assembly of men, he was wholly free from the vanity of displaying his powers, or the habit of engrossing attention to himself. There was a peculiar distinctness and pertinency of thought in his conversation. His mind never soared above the occasion, or object of discourse. Even to children he was scarcely less interesting than to his equals in age. His countenance never beamed with more benignant kindness than when he was engaging their minds on subjects adapted to their years. He was a perpetual instructer in their presence, and he was often heard to remark, that if he had children to educate, he should do it principally in the way of familiar conversation with them. In the society of

his friends, he was not only a strict observer of the equal laws of social converse, but he was remarkable for his skill in drawing them into interesting discussions, and eliciting their best thoughts on any subject. While they felt a perfect freedom in his presence, and were led by his own frankness and confiding disposition, to the most unreserved disclosure of their sentiments, there was every thing in him to inspire respect and excite them to mental exertion. Hence, together with the pleasure which his society and conversation directly afforded, they felt a satisfaction with themselves, which became associated with the remembrance of him, and served constantly to enhance the value of his friendship. The power of producing such a perfect union of intimacy and respect, with the influence attending it, was probably that which most distinguished him in the hearts of his friends. Associated as every thing amiable and excellent was in the idea of his character, his mere presence was delightful to them; the very thought of him aided their motives to piety and virtue. He fully illustrated the just remark of the Roman moralist; Occursus ipse sapientium juvat; et est aliquid, quod ex magno viro, vel *tacente*, proficias.

Unlike most men of superior talents, Mr. Frisbie seemed always to rise in real greatness, the

more closely he was seen; while the softer traits of his character, instead of being obscured by his genius, derived only additional richness from it. He was finely gifted for all the offices of mutual kindness and sympathy, and there was a peculiar charm in the interchange of such offices with him. No man ever performed them with more grateful sensibility. For all the charities of our nature his heart was tenderly alive. You need not be told of his filial piety; you have witnessed the purity and ardor of his affections in the dearest domestic relations. I have known him most in the family of a friend; and here I have known him in health and prosperity, and in sickness and sorrow, as the soother of affliction and as the object of sympathy, in all circumstances deepening the impression of his virtues, with every view of his character.

The pervading influence of such an example as Mr. Frisbie exhibited through life, is indeed of incalculable value. All that now remains to us, is to cherish the recollection of it ourselves, and impress it upon others.

ADDRESS

DELIVERED BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY IN CAMBRIDGE,

AT THE INTERMENT OF

Professor Frisbie.

JULY XII. MDCCCXXII.

[BY THE EDITOR.]

THE relations between man and man cease not with life. The dead leave behind them their memory, their example, and the effects of their actions. Their influence still abides with us. Their names and characters dwell in our thoughts and hearts. We live and commune with them in their writings. We enjoy the benefit of their labors. Our institutions have been founded by them. We are surrounded by the works of the dead. Our knowledge and our arts are the fruit of their toil. Our minds have been formed by their instructions. We are most intimately connected with them by a thousand dependencies. Those whom we have loved in life are still objects of our deepest and holiest affections. Their power over us remains.

They are with us in our solitary walks; and their voices speak to our hearts in the silence of midnight. Their image is impressed upon our dearest recollections, and our most sacred hopes. They form an essential part of our treasure laid in heaven. For above all, we are separated from them but for a little time. We are soon to be united with them. If we follow in the path of those whom we have loved, we too shall soon join the innumerable company of the spirits of just men made perfect. Our affections and our hopes are not buried in the dust, to which we commit the poor remains of mortality. The blessed retain their remembrance and their love for us in heaven; and we will cherish our remembrance and our love for them while on earth.

Creatures of imitation and sympathy as we are, we look around us for support and countenance even in our virtues. We recur for them most securely to the examples of the dead. There is a degree of insecurity and uncertainty about living worth. The stamp has not yet been put upon it, which precludes all change, and seals it as a just object of admiration for future times. There is no service which a man of commanding intellect can render his fellow creatures, better than that of leaving behind him an unspotted example. If he do

not confer upon them this benefit; if he leave a character, dark with vices in the sight of God, but dazzling with shining qualities to the view of men; it may be that all his other services had better have been forborne, and he had passed inactive and unnoticed through life. It is a dictate of wisdom, therefore, as well as feeling, when a man eminent for his virtues and talents has been taken away, to collect the riches of his goodness, and add them to the treasury of human improvement. The true Christian *liveth not for himself, and dieth not for himself;* and it is thus, in one respect, that he dieth not for himself.

We have come together for the purpose of such recollections. We have come together to give each other the consolation and support of our sympathy. We have come to be made better by the considerations, which an event the most solemn, and of general and deep concern to us all, and to many more beside us, presses upon our minds. We have come together to pay, certainly not the last tribute, but the first, to the memory of one, whose remembrance will never pass away from the hearts of those who have loved him. We have come to recollect those virtues, which are now lost to us, but which are safe in the keeping of God.

I cannot venture, if I would, to excite your feelings, for I must repress my own, as I can. But there is no danger that you will not hear me with sufficient interest. The grave is just about to close upon all that now remains in this world of one, whose genius was as rich, whose heart was as warm, whose virtue was as firm, whose understanding was as clear and vigorous, as we may ever hope, in the intercourse of life, to find thus united again. There is an eloquence in the dumb show that surrounds us, to which all words are weak.

The last recollections, which are left upon my mind of him whom we have lost, are of his expressions of deep religious feeling, and of those strong but humble hopes, which are now changed into certainty. These recollections connect themselves at once with all that I know of his character and life.

He was a religious man, in the high and true sense of the words; and to say that one is truly a religious man, is to say, that he comprehends and feels those relations by which, and by which alone, our nature is ennobled; that all which is most glorious and exalting in our conceptions of infinity and eternity has become to him a matter of habitual belief; that he knows himself to be the creature of God, holding a rank in the universe, immeasurably higher

than what the mere man of this world can imagine; and that he is under the uniform control of expectations and motives, the tendency of which is to raise him above all vulgar and selfish feelings, and to invigorate all that are pure and generous. The religion of him whom we mourn, was not of that spurious kind, which borrows its heat from the meaner passions. They furnished no fuel for its support. It burnt clear and steadily upon the altar of his heart, and the temple within was filled with its fragrance. His religion was the controlling principle of his life. It manifested itself, as it always does, when it thoroughly pervades and forms the character, not in artificial exhibitions for the view of men, not unseasonably and impertinently, but by that natural recurrence to its motives and sanctions, which appears, whenever the occasion demands it, in the conduct and conversation of a sincere and rational Christian. He had studied the evidences of our religion, with a very acute and clear mind, whose natural tendency, from his high integrity, and from his dread of all unfairness, was to admit objections and difficulties in at least their full strength; and there is no one whose faith is more firm than his was. He perceived the force of its external proofs; he understood its infinite value; he felt the divinity of its charac-

ter; he made it the foundation of his hopes. His views of religion were very serious; and he was earnest that it should always be presented to men as incomparably their most solemn consideration. The feelings of no one could be more abhorrent from all levity and indifference upon this subject; and from regarding it under a mere worldly aspect.

If those who knew him best, were called upon to mention any virtue by which he was particularly distinguished, I believe they would unite in naming INTEGRITY. He was a man, who, if ever any one could, might have told the world his purposes, and have risen in their respect. If you were to determine, whether he would pursue any particular course of conduct, or aim at any particular object, you had only to determine whether he would think that object right, and that course of conduct his duty; and you were sure that no selfish or mean passion, and no sinister purpose, would interfere to lead insensibly his judgment astray. You knew and felt that you could rely in perfect security upon his truth, sincerity, and openness. There were no false appearances about him. He had nothing of that disguise and cunning, which are sometimes mistaken for policy. His conduct lay before you in broad daylight; and you never

were at a loss for his motives, and you never perceived any but what were honorable. I know the force of the language I am using. It is the last occasion on which I should suffer myself to indulge in idle and unfounded praise. It is an occasion far too solemn and painful. I will speak of him with the truth which he loved. If it were possible I should not, his image, which is continually recurring to my mind, would bring admonition and shame along with it.

His notions of right and wrong were founded upon the laws of religion and of God, and not upon the maxims of the world. He compared his actions not with the opinions and sentiments of the day, but with the eternal principles of morality. He was not a harsh censor of men; he was ready to perceive what might be pleaded in excuse for their follies, and errors, and imperfections; but he never treated vices with levity. There is a passage of Tacitus, to which I have heard him repeatedly allude with strong approbation; and his reference to it shows the character of his own moral sentiments. It is where that historian, speaking of the manners of the Germans, says, that 'no one among them laughs at vices, nor is corrupting and being corrupted called the way of the world.' Nemo illic vitia *ridet*, nec corrumpere et corrumpi sæculum vocatur.

He was a public man. His life was spent in public services, and he was interested in every thing, by which the public welfare could be promoted. Natural weakness of constitution, and disease, as you know, affecting his eyes, and almost depriving him of their use for the purposes of study, opposed a constant obstacle to his efforts to do good, which it required more than common resolution to overcome. But he did overcome it. He made the best use of all the high intellectual powers which God had given him, and of all the bodily faculties which God, in his providence, permitted him to retain. He was a most faithful and valuable officer of this University. No one has contributed more to its respectability and usefulness. No one had juster views of the proper objects of such an institution, or of the means by which they are to be attained. No one could be more solicitous, that it should be distinguished for religion and good morals, as well as for its literary character. For the office which he formerly held, that of Professor of the Latin language, he was peculiarly fitted by his fine taste, and by his just discrimination of the meaning and force of language, the result of accurate thinking. For the duties which he last performed, as instructer in Moral Philosophy, he was equally qualified by his

activity of mind, by his distinctness of thought, by his clearness of expression, by his metaphysical acuteness under the direction of strong good sense, and above all, by the delicacy and purity of his moral principles and feelings. But it was not only in the performance of his professional duties that he served the University; he rendered it as essential a service by the example of his life, by the pervading influence of his correctness of thought and sentiment, and by giving the whole weight of a character, which none could know without respecting, to the advancement of moral and intellectual excellence. This is an indefinite service, of which it is not easy to estimate the exceeding value.

As a writer, from the physical causes to which I have before alluded, he gave to the world but few proofs and memorials of his fine genius. You are well acquainted with the manner, in which these have been estimated by all to whom they have become known. I will not now dwell upon the condensation of thought, and the beauty and richness of imagery, which they exhibit. They are marked by another characteristic, in the consciousness of which he would himself have felt far deeper pleasure. It is by their truth of sentiment, and high moral feeling. Such is the

unnatural love of every sort of excitement, which prevails among a portion of readers at the present day, that it appears to be sometimes forgotten, that the moral character of writings is a matter of consideration. But moral perfection is the highest object of a correct taste; and the true and complete exhibition of it in writing is scarcely less difficult than its practice in life. There is nothing false in that splendid revelation of ancient philosophy, that perfect goodness and perfect beauty are the same. It is not the work of a common intellect or vulgar taste, to diffuse over its writings the holy charm of moral loveliness. It is the result of a union between genius and virtue. There are hundreds of authors yet borne up by popular fame, whose minds were of far too low an order, to be conversant with those sentiments and principles which are the living springs of beauty. There are too, at the present day, as there probably always have been, many writers and many readers, who seem to think that correctness of sentiment is of little importance, provided the expression be happily turned or highly colored. Thus it is, that a great deal passes for fine writing, which has very little claim to the character, since truth and goodness are essential requisites to excellence, and the first demands of a cultivated taste and enlightened judgment. In

whatever was written by him whom we have lost, they were found united. His writings corresponded to his life. They reflected, as in a clear mirror, his heart and his understanding.

I have thus given, faintly and imperfectly, some sketch of the character of him whose loss we deplore. When such men are taken from us, we are made to feel the instability of life, and the insecurity of the tenure by which we hold its dearest blessings. But this feeling will be of little value, if it do not lead us to look beyond this world, and if it be not thus connected with a strong sense of the proper business of life, to prepare ourselves for happiness in that world, where there shall be no change but from glory to glory. It will be in vain for us to contemplate such a character as we have been regarding, if we do not feel that its foundation was in that religion, which teaches every one of us to regard himself as created by God, to be *an image of his own eternity.* It will be in vain for us to stand by the open grave of departed worth, if no earthly passion grows cool, and no holy purpose gains strength.

We are liable in this world to continual delusion; to a most extravagant overestimate of the value of its objects. With respect to many of our cares and pursuits, the sentiment expressed in the

words of David, must have borne with all its truth and force upon the mind of every considerate man, in some moments at least of serious reflection: *Surely every one walketh in a vain show*; *surely they are disquieted in vain.* The events of the next month or the next year, often assume in our eyes a most disproportionate importance; and almost exclude from our view all the other infinite variety of concerns and changes, which are to follow in the course of an immortal existence. The whole happiness of our being seems sometimes to be at stake upon the success of a plan, which, when we have grown but a little older, we may regard with indifference. These are subjects on which reason, too commonly, speaks to us in vain. But there is one lesson, that God sometimes gives us, which brings the truth home to our hearts. There is an admonition, which addresses itself directly to our feelings, and before which they bow in humility and tears. We can hardly watch the gradual decay of a man eminent for virtue and talents, and hear him uttering, with a voice that will soon be heard no more, the last expressions of piety and holy hope, without feeling that the delusions of life are losing their power over our minds. Its true purposes begin to appear to us in their proper distinctness. We are accompanying one who is about to take his leave

of present objects; to whom the things of this life merely are no longer of any interest or value. The eye, which is still turned to us with kindness, will, in a few days, be closed forever. The hand by which ours is still pressed, will be motionless. The affections which are still warm and vivid;—they will not perish; but we shall know nothing of their exercise. We shall be cut off from all expression and return of sympathy. He whom we love is taking leave of us for an undefined period of absence. We are placed with him on the verge between this world and the eternity into which he is entering; we look before us; and the objects of the latter rise to view, in all their vast and solemn magnificence.

There is, I well know, an anguish which may preclude this calmness of reflection and hope. Our resolution may be prostrated to the earth; for he on whom we were accustomed to rely for strength and support has been taken away. We return to the world, and there is bitterness in all it presents us; for every thing bears impressed upon it a remembrance of what we have lost. It has one, and but one, miserable consolation to offer:

"That anguish will be wearied down, I know.
What pang is permanent with man? From th' highest,
As from the vilest thing of every day,

He learns to wean himself. For the strong hours
Conquer him."

It is a consolation, which, offered in this naked and offensive form, we instinctively reject. Our recollections and our sorrows, blended as they are together, are far too dear to be parted with upon such terms. But God giveth not as the world giveth. There is a peace which comes from him, and brings healing to the heart. His religion would not have us forget, but cherish, our affections for the dead; for it makes known to us, that these affections shall be immortal. It gradually takes away the bitterness of our recollections, and changes them into glorious hopes; for it teaches us to regard the friend who is with us no longer, not as one whom we have lost on earth, but as one whom we shall meet, as an angel, in heaven.

OBITUARY NOTICE,

EXTRACTED FROM THE BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER OF JULY 13, 1822.

[WRITTEN BY PROFESSOR FARRAR.]

The interests of literature and religion have sustained a loss in the death of Mr. Frisbie, fully known only to those who were particularly acquainted with him. He sought retirement, and avoided those occasions, by which uncommon endowments are ordinarily brought into public estimation. It is difficult to speak of his powers and attainments, without seeming extravagant to those who had not the opportunity of judging for themselves. But there is no apprehension of a want of sympathy from any who have seen him intimately. To his classmates, to his associates in office, to his pupils, to all whose lot it has been to fall within the circle of his familiar walks, the appeal is made with confidence. To these, in a greater or less degree, but more especially to such as were favored with his confidence and affection, the treasures of his mind were poured

forth with a richness and abundance that have been rarely equalled. It was not in maintaining striking paradoxes, in a useless display of argument and eloquence, that his talents were exerted. Truth and virtue were always held sacred; and nothing was so sure to feel the severity of his rebuke, as a departure from either. Disputed questions in theology, morals, and metaphysics, the peculiar merits and defects of recent publications, were among his favorite topics. On these it was his delight, not to harangue to those around him, but converse with them, to excite a disposition to join in a free and unreserved interchange of thought; and many have found themselves drawn unawares into a discussion by the novel and interesting views presented to them.

He endeavoured always to give a philosophical turn to whatever subject came before him, and although his mind was full of resources for maintaining and enforcing a cause which he chose to espouse, he habitually regarded the splendid schemes and hypotheses of inventive genius with distrust, and was inclined to pay great respect to the sober judgment of the uneducated, and to what may be called the philosophy of common sense. He possessed uncommon acuteness and discrimination, and would sometimes appear to speculate with

great freedom; but he was cautious and guarded in an uncommon degree, as to what he himself adopted. He ventured to depart from the prevailing sentiments of the learned on some speculative points of intellectual and moral philosophy. Among the improvements which are considered as doing so much honor to Brown, his pupils will recognize doctrines which he has long maintained with great ingenuity and eloquence.

Besides an originality and justness in his views and speculations, there was a clearness and lucid order in the arrangement of his thoughts, even on the most abstruse and difficult subjects, which he seldom failed to impart to his hearers, while at the same time he fixed their attention by the energy of his manner, the copiousness and propriety of his language, the fertility and aptness of his illustrations.

On account of weakness of sight he was obliged to depend on others for his knowledge of books. Still his knowledge was various and accurate.— Beside the subjects more immediately connected with his profession, he was familiar with English literature, especially with the more recent authors. He was particularly fond of the best works of fiction, and had a high opinion of their utility. But he carefully distinguished between those that

maintain a pure and elevated morality, and such as are designed merely to amuse an idle fancy. His pointed reprobation of corrupt sentiments united with poetry of whatever excellence, his high but qualified praise of Miss Edgeworth, as expressed in his Inaugural Address, are, we doubt not, fresh in the recollection of many who heard him, on that occasion, for the first and only time.

Mr. Frisbie's decided belief in the truth of the christian religion was not the result of education. He had read and thought much on its evidences and its doctrines. He took a lively interest in the theological discussions of the day, and made up his mind upon controverted points, with great candor and deliberation, and was exerting the happiest influence in the theological school, in which he took an important part.

He was, moreover, a practical, as well as a theoretical Christian. This was manifest from his uniform sobriety of mind and conduct, his inflexible integrity, his purity, sincerity, and conscientiousness, in all the relations he sustained, his fidelity in his public duties, his observance of the christian ordinances, and respect for all the institutions of religion. It was particularly conspicuous in his last sickness. Few have had brighter prospects to resign. He was surrounded with

friends in whom he took the greatest delight. He had but just entered upon the ripe period of manhood. He held an office peculiarly suited to his taste and talents, and of great importance to the cause of truth and virtue, which he filled with distinguished honor to himself and benefit to the community. He resigned all, and resigned all cheerfully. He bowed in quiet and calm submission to the will of God, with a firm hope, through his mercy in Jesus Christ, of a better inheritance in another world.

WRITINGS

OF

PROFESSOR FRISBIE.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS,

DELIVERED UPON

THE AUTHOR'S INDUCTION

INTO THE OFFICE OF

PROFESSOR OF NATURAL RELIGION, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, AND CIVIL POLITY, IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY;

NOVEMBER 5, 1817.

It is well known, that the topics, which fall within the province of this Professorship, are not now for the first time made a part of the instruction in this University. They have always, in connexion with the philosophy of the mind, received their due portion of attention. But the liberality of Mr. Alford has at length enabled the Corporation to divide studies, heretofore united in a single department; a measure which the increased number of our students seems at this time peculiarly to require. Leaving therefore the science of our intellectual nature, a science the most subtile and profound, and which lays the foundation of our speculations in taste as well as morals, to the talents and researches of an experienced and tried Professor, they have assigned natural religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity to a distinct instructer. On this occasion, which intro-

duces that instructer to his office, he has thought that some remarks upon *the necessity*, *the objects*, and *influence* of moral philosophy would not be uninteresting or unappropriate.

Moral philosophy, in strict propriety, is the science of the principles and obligation of duty; but in the observations I may now make, I shall have reference also to all those studies and inquiries, which have for their object the knowledge and improvement of the moral condition of man.

The doctrine of a moral sense has furnished the first objection to the necessity of moral science. It has often been said, the heart is the best casuist, and its natural promptings the safest guides in duty. But in respect to this objection it must be carefully remembered, that we are not to form our estimate of the value of natural conscience from the prevalent opinions of civilized and christian countries. The moral sense of the most unlearned at the present day is not the sense of nature, but of cultivation; it has been modified by the studies and experience of ages, and above all, by the christian religion. It is not denied, that we have from nature a moral as well as an intellectual capacity; but the former, no less than the latter, is to be improved and enlarged by observation and thought. Many duties arise from relations, which are complicated and remote;

these relations must be investigated and brought together, and general principles, which may be settled into rules, deduced from them. The necessity of this is sufficiently shown by the different and contradictory maxims of duty, that have prevailed in different ages and nations. Were, however, the original suggestions of uncultivated conscience far clearer and more decisive than experience will allow us to believe, still the necessity of philosophy would not be superseded. The unremitted labors of the moralist would notwithstanding be required, to relieve the sentiments of mankind from those associations of prejudice, of fashion, and of false opinion, which have so constant an influence in perverting the judgment and corrupting the heart, and to bring them back to the unbiassed dictates of nature and common sense. Besides, the moral constitution of man, his relations, and duties, are subjects too interesting, and too fruitful of remark, to be neglected in the speculations of the ingenious and inquiring. Erroneous theories will be formed, nay they will be presented to mankind as the rule of life, and even history and fiction be made vehicles of principles, dangerous alike to virtue and to peace. While indeed these speculations of false philosophy are wrapped in metaphysical subtilties, they may excite little

alarm, and serve rather to amuse the learned; they are those eccentrick lightnings, that play harmlessly in the evening cloud; but when they are made the maxims of common life, or embodied in popular fiction, find their way into the hearts of men, they are these same lightnings concentrated and brought down to earth, blasting and consuming. The safety of society then requires, that such systems be subjected to the jealous scrutiny of a sound philosophy, and that there be men, whose habits and studies will lead them to a rigid superintendence of whatever is proposed;—to give authority to truth, and to detect and expose what is only specious and insinuating. If our moral being could be left, as it came from the hands of its Creator, to the simple and wholesome viands of nature, if it breathed only the pure atmosphere of truth, it might perhaps preserve the soundness of health, and the ingenuous suffusions of virtue; but pampered, as it is, with false philosophy and factitious sentiment, the antidote should grow with the poison. There will always be a Hobbes, a Rousseau or a Godwin; let us then have also our Cudworths, our Butlers, and our Stewarts.

As a second objection to moral science, it has been asked, do not the Scriptures furnish a perfect rule of right? God hath given us the Bible, and

what more do we need to guide us to happiness and to heaven? I answer, the proper exercise, in the use of this gift, of those powers, which, no less than the Bible itself, we have received from his hands. The morality of the Scriptures is preceptive and not theoretick; it enjoins dispositions, without showing their relative subordination, or specifying the actions that flow from them; it commands duties, but does not teach principles; nor was it possible, that its precepts, however numerous, should extend to all the variety of daily occurring cases. It is necessary for the christian to analyse the moral rules of his religion, to trace them to their principles, and again from these principles to deduce new rules, and by a knowledge of the reason of each, understand its ever varying accommodation to varying circumstances. Through a neglect of these considerations, what enormities have not been perpetrated by men with the Bible in their hands, from a wrong application of its precepts and examples? It is in this, as in the science of law; innumerable as are the provisions of statutes and cases, still that counsellor would be ill prepared to advise his client, who had not learned to distinguish the principle from the facts, and thus to judge how far the former might be affected by the minutest change in the latter. There is a legal mind, a law logick,

more important to the professor, than a knowledge of all the precedents in all the books without it.

But while we maintain, that revelation does not supersede the necessity of philosophy, lest we should be misunderstood, it may be proper that we notice more particularly than the subject might seem to require, the unspeakable importance of the aids it affords to the christian moralist, and the strong light it throws over the region of his inquiries.

The Bible has taught us the being and attributes of God with a clearness and certainty, to which nature had made but the feeblest approaches; while at the same time, particularly in the New Testament, it gives many plain rules in almost every branch of duty. From what a maze of paradox and doubt, in which heathen philosophers were continually bewildered and perplexed, are we now extricated by a few simple and sublime truths? Accordingly, we can scarcely read a page of a christian moralist, but we find him limiting, controlling, or supporting principles, by appeals to the acknowledged doctrines of revealed theology; while the practical rules are so many beacons along the road to mark his course, and light him on his way. To investigate the principle of an admitted rule is much easier, and followed by conclusions

far more satisfactory, than when the principle and the rule are both to be discovered. And when we proceed still further, to trace out new principles and deduce new rules, our inquiries are guided, and our conclusions tried, by truths already known. The parts supplied must be suited to those we possess; as our theories involve consequences, that contradict or harmonize with the plain maxims of the gospel, we know them to be false, or may presume them to be true.

In conformity with these remarks, how different has been the practical application of the same theories, as they have been followed out into their consequences by sceptical or christian moralists. The systems of Godwin and Paley are both founded on the same general principle of utility. This principle leads the author of the Political Justice to consequences, that would sever not only the ties of intimate affection, but the very bonds of social order. These consequences, he who admits the principle, may find it difficult to avoid; yet the Archdeacon of Carlisle, guided and controled by the doctrines of the Bible, connected it with rules of conduct consistent with the truest reason and purest virtue. Mr. Hume, aware of the cause of such differences, has lamented the unnatural alliance, which in modern times has united theology

with morals; but he who well considers the exact coincidence of the instructions of Jesus Christ with the deepest principles of our nature, and the soundest deductions of philosophy, will find reasons, hardly less impressive, than the miracles themselves, for believing that he was a teacher sent from God, and knew what was in man.

It is in the inducements even more than the rules of duty, that ancient ethics are deficient. A future state of righteous retribution alone furnishes those sanctions, which can give efficacy to the motives or confidence to the hopes of virtue. How indistinct and unsettled were the notions, and how wavering the belief of the wisest heathen sages upon this subject, is well known to every classical scholar. In the Offices of Cicero, the purest and most complete of the ancient compendiums of duty, and which, more than any other of his philosophical writings, displays the man rather than the academician, the anxious father can find no higher obligation to virtue, to urge upon his son, than the sentiment of his own conscious mind. But what to him was scarcely hope, to us is confidence. Life and immortality are brought to light in the Gospel.

The *objects of moral science* are implied in what we have said of its *necessity*. They are to

preserve from neglect or perversion the knowledge we already possess, to enlarge its boundaries, and strengthen its foundations, by new or clearer views of the nature and relations of man, and above all, to give it a practical influence upon the character and prospects of society. That the rules of duty should ever be made so simple or so particular, as in no case to be mistaken, is not to be expected, perhaps not to be desired; since much of our discipline consists in our doubts. But moral knowledge cannot yet be supposed to have reached its limits. There are unexplored avenues before us, and gleams of light invite us onward. No theory of morals has as yet received a general, much less a universal assent; and of practical principles, how many are obscured by doubt, and embarrassed by objections? When does luxury become vice, and how far may we innocently use, what the many will abuse? Questions, like these, are of daily occurrence and momentous importance. The scrupulously conscientious may be safe, for they will forbear, when they are not certain they are right; but the multitude, only when they are not certain they are wrong.

In the relations of states, of rulers and subjects, the principles of morality and rules of conduct are still more indefinite and unsettled. That the law

of nations is but the extension of those maxims of equity and kindness, which should regulate the intercourse of individuals, till of late, seems, in practice at least, hardly to have been conceived. Expediency rather than right has been the great spring of political motion, and diplomacy but another name for intrigue and duplicity. The representative, in his seat, will advocate with his voice, and support with his vote, measures which the man, in the relations of private life, would blush to acknowledge. Nor is this want of just sensibility confined to the statesman; with the citizen, to defraud the public is too often but an achievement of ingenuity; and even the scholar in his closet, while he kindles with indignation at the injustice or cruelty of an individual, reads the aggressions and ravages of nations with hardly a sentiment, that they are crimes.

Here then is much to be done; and there is also somewhat to encourage exertion. On these subjects are not juster views beginning to make their way? Negotiations are professed to be conducted more in the honourable spirit of frankness and conciliation. The laws, if not the practice, of civilized war have been softened into comparative mildness. Questions of national interest are debated, and the measures of governments examined,

upon the broad basis of equity and truth, and statesmen compelled, if not to adopt, certainly to defend their plans of policy, not by reasons of state, but reasons of right. If all this be in pretence, more than in truth, still the necessity of hypocrisy is one proof of the existence of virtue. If the splendid pall be thrown over the bier, it is because men cannot bear the ghastliness of death.

But it is necessary to consider well, in what manner the objects we have mentioned are most successfully to be pursued. He who would advance the improvement of individuals and nations, must not be too exclusively occupied with metaphysical subtilties, and abstract reasonings. To distinguish the original laws of our nature from the judgments founded upon education, custom and habit, is the great difficulty, that meets us at every turn, and embarrasses every step of our moral inquiries. This difficulty can be surmounted only by a close attention to the phenomena of our active powers. The philosopher must investigate and teach the moral constitution of man, must study him in the infancy as well as the mature development of his faculties, and show by what motives, associations and influences, his character and conduct may be formed to the desired result. Thus alone will he be able to loosen the primitive principles of truth from what

is adventitious, and make a successful application of his discoveries to the interesting purpose of moral education. The grand outlines of duty are in a good degree known and admitted. There is the great road, which all allow to be the highway of virtue; but the thousand avenues, that lead to it, the thousand devious paths, that imperceptibly diverge from it, these are to be explored, their direction ascertained, and clearly pointed out. In doing this, it will be necessary to bring frequently into notice many truths, which are only assented to, or not contradicted, and to give them a prominent and palpable form; so that no one can violate or disregard them without being conscious himself and shewing to others, that he does so. These relate to a numerous class of actions, whose effects are rather indirect than immediate, and which yet have a most important influence, in giving a first impulse and direction to the thoughts, and a cast to the feelings. They do not so much indicate a settled depravity of motive, as an insensibility to the nicer shades of moral distinction, and an indifference to consequences, which are rather probable than certain. In such cases little compunction is felt, not merely because they are countenanced by publick opinion, but because the individual does not distinctly present to his own

mind truths, of which he is not however wholly unaware.

Having thus spoken of the *necessity* and *objects* of moral philosophy, we proceed to notice some circumstances of its *practical influence.* And here we would observe, that although knowledge is not virtue, yet to enlighten the conscience is in itself an important means of improving the heart. Wrong actions, even with a good intention, have an effect beyond the immediate evil they produce, dangerous to the virtue not only of the agent, but of others. He, who thinks persecution or cruelty, his duty, cannot practise them, without having his bad passions called forth, and his heart hardened. Every error in conduct, as well as speculation, carries him further from virtue and truth, and he is less likely, at each step, to act rightly or think correctly. Degrading prejudices or narrow views are sometimes so mingled with the best dispositions, that the natural tendencies of virtue are checked, its beauty tarnished, and influence perverted; while as the views are corrected and enlarged, its efforts are facilitated, its charms acknowledged, and its example commanding.

But is there not in these studies a direct tendency not merely to enlighten the conscience, but to form and cherish that moral sensibility, which is

at once the prompt inspirer and jealous guardian of virtue? The first influence of this kind, we shall notice, is upon those engaged in such inquiries. Truths which are frequently presented to the mind, can hardly fail, imperceptibly perhaps, to produce some effect upon it. But when these truths are the subjects of personal speculation, when their character, relations and practical consequences are the constant topics of study and interest, this effect must be greatly increased. A disposition to consider our own pursuits and discoveries as all important to society, and sometimes to make the most incongruous application of them, has often given just occasion to the wit of the satirist. The poem is well enough, said the mathematician; but I do not see, that it proves any thing. The chemist and physical philosopher are deeply interested in the application of their principles to the arts; and will not the same law of our nature operate in moral speculations? Can he rest at ease, whose conduct is constantly at variance with the principles he is laboring to establish, and the rules he is forming for others? Will he not rather, if he cannot suit his life to his theory, accomodate his theory to his life? Thus Rousseau substituted sentiment for virtue; and the profligacy of his manners was at once the cause and the effect

of the profligacy of his writings. I am unwilling to think that one can have the beauty of moral order, and the indications of moral design, constantly in view, without having his feelings touched and his heart made better. Can you breathe the pure mountain air, and not be refreshed? Can you walk forth amidst the beautiful and grand of the works of God, and feel no kindling of devotion?

If the effect, we have described, be natural, it cannot be confined to the philosopher alone; it will extend itself in his instructions and writings. The same views will be gradually applied in the formation of the dispositions and habits of children; they will become an important branch of liberal knowledge; and thus exert a control over the higher classes of society, over men of letters and the popular authors of the day.

This suggests to us another means of practical influence. Those compositions in poetry and prose, which constitute the literature of a nation, the essay, the drama, the novel, it cannot be doubted, have a most extensive and powerful operation upon the moral feelings and character of the age. The very business of the authors of such works is directly or indirectly with the heart. Even descriptions of natural scenery owe much of their beauty and interest to the moral associations they awaken.

In like manner fine turns of expression or thought often operate more by suggestion than enumeration. But when feelings and passions are directly described, or embodied in the hero and called forth by the incidents of a story, it is then, that the magic of fiction and poetry is complete, that they enter in and dwell in the secret chambers of the very soul, moulding it at will. In these moments of deep excitement, must not a bias be given to the character, and much be done to elevate and refine, or degrade and pollute, those sympathies and sentiments, which are the sources of much of our virtue and happiness, or our guilt and misery? The danger is that, in such cases, we do not discriminate the distinct action of associated causes. Even in what is presented to the senses, we are aware of the power of habitual combination. An object naturally disagreeable becomes beautiful, because we have often seen the sun shine or the dew sparkle upon it, or it has been grouped in a scene of peculiar interest. Thus the powers of fancy and of taste blend associations in the mind, which disguise the original nature of moral qualities. A liberal generosity, a disinterested self devotion, a powerful energy or deep sensibility of soul, a contempt of danger and death are often so connected in story with the most profligate principles and

manners, that the latter are excused and even sanctified by the former.* The impression, which so powerfully seizes all the sympathies, is one; and the ardent youth becomes almost ambitious of a character, he ought to abhor. So too sentiments, from which in their plain form delicacy would revolt, are insinuated with the charms of poetical imagery and expression; and even the coarseness of Fielding is probably less pernicious than the seducing refinement of writers like Moore; whose voluptuous sensibility steals upon the heart and corrupts its purity, as the moon-beams, in some climates, are believed to poison the substances, on which they fall.

But in no productions of modern genius is the reciprocal influence of morals and literature more distinctly seen, than in those of the author of Childe Harold. His character produced the poems, and it cannot be doubted, that his poems are adapted to produce such a character. His heroes speak a language, supplied not more by imagination, than consciousness. They are not those machines, that, by a contrivance of the artist, send forth a music of their own; but instruments, through which he breathes his very soul, in tones of agonized sensibility, that cannot but give a sympathetic impulse

* See note at the end of the address.

to those who hear. The desolate misanthrophy of his mind rises and throws its dark shade over his poetry, like one of his own ruined castles; we feel it to be sublime, but we forget, that it is a sublimity it cannot have, till it is abandoned by every thing, that is kind and peaceful and happy, and its halls are ready to become the haunts of outlaws and assassins. Nor are his more tender and affectionate passages those, to which we can yield ourselves without a feeling of uneasiness. It is not that we can here and there select a proposition formally false or pernicious; but that he leaves an impression unfavourable to a healthful state of thought and feeling, peculiarly dangerous to the finest minds and most susceptible hearts. They are the scene of a summer evening, where all is tender and beautiful and grand; but the damps of disease descend with the dews of heaven, and the pestilent vapours of night are breathed in with the fragrance and balm, and the delicate and fair are the surest victims of the exposure.

Although I have illustrated the moral influence of literature, principally from its mischiefs; yet it is obvious, if what I have said be just, it may be rendered no less powerful, as a means of good. Is it not true that within the last century a decided and important improvement in the moral character

of our literature has taken place; and, had Pope and Smollet written at the present day, would the former have published the imitations of Chaucer, or the latter the adventures of Pickle and Random? Genius cannot now sanctify impurity or want of principle; and our criticks and reviewers are exercising jurisdiction not only upon the literary but moral blemishes of the authors, that come before them. We notice with peculiar pleasure the sentence of just indignation, which the Edinburgh tribunal has pronounced upon Moore, Swift, Goethe, and in general the German sentimentalists. Indeed the fountains of literature into which an enemy has sometimes infused poison, naturally flow with refreshment and health. Cowper and Campbell have led the muses to repose in the bowers of religion and virtue; and Miss Edgeworth has so cautiously combined the features of her characters, that the predominant expression is ever what it should be; she has shown us, not vices ennobled by virtues, but virtues, degraded and perverted by their union with vices. The success of this lady has been great, but had she availed herself more of the motives and sentiments of religion, we think it would have been greater. She has stretched forth a powerful hand to the impotent in virtue; and had she added, with the apostle, in the name of Jesus

of Nazareth, we should almost have expected miracles from its touch.

The incorporating of religion with morality we mention in the last place, as a means of practical influence. Those we have hitherto noticed, have a more particular reference to the higher and intellectual classes; but this extends to every order in society. It is not the fountain, which plays only in the gardens of the palace, but the rain of heaven which descends alike upon the enclosures of the rich and the poor, and refreshes the meanest shrub, no less than the fairest flower. The sages of antiquity seem to have believed, that morality had nothing to do with religion; and Christians of the middle ages, that religion had nothing to do with morality; but, at the present day, we acknowledge how intimate and important is their connexion. It is not views of moral fitness, by which the minds of men are at first to be affected, but by connecting their duties with the feelings and motives, the hopes and fears of Christianity. Both are necessary, the latter to prompt and invigorate virtue, the former to give it the beauty of knowledge and taste. It is heat, that causes the germ to spring and flourish in the heart; but it is light, that imparts verdure to its foliage, and their hues to its flowers.

Thus I have spoken, not as I could have wished, but as I was able, of the necessity, the objects, and influence of the studies of the moralist. I am aware of objections to much that I have said, which I have omitted to notice, not because they are unimportant, but from want of time for their discussion. The idea of perfectibility has been considered as the dream of the visionary; but it does not follow, that because every thing is not to be hoped, therefore nothing is to be attempted. Man has certainly capacities of improvement, and he can feel a moral influence; his progress may be fluctuating and slow; but, from the application of judicious and unremitting efforts, will it not be certain? Commencing with those who labor to unfold the principles and ends of moral action, may it not be expected to descend, as we have said, through the higher and more intellectual classes of society, till it reaches and purifies and ennobles the great mass of mankind in the humblest walks of life; as the blood, flowing from the heart and distributed through the larger arteries, finds its way at length into the capillary and minuter vessels, where it is incorporated with the very substance of the body, giving health and vigour and beauty. Let us then close, by accommodating to our subject the words of Quintilian concerning eloquence,

"Nam est certe aliquid consummata virtus;* neque ad eam pervenire natura humani ingenii prohibet; quod si non contingat, altius tamen ibunt, qui ad summa nitentur."

NOTE.

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The great mischief, which I believe has arisen to the cause of morality from the source, I have mentioned, induces me to subjoin in a note some notice of an objection, which I am aware may be made to what I have said. It may be asked, are not such qualities found combined in real life; and is it not the legitimate province of fiction to represent all the variety of human characters, as experience has shewn them? To this I answer. If the combinations, I have censured, were in truth presented to us in our intercourse with society, still it would not be necessary for the purposes of interesting fiction, to give them to us heightened and coloured, as they often are, by all the powers of genius and fancy. The end of such compositions is to amuse and instruct. These ends may be attained, and the whole store of human feelings and passions, virtues and vices, exhibited in a manner the most impressive, without such a union, as to neutralize or change their just and proper character and effect. There

* Eloquentia.

are poisons in nature, and some too which might impart a new flavor and relish to food; yet who would, for this reason, mingle them in the viands, which he offers to his friend. The painter or poet, in his delineations of the scenes of nature, does not think himself obliged to copy those deformities, which would disfigure his piece and impair its effect. He may select and combine anew, and still be considered as faithful to his grand original, if it furnish all the elements of his picture. In like manner, the moral painter, while the features of his characters are such, as are not inconsistent in themselves, and may be easily conceived to be united in life, has all the truth which his object requires, and a variety of materials, sufficiently copious and powerful for the highest efforts of genius. But the supposed fact, on which the objection is grounded, does not appear to me supported by experience. If unprincipled or profligate men are sometimes found possessed of qualities, which, on a slight acquaintance, render them interesting and amiable, yet, on a more intimate knowledge, some secret meanness, some deep taint of selfishness, or coarseness of feeling, will generally be discovered, to tarnish all that seemed fair, to offend the taste, and separate from their sympathy and communion the truly virtuous and refined. Shakspeare is the acknowledged painter of nature; and although he is often vulgar and indecent, the fault of the age not less than of the man, I cannot now call to mind a single character, among the great variety he has drawn, whose tendency is, to render vice lovely, or virtue repulsive. Compare the

Iago of this poet with the Zanga of Young. In their general design there is a resemblance, but, while Iago is as hateful, as he is wicked, there is in Zanga a tenderness and elevation, which shed a splendor even upon a revenge the most malignant. Indeed, are not beings like Zanga or the Corsair creatures, not of nature, but of fancy; and do we not find, that, in fact, any one habit of mind or conduct, radically inconsistent with a principle of universal virtue, will at length pervert the whole man, and spread its polluting influence over whatever was originally great or excellent?

REMARKS ON TACITUS.

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BY MESSRS. WELLS AND LILLY.

An American edition of the works of Tacitus has, we think, a particular claim to the notice and patronage of all those, who profess to be the well wishers of our rising literature. We do not say this from a belief in any imagined superiority of the ancients over the moderns in genius or taste. We are willing to admit, that Latin and Greek are not every thing, nor even the principal thing; nay more, that there are many productions of the ancients, which are read, not for their intrinsic merit, but merely as necessary appendages to the character of a scholar. 'Non tantam habent speciem, quantam religionem;' and it is of little consequence, perhaps, how soon they lose even this. Nor do we place very high on the scale of mental worth those learned laborers, who have spent their lives, in settling disputed readings, or explaining doubtful passages, in a Greek or Roman classic. It is an employment, which has somewhat of the semblance of intellectual, without tasking the thoughts to that

severe work of inventing and combining, which so wears upon the nerves and exhausts the spirits.

After concessions so liberal, we may surely be permitted to express the opinion, that there are many and great advantages, to be derived from the study of the classics. It must be allowed, that even the commentators have not been without their use; they have often thrown much light upon history, as well as upon their author; and afforded great facilities to those, who would seek, with higher views, what is really valuable in the productions of Greece and Rome. At that early period of life, when the languages of these nations are usually learned, their study affords a useful discipline to the mind, which could not, perhaps, at that age, be so well derived from any other source. In discovering the meaning of a passage, there is not only a vigorous exercise of the powers of invention and comprehension; but in that grammatical analysis of each sentence, which is necessary for this purpose, a constant process of reasoning is carried on. By translation, a youth, while he acquires that copiousness of expression, so much insisted on by Quintilian, forms, at the same time, the habit of nicely discriminating the import of words, and perceiving their minutest shades of difference, and this much more from the dead, than living languages; because

their idiom and modes of combination vary more from our own. The importance of the early formation of this habit will be obvious to those, who consider, that language is not only the vehicle of our thoughts, when we impart them to others, but the very body, in which they appear to ourselves. We think in propositions, and in proportion to the propriety and definiteness of our words, will be those of our ideas. It is true, that during the period we have mentioned, many facts in geography, civil and even natural history, might be stored in the memory. But, not to mention that, especially with the children of the wealthy, there is time enough for all these; we hold it to be a maxim, that discipline, rather than knowledge, should be the object of education. We do not consider that youth as best taught, who has read or knows the most, but him, who carries into the world an understanding, formed successfully to grapple with whatever subject may be proposed, and most able, in whatever situation he may be placed, to think and act with sagacity, with truth and effect. The languages of the classics, once acquired, open to the maturer taste and judgment all the stores of ancient wisdom, poetry, and eloquence. Nor is it a slight knowledge of the character and manners of a people, their habits of thinking and feeling, their

progress in philosophy and morals, which may be obtained from the mere vocabulary and peculiar modes of expression, prevalent among them. To be convinced of this, we have but to recollect, how many ideas in intellectual and moral science, and even more, in the relations, duties, and endearments of domestic life, are, with their appropriate terms, common among us, which cannot be expressed in the language of the Romans.

But we have said enough to intimate to our readers, which was all we intended, with what aim, and to what extent, we think these studies should be pursued. It is time that we proceed to some remarks upon the style and character of the author before us.

The style of Tacitus we should not propose as a model for imitation; it has something perhaps of that affectation, into which the Latin writers, after the Augustan age, generally fell. Often abrupt and involved, and sometimes so elliptical, as to be obscure, it wants that natural ease and simplicity of construction, which we admire in Cicero and Livy. Sentences perhaps are not unfrequent, in which to readers, principally conversant with the writers of the era, we have mentioned, even the grammar may seem strained. But the style of Tacitus, although it wants simplicity of structure, has all that sim-

plicity, which depends upon the absence, of whatever is feeble, unmeaning, or unnecessary. He has, it is true, no formal figures, or studied comparisons; for this his feelings were too rapid; but he abounds in metaphors, the most bold and forcible. All inanimate nature beneath his touch lives and acts; 'terra,' says he 'horrida sylvis, paludibus fœda.' He seizes from resemblance every epithet, which can increase the depth and energy of his expressions; choosing for his purpose even more frequently analogies of effect, than of appearance; and thus employing those, which act not only indirectly through the imagination, but immediately upon the heart. There is in his style a vigor, which depends even more upon selection than combination; and thus he often concentrates in a single word or phrase an import, which no translation can convey. His very ellipses, when habit has accustomed us to their use, bring upon the mind a condensation of meaning, which fills, at once, all our powers of conception.

But it is not for his style, that we principally admire this author; his profound views of the human heart, his just development of the principles of action, his delicate touches of nature, his love of liberty and independence, and above all, the moral sensibility, which mingles, and incorporates

itself with all his descriptions, are qualities, which must ever render him a favorite with the friends of philosophy and of man.

Tacitus has been truly called the philosopher of historians; but his philosophy never arrays itself in the robe of the schools, or enters into a formal investigation of causes and motives. It seems to show itself here and there, in the course of his facts, involuntarily, and from its own fulness, by the manner of narration, by a single word, and sometimes a general observation. Events, in his hands, have a soul, which is constantly displaying its secret workings by the attitude, into which it throws the body, by a glance of the eye, or an expression of the face, and now and then a sudden utterance of its emotions. It is not the prince, the senator, or the plebeian, that he describes; it is always man, and the general principles of human nature; and this in their nicer and more evanescent, as well as their boldest and most definite expressions. If we were not afraid of giving too violent a shock to classical devotees, we should say, that, in the particulars we have mentioned, Tacitus in history is not unlike Miss Edgeworth in fiction. There are indeed many circumstances, unnecessary to be pointed out, in which they differ; but there is in both the same frequent interspersion in the narrative

of short remarks, which lay open a principle of human nature, the same concise development of character by discrimination and contrast, and the nice selection of some one trait, or apparently trifling circumstance of conduct, as a key to the whole; traits and circumstances, which, though none but a philosopher would have pointed out, find their way at once to every heart. But the historian has none of the playfulness, the humor and the mind at ease, which are seen in the novelist. He knew himself the register of facts, and facts too, in which he took the deepest interest. He records events, not as one curious in political relations, or revolutions in empires, but as marking the moral character and condition of the age; a character and condition, which he felt were exerting a direct and powerful influence upon himself, upon those whom he loved, and with whom he lived.

The moral sensibility of Tacitus is, we think, that particular circumstance, by which he so deeply engages his reader, and is perhaps distinguished from every other writer, in the same department of literature; and the scenes he was to describe peculiarly required this quality. His writings comprise a period, the most corrupt, within the annals of man. The reigns of the Neros and of many of

their successors seemed to have brought together the opposite vices of extreme barbarism and excessive luxury; the most ferocious cruelty and slavish submission; voluptuousness the most effeminate, and sensuality worse than brutal. Not only all the general charities of life, but the very ties of nature were annihilated by a selfishness, the most exclusively individual. The minions of power butchered the parent, and the child hurried, to thank the emperor for his goodness. The very fountains of abomination seemed to have been broken up, and to have poured over the face of society a deluge of pollution and crimes. How important then was it for posterity, that the records of such an era should be transmitted by one, in whose personal character there should be a redeeming virtue, who would himself feel and awaken in his readers that disgust and abhorrence, which such scenes ought to excite? Such a one was Tacitus. There is in his narrative a seriousness, approaching sometimes almost to melancholy, and sometimes bursting forth in expressions of virtuous indignation. He appears always to be aware of the general complexion of the subjects, of which he is treating; and even when extraordinary instances of independence and integrity now and then present themselves, you perceive, that his mind is secretly constrasting

them with those vices, with which his observation was habitually familiar. Thus in describing the pure and simple manners of the barbarous tribes of the north, you find him constantly bringing forward and dwelling upon those virtues, which were most strikingly opposed to the enormities of civilized Rome. He could not, like his contemporary Juvenal, treat these enormities with sneering and sarcasm. To be able to laugh at vice, he thought a symptom, that one had been touched at least by its pollution; or to use his own words, and illustrate, at once, both of the remarks, we have just made; speaking of the temperance and chastity of the Germans, he says, 'Nemo enim illic ridet vitia, nec corrumpere et corrumpi sæculum vocatur.' Therefore it is, that in reading Tacitus, our interest in events is heightened by a general sympathy with the writer, and, as in most instances, it is an excellence, when we lose the author in his story, so in this, it is no less an excellence, that we have him so frequently in our minds. It is not, that he obtrudes himself upon our notice, but that we involuntarily, though not unconsciously, see with his eyes, and feel with his feelings.

In estimating, however, the moral sentiment of this historian, we are not to judge him by the present standard, elevated and improved, as it is, by

Christianity. Tacitus undoubtedly felt the influence of great and prevalent errors. That war with barbarians was at all times just, and their territory and their persons the lawful prey of whatever nation could seize them, it is well known, had been always the practical maxim of the Greeks, as well as the Romans. Hence we are not to be surprised, that in various passages of his work, he does not express that abhorrence of many wars, in which his countrymen were engaged, which we might otherwise have expected from him. This apology must especially be borne in mind, as we read the life of Agricola. The invasion of Britain by the Romans was as truly a violation of the rights of justice and humanity, as that of Mexico and Peru by the Spaniards; and their leader little better in principle, than Cortes and Pizarro. Yet even here, full as was Tacitus of the glory of his father-in-law and of Rome, we have frequent indications of sensibility to the wrongs of the oppressed and plundered islanders. The well known speech of Calgacus breathes all the author's love of liberty and virtue, and exhibits the simple virtues, the generous self-devotion of the Caledonians, in their last struggle for independence, in powerful contrast with the vices and ambition of their cruel and rapacious invaders.

We have mentioned what appear to us the most striking characteristics of the author before us. When compared with his great predecessor, he is no less excellent, but essentially different. Livy is only an historian, Tacitus is also a philosopher; the former gives you images, the latter impressions. In the narration of events, Livy produces his effect by completeness and exact particularity, Tacitus by selection and condensation; the one presents to you a panorama—you have the whole scene, with all its complicated movements and various appearances vividly before you; the other shews you the most prominent and remarkable groups, and compensates in depth, what he wants in minuteness. Livy hurries you into the midst of the battle, and leaves you to be borne along by its tide; Tacitus stands with you upon an eminence, where you have more tranquillity for distinct observation; or perhaps, when the armies have retired, walks with you over the field, points out to you the spot of each most interesting particular, and shares with you those solemn and profound emotions, which you have now the composure to feel.

If the remarks we have already made are true, it is obvious that an adequate idea of whatever is most remarkable in Tacitus, cannot be obtained from

translations. The language of this author is the language of poetry, the language of association and suggestion. This, although in many respects universal, is much modified, if not formed, by the habits of living and thinking, in which we have grown up. There may be a coincidence in the radical ideas of corresponding terms in different tongues; but in the innumerable trains of images and impressions, which cluster around them, which constitute their retinue of relatives and dependents, and indicate their rank and consequence, there must be the greatest variety. A word, which in one language is associated only with circumstances of dignity and interest, may have its corresponding word in another, connected with those of meanness and vulgarity.

These general remarks have a particular force, when applied to a diction, like that of Tacitus, full of metaphor and allusion. Besides, there is a life and freshness in an original, which is almost always lost in a translation. The general facts and ideas may be preserved, but deprived of all that gave them spirit and interest. Translation seems to throw a sort of winter over the page; there are the same trees, but they are stripped of their foliage; the same fields, but they have lost their verdure; the same streams, but they are frozen. Of the translations

of Tacitus, the only ones, with which we are acquainted, are those of Gordon and Murphy; and for ourselves we confess we prefer that of the former. It is very literal, and though antiquated and uncouth, often reminds us of the original. To the English reader we suppose the latter will be more acceptable. The style is easy and accommodated to our own idiom; but it is not Tacitus. Gordon is an old coin, rough cast indeed and rusty; but we can easily imagine it to resemble one of the emperors. Murphy is a modern imitation, polished and bright; but might as well be called a Louis, as a Cæsar.

We owe perhaps an apology to our readers, for entering, at this time, into the particular character of a work, so long a favorite with the learned. We have been induced to do it by an earnest desire, to cooperate with the liberal efforts of the publishers of the present edition, to encourage among us a taste for the best Latin classics. In adding the works of Tacitus to those of Cicero, they have greatly increased the obligation, which the friends of American literature already owed them. The editions of the historian of the Cæsars, most common in our libraries and book-stores, are the Edinburgh, and that of Oberlin; neither of them well suited to the character of our scholars. The former, entirely without notes, does not afford those

facilities, which are almost necessary, for understanding the author; while the latter is greatly enlarged in size, and consequently in expense, by a multiplicity of notes, the principal object of which is, to settle by argument and authorities the true reading of the text.

In the present edition, which is a republication of Oberlin's text, the editor has, very judiciously we think, omitted most of the critical notes, while he retains those, which are explanatory, adding many others of the same character, principally from Brotier. He has also inserted from Brotier the pedigree of the Cæsars, with short biographical notes to each name; containing in the whole nearly fifty pages, together with a very copious historical index. He has omitted the index latinitatis; because, we presume, it was thought to be rendered unnecessary by the explanations in the notes. We are thus furnished with an edition of Tacitus, which, while it offers to the student all the helps, he can desire, is without any of the voluminous appendages of, to us at least, unnecessary learning; and promises, so far as we can judge, to be more useful, than any with which we are at present acquainted. We repeat, that we think the public already much indebted to the talents, classical learning and taste of the editor of this work;

and we earnestly hope, the publishers will find in a liberal patronage, sufficient inducement to add, in due time, to those of Cicero and Tacitus, editions of Quintilian and Livy, and if possible all the best Latin classics, which will, beside their intrinsic merit, have, to every American, the strong recommendation, that they are our own.

EXAMINATION

OF

DR. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY

OF

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

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WHAT is that quality in actions, which is the object of moral approbation, and by what faculty of our minds do we become acquainted with this quality, are questions, which have long exercised the ingenuity of speculative men. One class of theorists informs us, that there is in certain actions a fitness, congruity, or intrinsic excellence, which, like truth, is discovered by the understanding, and of which the idea is simple, and of course not to be defined. Another tells us, that virtue is the tendency of actions to a certain end, and that this end is either directly or more remotely the happiness of the agent himself. By a third we are taught, that approbation is an agreeable feeling, and virtue the cause that excites it. Among the advocates of this last system are Dr. Hutchinson, Mr. Hume, and Dr. Smith. Dr. Hutchinson believed this feeling to be

specific, and assigned for its perception a distinct faculty, which he denominated the moral sense. Mr. Hume and Dr. Smith, while they agreed with Hutchinson in considering approbation as a feeling, denied the necessity of supposing an appropriate faculty for its perception;—the former of these philosophers referring the phenomena of approbation to the more general law, by which the perception of utility is agreeable to us, and the latter to sympathy. It is the theory of Dr. Smith, upon which we propose to offer some remarks to our readers.

Notwithstanding the intrinsic difficulties of the subject, and the uncommon ingenuity with which it is treated by Dr. Smith, his theory of moral sentiments has not, so far as we know, been formally examined by any writer; though it seems to have been adopted by none. Before, however, we enter upon this discussion, it may be useful to that portion of our readers, who are not much accustomed to speculations of this sort, to state, as clearly as we can, what the problem is, which is to be solved, and in what its difficulty consists.

In the contemplation of particular actions, the spectator is conscious of the sentiment of approbation; and the quality, which is the object or occasion of this sentiment, we denominate rectitude. But what is approbation, and what is rectitude?

When I taste a peach, I have an agreeable sensation; when I understand a mathematical proposition, I perceive a truth. To which of these facts is approbation analogous? I observe, for instance, the conduct of a just and benevolent man; I find feelings of approbation, love, esteem, springing up in my breast, and I affirm his actions to be right. Now do I exercise these feelings because I perceive the rectitude of his conduct, or do I judge his conduct to be right, because it gives me these feelings? But if it be said, that the object of approbation is the beneficial tendency of actions, or their conformity to the divine will, rather than their intrinsic nature; —this tendency or conformity to a rule is, indeed, discerned by the understanding; but the question still returns, why are they approved? Is it because the spectator perceives in them somewhat excellent in itself, or because they are directly agreeable to him; or has he learned to approve of the happiness of another by associating it in some way with his own, and of conformity to the divine will, by a reference to those sanctions of reward and punishment, which may affect himself? Thus, when we examine the foundation of our approbation of benevolence, the inquiry seems to result in one of these three principles: that benevolence is, by the constitution of our being, the ultimate cause of a

pleasing emotion; or that the understanding directly perceives in it somewhat excellent and right, which, like truth, recommends itself at once to an intelligent nature; or that all approbation is at last to be referred to the phenomena of self-love. To answer the inquiries which have been stated, is the design of a theory of morals.

Could we recollect every incident of our lives, from our birth to the present moment, so that we could exactly trace the formation or development of all the principles of our moral and intellectual being, the questions we have stated would involve no great difficulty. But we approve, long before we consider the nature or object of approbation. When we first turn our thoughts to the examination of these principles, they are in their maturity; they have grown up, mixed and modified and changed by a thousand impressions and associations; so that we can no longer, without great labor, distinguish what is native and original from what is formed and adventitious. It is the province of the theorist then, to resolve this compound into its elements. To do this, he must bring together a large variety of cases, which are known to involve the principle he seeks, and proceed, in a sort of algebraic process, by repeated comparisons and separations of what is unessential, till at last the truth required stands

by itself, distinct and alone. Or, from some prominent facts he may assume an hypothesis, and should it be found, on its application, to explain the phenomena, it may be presumed to be true. Thus the moral philosopher may bring together the several classes of actions that are approved, and by a careful analysis of each, endeavor to discover those circumstances, which are common to them all; or, observing a general consistency of facts with some one principle, he may assume that principle as the foundation of virtue, and see how far it will account for the moral judgments of mankind.

We shall now proceed to state, with as much perspicuity and conciseness as we are able, the celebrated theory of Adam Smith. In doing this, however, it is not our intention to give a complete view of this most ingenious system; but only so far to lay it before our readers, as to enable them to understand its fundamental principles, and judge of the propriety of the remarks we may make upon it.

The great basis of moral sentiments, according to Dr. Smith, is sympathy. Sympathy is that principle of our nature, which leads us to enter into the feelings, affections and motives of other men. Hence it follows, that a being perfectly solitary,

as there would be none with whom he could sympathize, could have no notions whatever of right or wrong, of merit or demerit. The primary objects of all our moral perceptions, therefore, must be the actions of other men, and we judge of our own, only by applying to them the rules we have formed in estimating the conduct of those around us. In judging of the conduct of other men, we are conscious, in the first place, of the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation; and, secondly, we have a sense of the merit and demerit of the agent.

The sentiment of approbation is thus explained. Sympathy is that analogous feeling, which arises from an imaginary application to ourselves of the circumstances of him with whom we sympathize. When the spectator thus places himself in the situation of the agent, he finds that he can or cannot go along with him in the affections and motives by which he is actuated. If he can, he approves; if he cannot, he disapproves. In this, two distinct feelings are to be noticed;—first, the sympathetic passion of the spectator; secondly, the emotion which arises from observing the perfect coincidence of this passion with the original passion of the person principally concerned. The former may be either pleasing or painful, according to the nature

of the original passion; the latter is always agreeable, and is that, in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists. The propriety of any action, —by which is meant that quality which moralists have commonly denominated rectitude,—consists in the suitableness of the affection or motive, from which it proceeds, to the cause or object that excites it; and this suitableness is nothing more than that precise kind or degree of affection, with which the spectator can entirely sympathize and go along.

'When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them. The man who resents the injuries that have been done to me, and observes that I resent them precisely as he does, necessarily approves of my resentment. The man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonableness of my

sorrow. He who admires the same poem, or the same picture, and admires them exactly as I do, must surely allow the justness of my admiration. He who laughs at the same joke, and laughs along with me, cannot well deny the propriety of my laughter. On the contrary, the person who, upon these different occasions, either feels no such emotion as that which I feel, or feels none that bears any proportion to mine, cannot avoid disapproving my sentiments, on account of their dissonance with his own. If my animosity goes beyond what the indignation of my friend can correspond to; if my grief exceeds what his most tender compassion can go along with; if my admiration is either too high or too low to tally with his own; if I laugh loud and heartily when he only smiles, or, on the contrary, only smile when he laughs loud and heartily; in all these cases, as soon as he comes from considering the object, to observe how I am affected by it, according as there is more or less disproportion between his sentiments and mine, I must incur a greater or less degree of his disapprobation: and upon all occasions his own sentiments are the standards and measures by which he judges of mine.

'To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them. If the same arguments which convince you, convince me likewise, I necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily disapprove of it; neither can I possibly conceive that I should do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more

than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others.

'When we judge in this manner of any affection, as proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which excites it, it is scarce possible that we should make use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent affection in ourselves. If, upon bringing the case home to our own breast, we find that the sentiments which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily approve of them, as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion.

'Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.'

The whole account of the matter, then, is simply this. When the spectator would judge of the moral character of the actions of other men, he places himself, by an effort of imagination, in the situation of the agent; if he finds himself affected with feelings and motives, similar to those of the agent, if he finds the same hopes, fears, passions, springing up in his own breast, he perceives this coincidence;

and this perception of coincidence, whatever be the nature of the original passion, is agreeable to him, and is no other than the sentiment of moral approbation. On the other hand, if he cannot go along with the agent, if he cannot by the power of sympathy identify his own feelings with those he observes, this want of coincidence is attended with pain, and he has the sentiment of disapprobation.

The account of approbation which we have attempted to state, is an hypothesis, and, like all hypotheses, is to be tried by its coincidence with the phenomena it undertakes to explain. Let us, therefore, examine how far it is consistent with what every one has observed to take place in his own mind, when he approves or disapproves.

In the first place, then, we think there are numerous instances of sympathy without approbation, and even with disapprobation. An amateur gives to his friend an account of a fine picture he has seen and been induced to purchase; he enumerates with delight all its excellences; its design, its execution, the truth of its coloring, and force of expression. His friend enters with complete sympathy into the feelings of the amateur, in his admiration, and the consequent purchase;—has he therefore the sentiment of moral approbation? We can sympathize with the joys

or the sorrows of those with whom we are connected; we may judge the conduct they adopt to be entirely reasonable, and suited to the circumstances in which they are placed, without ascribing to them any moral quality. I may enter with strong sensibility into the distress of the beggar, who asks my alms;—do I therefore approve his solicitations, as a moral act? We readily sympathize with the appetite of a hungry man, and judge the consequent action of eating to be perfectly suitable to the feelings that occasion it.—There is indeed a sort of analogical sense, in which the term approbation may be applied in these instances. Thus we approve the literary tastes and speculative judgments of the scholar; but it is an approbation that implies no moral quality, and how we gain the idea of this moral quality of actions, is the very thing to be explained. It may be admitted, that the feelings in the cases we have stated, are suitable to the causes that excite them, and to the actions to which they give rise; nay more, that it is by sympathy we judge of this suitableness; but how are we to distinguish between that suitableness, which is the object of moral approbation, and that which is not? This contains the whole difficulty of the problem, and this difficulty, it seems to us, Dr. Smith has left untouched.

Since, according to Dr. Smith, it is by placing ourselves in the circumstances of the person, principally concerned, that the analogous emotion is excited in our own breasts, must not those emotions be the same in kind, that they would be, were we actually in those circumstances? The sympathies of any individual, then, must depend very much on the previous constitution of his habits and tastes. The ambitious will sympathize with the votaries of ambition; the voluptuary with the voluptuous; the avaricious with the greedy of gain. On what principle of human nature do those writers calculate, who send forth their pages of sensuality, but on the polluted imaginations and depraved sympathies of readers, like themselves? If an individual, in a given situation, exercise feelings of envy, or malice, or revenge, and afterwards a second, in the same circumstances, exercise the same feelings, it is plain that the first must altogether sympathize with the second: for, if he bring fully home to himself all the circumstances of his neighbor, the effect of imagination must be the same in kind, if not in degree, with that of the reality. But does it not follow from the theory of Dr. Smith, that every sympathetic emotion must necessarily be the proper object of moral approbation; since it agrees with the orignal emotion, and is perceived to do so?

But as sympathy cannot distinguish between that suitableness, which is the proper object of moral approbation and that which is not; so neither does it offer any explanation of the different degrees of approbation, with which we contemplate different actions. The only circumstances of difference in this respect, so far as sympathy is concerned, seem to us to be the following,—1. The nature of the original passion, considered as pleasing or painful; 2. its strength; 3. the strength or completeness of the sympathy; 4. the vividness of the pleasure with which the consciousness of this sympathy affects the spectator. The degree of approbation cannot depend on the first circumstance; because approbation itself arises, not from the pleasing or painful nature of the original feeling, but from our capacity to go along with it. Nor, secondly, on the strength of the original passion; because the calm and gentle virtues, the exertion of self-command, the suppression and very annihilation of passion, are often the objects of the highest approbation. Nor thirdly, on the completeness of the sympathy:—as we have already attempted to shew, this may take place, when there is no approbation that is properly moral. We are here to distinguish between the completeness and degree of approbation. It is obvious, that we may thoroughly

approve what we do not highly approve. The degree of moral approbation must therefore, it would seem, depend on the fourth circumstance,—the vividness of the secondary emotion. But the variations of this vividness can, for the same reasons, no more than the degree of approbation connected with them, arise from either of the circumstances we have just mentioned. There remains, then, so far as we can see, no other cause that can be assigned for this effect, but the moral character of the original affection. Unless, therefore, the cause and the effect can be the same thing, does it not follow, that moral approbation is not the consciousness that we can go along with the affections of another, but that it is founded on the moral excellence of those affections themselves?

Not only are there numerous instances of sympathy without approbation; there are also instances of approbation without sympathy. How many, who read the story of Regulus, can, with the full conception of his tortures, rouse themselves to that heroism of integrity which led the Roman General voluntarily to expose himself to the ferocious cruelty of an exasperated enemy? When extraordinary instances of generosity are presented to the avaricious, of courage to the timid, of decision to the wavering, is it their capacity to go along with the

liberal, the brave, and the resolute, that gives rise to the admiration they experience ;—or is it rather the very conviction that, in the same circumstances, they could not have felt and acted in the same manner ; that these virtues are beyond their reach, and almost beyond their conception ? Indeed the difficulty we ascribe to any act of virtue is a principal ground of the high approbation with which we consider it. And this very idea of difficulty is nothing else, than the incapacity we find in ourselves, to exercise the feelings and exert the efforts which such virtue implies. We shrink back appalled from the enterprise, and, in the same proportion, we admire that force of self-command and energy of purpose, which peril cannot intimidate, nor obstacles withstand.

In the instances just mentioned, we have followed the account of sympathy which our author has himself given. We are aware, however, that there is a sense, in which we may be said to go along with feelings in others, which, in the same circumstances, we could never have exercised ourselves. We can easily conceive of emotions, very different from those which would have been excited in us by the occasion, which gave rise to these emotions in the person principally concerned. We have before felt them, perhaps, in other circumstances, and in an

inferior degree, and we understand their nature and their effects. There are also partial sympathies, which are even heightened by the want of completeness. Thus, I may more deeply sympathize with the joy of the liberated captive, because I could not enter into the fortitude and resolution, with which he endured the toils and privations of his servitude. I can easily imagine myself to lead on a band of warriors to the attack, I can mingle in the turmoil and desperation of battle, I can feel my heart dilate with the shouts of victory, and the honors of triumph ;—but in all this, I have thrown around myself a fancied invulnerability ;—I do not bring home to my mind the appalling ideas of wounds and of death ; my feelings are those with which the real hero recounts the story of his dangers, not those with which he encountered them. As in terrific dreams we are sometimes relieved by saying to ourselves, 'tis but a dream ; so in our waking reveries, we play the hero with a secret consciousness of security. When the man of natural timidity places himself, though but in idea, in scenes of danger, which he has reason to think he will soon be called upon to encounter,—if, for instance, he is told that the enemy are but a few miles from his home,—he will then find in his heart-sinking and dismay, the difference between the

imagination of perils he may soon prove real, and those illusions of fancy which we have just described. To be convinced of this, let the reader but thrust, with Mucius, his right hand into the fire; let him feel, as strongly as he can in fancy, his muscles shrinking and shrivelling, and slowly consuming in the flames;—and he will be satisfied it is the eclat of admiration, not the fortitude of endurance, which, in reading the story, he ordinarily brings home to himself.

There is besides, we think, a sympathy of contagion, if we may be allowed the expression. A child is thrown into tears by the tears of those around him. We read the sentiments and actions of the great and good, we imbibe their emotions, and become animated with their zeal. These feelings seem to arise, not from placing ourselves in the situation of those with whom we sympathize; but to be kindled in our own hearts from the fire that warms the bosoms of those with whom we are conversant. Even language exerts a spell, by which it calls up powerful passions. Emotions, no less than ideas, are associated with words, and are often excited by them, without the intervention of thoughts or images. But in the theory of Dr. Smith, it is the suitableness of passions and feelings to the cause that excites them, which is to be

determined by the sympathy of the spectator. This sympathy, therefore, to furnish such a criterion, must consist in the coincidence of the feelings, which naturally spring up in the breast of the spectator, from an exact application to himself of all the circumstances of the person principally concerned, with the feelings of that person. If the effect of imagination be not the same with that of reality, in kind at least, the case is changed, and the imagined circumstances of the spectator are not the same with those that really affect the agent. In this view of the subject, the instances we have given above, appear to us to be in truth instances of moral approbation without sympathy.

But if the term sympathy be used, as it often is, to denote any strong conception of the feelings of others, which is attended with a sort of personal interest in what concerns them; it must be admitted, we think, that the sympathies even of the virtuous, are by no means confined to affections that spring from integrity and beneficence. Even the dark and violent passions of the malignant and revengeful, when exhibited by the hand of genius, find somewhat kindred in our hearts. This is perhaps not so much from considering how we should be affected by similar circumstances, as that for a moment we lay aside our own identity, and become

the being we contemplate. How else is it, that we are so powerfully affected by those delineations of the poet, which display to us the workings of a criminal ambition, of a cruel revenge, or a desolate misanthropy? Who does not enter deeply into the passions and fate of Macbeth, of Zanga, and of the Corsair? Who does not go along with Richard in the expression of those feelings which terminate in the desperate resolution—"I am determined to prove a villain?" Yet surely in these cases it will not be said, we have the sentiment of moral approbation.

We can neither approve nor condemn that of which we have no conception. A feeling can be known only by experience; nor is there any method of conceiving the emotions of another, but by exciting somewhat of the same kind in our own breasts. It seems to be the office of the power, by which we do this,—call it what we may,—to bring before us the minds and hearts of other men, to receive from our moral faculty the sentence of approbation or condemnation, as from their own intrinsic character they may deserve. But this moral decision is in no respect identified with the perception, that we can or cannot sympathize with the state of mind upon which it is exercised. Our sympathetic, as well as our original affections, are referred to a general rule of rectitude; and the former no less than

the latter, are not unfrequently the occasion of self-reproach. We enter into feelings which we disapprove, and we secretly condemn ourselves that we do so. Nor can this be explained by supposing with Dr. Smith, that in such cases, we refer to the sympathy of a more impartial judge; since the sympathies of different men cannot be compared with each other, in respect to their justness and impartiality, but by applying to them some common standard. And that can never be an ultimate standard, which is itself to be judged by one more so.

Thus we think, it appears, that approbation is entirely distinct from the perception that our affections agree with those of the agent, and that either may exist without the other. The two sentiments however, often coincide, and are mutually heightened by their union. When we observe the conduct of the devoted friend, the enlightened patriot, the good man, we highly approve it; we enter into their affections, we clothe ourselves with their integrity and disinterestedness, we appropriate the praise and admiration that belong to them, and become in imagination, the objects of the love and veneration of mankind. Yet the pleasure of these various sympathies is not approbation, but is founded upon it. In like manner, when we look upon

the depraved and the abandoned, we condemn them, our hearts recoil from their communion, because we cannot place ourselves in their circumstances, without feeling that we become the just objects of general reprobation and abhorrence. In this manner, our approbation of the good and the condemnation of the bad are increased by sympathy. Dr. Smith observed this, and it led him, we venture to affirm, to the error of his work, if it be, as we suppose, an error. He remarked the peculiar satisfaction with which we enter into the feelings of the virtuous—a satisfaction founded, we think, upon previous approbation—and not distinguishing the parts of this blended emotion, he assumed that, as the essence, which is only an effect. Accordingly he has, we think, throughout his work, denominated that sentiment moral approbation, which is properly only a consequence of it.

Having thus explained upon what the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation of actions depends; our author next proceeds to consider, how we come by a sense of the merit or demerit of the agent.

As the propriety of the consequent action consists in the suitableness of the affection to the cause or object which excites it; so the merit of the agent consists in the beneficial nature of the effects,

which the affection aims at or tends to produce. Merit is the desert of reward, and demerit of punishment. Gratitude and resentment are the passions which naturally prompt us to reward and punish. When therefore the spectator observes the beneficial or hurtful tendency of any action, he naturally enters into the gratitude or resentment of him, who is the object of it. And this sympathy with the gratitude or resentment of him, who is the object of a beneficial or hurtful action, is what constitutes in the spectator the sense of merit or demerit. In observing beneficent conduct, we have then a double sympathy; in the first place, we enter into the liberal affections and kind designs of the agent, we perceive that we can altogether go along with him in his generous purposes, and thus we have the sentiment of approbation; in the second place, we enter into the gratitude of him who is obliged; we go along with him in those lively impulses, which prompt him to remunerate his benefactor, and thus have a sense of the merit of the agent. It is the union of these two sympathies, each in itself separately pleasing, and mutually enlivening and heightening each other, that gives to beneficence that supremacy of interest, which it holds over other virtues.

'To be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or resentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that gratitude, and of that resentment, which naturally seems proper, and is approved of.

'But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.

'He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to some person or persons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby applaud; and he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who in the same manner is to some person or persons the natural object of a resentment, which the breast of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathize with. To us, surely, that action must appear to deserve reward, which every body who knows of it would wish to reward, and therefore delights to see rewarded: and that action must as surely appear to deserve punishment, which every body who hears of it is angry with, and upon that account rejoices to see punished.'

There are two important qualifications of this doctrine, which we give in the author's own words.

'It is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial soever on the one hand, or how hurtful soever on the other, the actions or intentions of the person who acts may have been to the person who is, if I may say so,

acted upon, yet if, in the one case, there appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his conduct, we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the person who receives the benefit: or if, in the other case, there appears to have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are such as we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy with the resentment of the person who suffers. Little gratitude seems due in the one case; and all sort of resentment seems unjust in the other. The one action seems to merit little reward; the other to deserve no punishment.'

'Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety, and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the sentiments of any person as proper and suitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the same manner as he is, but we must perceive this harmony and correspondence of sentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I should conceive precisely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be said to approve of the sentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord

between his sentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another person, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his case home to myself, I feel gratitude arise in my own breast, I necessarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the person who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our sentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correspondence of sentiments, therefore, is here required. It is sufficient that, if he was grateful, they would correspond; and our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a similar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.'

Merit, according to Mr. Hume, "consists in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself, or others." This definition has been thought too comprehensive; since it includes in the class of virtues many qualities, which are merely natural, such as courage, genius, &c. The account we have just given from Dr. Smith, is liable, we think, to the opposite objection, that it excludes from merit many actions, which the

common judgment of mankind has agreed to consider as possessing that quality in a high degree. Merit implies desert of reward; but we are not always to understand by reward some specific remuneration. Approbation, praise, esteem, love, are often the appropriate and sole rewards of the highest merit. Dr. Smith seems to us, without however precisely making this distinction in his own mind, to have confined himself, in his selection of instances, to the former idea of reward; and, of course, to have met with no difficulty in finding an individual upon whom the province of returning a favor properly devolved, and with whose gratitude the spectator might sympathize. Still, however, he admits it to be a just consequence of his theory, that there are affections with their consequent actions, which are the proper objects of moral approbation, which yet imply no merit in the agent. Is there then no merit in magnanimity, in temperance, in fortitude, in patience? These may sometimes, indeed, be practised on principles merely selfish, or be the results of physical constitution; but they may also, and often do, spring from a high sense of duty, when still no such benefit is conferred on any individual, as to be a foundation for gratitude. The Christian, when, through a series of deep afflictions, he exhibits, from a sentiment of religion,

a spirit humble, patient, resigned,—does he not as truly deserve applause and admiration, as the performer in the more splendid scenes of generosity and beneficence?

Forgiveness of injuries is a virtue of a high stamp, a virtue almost peculiarly christian. It implies the dominion of principle over some of the strongest passions of our nature, the promptings of revenge, the pride of self-respect, the sense of reputation;—passions which the world is ready enough to countenance and even approve. Yet our high estimate of the merit of this virtue can hardly have its foundation in the sentiment of gratitude, either original or sympathetic. It is indeed a benefit; but it is one of the last we are willing to receive from a fellow mortal. It is connected in the mind of the injurious person with so bitter a sense of guilt, of humbling inferiority, and wounded self-love, that he must be a very good, or a very mean man, who is willing to be forgiven. Nor are these, feelings into which the spectator is much disposed to enter. He does not like, even in imagination, to assume to himself emotions so full of disquietude and mortification. When we recollect the well known answer of Turenne to the young man who insulted him, do we for a moment place ourselves in the situation of the latter? Is not our whole attention

fixed in direct admiration of the former? We do not intend to intimate, that forgiveness is not sometimes received with the liveliest gratitude; but we do say, that the instances of this are not so numerous, as to furnish any general sympathy, which might be the foundation of the high esteem, in which we hold the virtue. Nay further, the very worthlessness and ingratitude of him, who receives forgiveness, increases our sense of the desert of him who extends it.*

This, then, is our first objection to the doctrine we have stated, that it takes from many actions all that merit, which,—although they may confer no such particular benefit on any individual as to be the proper occasion of gratitude,—the common consent of mankind has still ascribed to them. Or, in other words, that the perception of merit often exists where there is no imagined gratitude which can be its foundation. We observe, in the next place, that there are many instances of approved gratitude, unaccompanied with the perception of any proportionate merit in him who is the object of it; and that even where they both concur, they

*This case, we think, involves another difficulty. The sense of demerit consists in a sympathy with the just and approved resentment of the injured person; how is it then, that we at the same time so highly approve the want or suppression of this resentment?

operate by different laws, and upon distinct qualities of actions.

> " How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is,
> To have a thankless child!"

This is a trite quotation, but in its connexion, pertinent to our purpose. What heart does not enter into this expression of Lear? If there be any crime, from which we turn away with peculiar reprobation, it is filial impiety; and on the other hand, there is no feeling, which more readily excites in us a kindred sensibility, than the gratitude of an affectionate and devoted child. Yet this sympathy, we think, is not attended with a sense of any considerable merit in the parent. So intimately interwoven are their interests, that the fondness, which leads a parent to watch assiduously over the happiness of its offspring, is often but a refined selfishness. Nay more, even when this fondness, as in the case of Lear himself, degenerates into folly and weakness, or is attended with circumstances of injustice, it rather strengthens than diminishes the claim on the proper filial return. We may state a stronger instance. Is not our horror at the parricide of the monster Nero in some degree augmented by the thought of those very crimes, by which Agrippina had opened for him a passage to the throne? These atrocities,

wrought for his sake, seem to have given the mother a more than ordinary claim on the regard of her son, and throw even over parricide itself, a darker hue of ingratitude.

Again; we think it a general principle, that gratitude is rather inspired by those actions which we consider as indicative of a peculiar and personal regard to ourselves, than by those which flow from a sense of duty in the agent. Thus we are better pleased with a flattering opinion than a favor. Expressions of good will, of high estimation and attachment, often draw from us livelier returns, than the most essential benefits which do but show the general benevolence of their author. A captive, who would feel the warmest gratitude to a friend, who should, from personal attachment, encounter great hazard, and make extraordinary efforts for his liberation, would probably be less affected by the disinterested generosity of some unknown individual, who should have created a general fund for the ransom of slaves. If then gratitude considers an action as a favor, and expressive of regard to the object; while the perception of merit considers it as a virtue, and implying a reference to duty;—these two views contemplate qualities essentially different. Although they may often concur and exert a reciprocal influence in the same

action, yet either may not only be considered separately from the other, but they are frequently found in fact thus distinct. The limitation, then, which we have already quoted from Dr. Smith,—a limitation essential to the support of his doctrine,—must be inconsistent with experience. 'We cannot,' says he, 'go along with the gratitude of an obliged person, unless we have first altogether approved the motives of him who confers the favor; nor with the resentment of him who sustains an evil, unless we disapprove of the motives of him who inflicts it.' The latter part of the proposition, we are ready to admit, is more generally true than the former.

The natural occasion of justifiable resentment is the expression of ill-will, or at least of culpable negligence; these are also the proper objects of blame; the perception of demerit, therefore, usually coincides with the sense of resentment. The natural occasion of gratitude, on the other hand, is the expression of good will, of personal regard. Those actions which are expressive of regard to one, may involve in them injustice to the rights of another; yet the obliged person, even while he disapproves the whole complex action by which he is benefited, cannot help feeling gratitude for the affection by which he is distinguished; nor will

this gratitude be disapproved even by the impartial spectator. Here the perception of merit is totally distinct from the sense of a favor, and the latter may exist, not only without, but in opposition to the former. When, however, the motive of the agent implies at once a regard to the object and to the rectitude of the action, these sentiments concur. And when the benefit springs from indirect and sinister views, from the weakness or caprice or profuse generosity of the benefactor, or from accident,—as from the similarity of a name,—or from any circumstance, which marks no particular regard either to him on whom it is conferred, or to its own intrinsic rectitude,—little gratitude is felt; nor is there, at the same time, any perception of merit. It is by instances of this description, and instances taken from resentment, that Dr. Smith has illustrated his limitation, without being aware, it seems to us, that their application was not universal.

We may here notice another general principle in which a want of correspondence is seen. Our sympathies are easily and strongly awakened, in proportion to the particularity of the object. Orators and poets are aware of this. When they desire deeply to affect us, they do not bring before our minds a multitude, but concentrate all our

attention upon a single group or an individual being. What is wanting in extent, is more than compensated by intensity. Let us apply this to the subject under consideration. The merit of benevolence, other circumstances being the same, is in proportion to the wideness of its views, and the multiplicity of the objects it embraces. This is the plain decision of the judgment; but so far as feeling is concerned, this very wideness and multiplicity will but diminish its vividness. A province saved, or a city rescued, are but vague and uninteresting scenes. The spectator, would he excite himself to any strong emotion, must select a single family or a particular individual; and even an obliged person himself is much less sensible of a bounty he shares with thousands, than of one, of which he is the peculiar and privileged object.

Thus we have attempted to show, not only that we may have the sense of merit, and sentiment of gratitude, unconnected with each other; but also, that where both these sentiments are found, the latter does not correspond in the laws of its operation with those, by which the former is regulated. Yet were it otherwise, did the most perfect coincidence in this respect exist, still the theory of Dr. Smith would not be proved. Sympathy is a

feeling: a feeling exists entirely in the spectator, and implies nothing external to him but a cause;—but is there not, in the idea of merit, a judgment of the understanding, a belief that some quality exists in the agent, which constitutes desert, and gives him a claim, independently of any motive or opinion of the spectator? And is not this judgment or belief, not the consequence, but the cause of the feeling? I have the sensation of sweetness from the use of honey; from this sensation I infer some quality in the honey as its cause; or rather, perhaps conjoined with the sensation, and dependent upon it, is the belief of this cause. Now in the idea of merit is not this order reversed, and does not the feeling depend upon the perception, and not the perception upon the feeling? I have no idea of sweetness, independently of the sensation; but may I not have the idea of merit, without any feeling whatever?

Having explained, in the two former parts of his work, our moral sentiments as they relate to the actions of other men, Dr. Smith proceeds, in the third, to consider in what manner we judge of our own; to shew the origin of general rules, and of our sense of duty. But as the portion of the work which we have already examined contains the elementary principles of his whole theory, we shall

content ourselves, in what remains, with a brief abstract from the author himself, making very few remarks of our own.

It is agreeable to us to sympathize with those around us; it is also agreeable to us, that they, in their turn, should sympathize with us. As on the former of these facts, are founded the judgments we pass upon the conduct of others, so on the latter, depend the judgments we form of our own.

'We either approve or disapprove of our own conduct according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it.'

Although in judging of our own conduct, we thus refer to the opinions of other men; yet as those around us, from their different private biases and passions, or from the incompleteness of their views, will often be led to form partial and contradictory judgments concerning us; to relieve ourselves from this inconvenience, we are insensibly led to set up in our own breasts an imaginary being, at once dispassionate and well-informed, to be the judge of our actions. Hence arises a distinction between the love of praise, and of praiseworthiness; the former implying a reference to the real judg-

ments of the world, and the latter to those of the man within the breast.

That in the estimate of our own conduct, we have often a secret reference to the judgments of those with whom we live, cannot be denied. There is a considerable portion of mankind with whom public opinion, rather than any standard of rectitude, is the rule of conduct; and even those who aim to regulate themselves by the principles of duty, have frequent occasion to contemplate their own actions in that light, in which the impartial spectator would view them. But they do this, not to take from this external estimate their rule of judgment, but in order to enable themselves to apply the rule they already possess, with greater equity and fairness. It is a fiction which they use to dissipate those false colors, which inordinate self-love or strong passion may have thrown over their actions, and bring them in their proper hue and just forms before the tribunal of conscience.

To guard us, however, against the fatal delusions of self-deceit, nature, according to Dr. Smith, has provided another remedy in the formation of general rules.

'Our continual observations upon the conduct of others insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules, concerning what is fit and proper either to be done

or to be avoided. Some of their actions shock all our natural sentiments. We hear every body about us express the like detestation against them. This still further confirms, and even exasperates, our natural sense of their deformity. It satisfies us that we view them in the proper light, when we see other people view them in the same light. We resolve never to be guilty of the like, nor ever, upon any account, to render ourselves in this manner the objects of universal disapprobation. We thus naturally lay down to ourselves a general rule, that all such actions are to be avoided, as tending to render us odious, contemptible, or punishable, the objects of all those sentiments for which we have the greatest dread and aversion. Other actions, on the contrary, call forth our approbation, and we hear every body around us express the same favorable opinion concerning them. Every body is eager to honor and reward them. They excite all those sentiments for which we have by nature the strongest desire; the love, the gratitude, the admiration, of mankind. We become ambitious of performing the like; and thus naturally lay down to ourselves a rule of another kind, that every opportunity of acting in this manner is carefully to be sought after.

'It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable

or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of.'

This account of general rules, it will be seen, is materially different from that of Dr. Paley. The general rules of our author are inductions from particulars, and apply to no case in which a well-regulated mind, in a state of due sensibility, would not exercise all those affections, which would of themselves prompt the action, and are the proper occasion of the peculiar sympathies, on which the general rule is founded. Those of Paley, on the contrary, are formed from a consideration of the general consequences of that class of actions; and to bring any case within the rule, it is only necessary it should belong to the class, although no one of the contemplated consequences, in that particular instance, seems likely to follow.

A regard to these general rules, says Dr. Smith, is what constitutes the sense of duty. A sense of duty, therefore, is a determination of the mind, to act in such a manner as to become the natural object of the sympathy of the impartial spectator. This explanation seems not only incomplete, but also to oppose new difficulties to the theory of the author. Affections, not actions, are the objects of

sympathy. The affection appropriate to beneficence is benevolence; yet benevolence is a very different thing from a sense of duty. Now although it is very natural that in default of the particular sentiment, which is the suitable occasion of sympathy, mankind should still perform those actions, by which, as the ordinary signs of this sentiment, they may hope to secure this sympathy;—yet how it happens that this substituted principle should in the view of the spectator become more estimable than even the original affection itself, on which its whole force and authority depend,—is not so easy to explain.

In the fourth part of his essay, our author examines the principle of utility.

'The utility of any object pleases the master, by perpetually suggesting to him the pleasure or conveniency it is fitted to promote. The spectator enters by sympathy into the sentiments of the master, and necessarily views the object under the same agreeable aspect.'

He admits, that utility and hurtfulness are the general characteristics of virtuous and vicious actions; but he still affirms—

'that it is not the view of this utility, or hurtfulness, which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation. These sentiments are, no doubt, enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness.

But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception.

'For, first of all, it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that, by which we appprove of a convenient and well-contrived building; or, that we should have no other reason for praising a man, than that for which we commend a chest of drawers.

'And, secondly, it will be found, upon examination, that the usefulness of any disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation; and that the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety, quite distinct from the perception of utility.'

He thus explains in what manner philosophers may have been led to consider utility, as the proper object of moral approbation.

'When a philosopher goes to examine why humanity is approved of, or cruelty condemned, he does not always form to himself, in a very clear and distinct manner, the conception of any one particular action either of cruelty or humanity, but is commonly contented with the vague and indeterminate idea which the general names of those qualities suggest to him. But it is in particular instances only, that the propriety or impropriety, the merit or demerit, of actions is very obvious and discernible. It is only when particular examples are given, that we perceive distinctly either the concord or disagreement between our

own affections and those of the agent, or feel a social gratitude arise towards him in the one case, or a sympathetic resentment in the other. When we consider virtue and vice in an abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these several sentiments seem in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments themselves become less obvious and discernible. On the contrary, the happy effects of the one, and the fatal consequences of the other, seem then to rise up to the view, and, as it were, to stand out and distinguish themselves from all the qualities of either.'

With these views of Dr. Smith we are much inclined to agree entirely. The popular doctrine of Paley, which, at first, seems to furnish so easy an explication of the difficulties which embarrass the theory of morals, will be found, we are pursuaded, the more it is examined, more and more inconsistent with sound philosophy and safe practice.

Thus we have finished our account of that portion of Dr. Smith's essay, which treats of the origin and formation of our moral sentiments. These sentiments, the reader will recollect, are properly three. In the first place, as we find that we can or cannot enter into the motives of actions, we have the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation: secondly, from sympathy with the gratitude or the resentment of the object of a benefit

or of an injury, we have a sense of the merit or demerit of the agent: and thirdly, from the perception, that an action is agreeable to the laws according to which the two preceding sympathies usually operate, arises the sense of duty. To these is added the emotion, which springs from the observation of the useful or hurtful tendencies of actions. This last, however, although it mingles with all the former, and enlivens their effect, is not specifically moral; since it is not peculiar to conduct, but is equally excited by whatever is salutary or pernicious in nature or art; by a fruitful field or well-contrived machine.

There are many incidental discussions in this work of great interest, upon which we have not touched. Our remarks have been exclusively confined to its fundamental principles. And although in these we do not agree with the author, yet we cannot sufficiently admire the ingenuity, acuteness, and eloquence, with which the whole is executed. In the numerous illustrations, which abound in the work, a great variety of curious facts are brought together and analyzed, and many collateral and important points, which naturally occur in the course of the inquiry, are investigated and explained with singular skill and justness. These together form perhaps

a more complete natural history of our active powers, and the economy of our moral constitution, than is to be found in any one work with which we are acquainted. They compose much the larger portion of the treatise, and as the intelligent reader will, with little difficulty, disembarrass them of that characteristic phraseology which grows out of the author's peculiar views, they are of equal importance, whatever theory he may adopt. The general sympathies of our nature will be allowed by all, to hold a most powerful influence over our moral perceptions and feelings. This influence is developed, and the various modifications that these perceptions and feelings receive from circumstances, and from other principles and passions, are detected and illustrated, with the greatest acuteness and felicity; and the whole combined with practical lessons of conduct, in a style the most engaging and impressive.

Still however, even in the execution of this part of the work, some faults may be pointed out. The style is often vague and diffuse, and rather that of a popular essay, than a philosophical discussion. Many ideas, which individually considered may be presented with sufficient clearness, yet want that exactness of form, which is necessary to determine their application to other ideas, and their

precise bearing upon the point in question. This is especially the case in the frequent use of indefinite terms, where they should be particular, and of limited terms, when the argument requires those which are universal. His illustrations, in themselves so pertinent, are often stated in a manner better suited to enforce received truth, than to settle what is doubtful, or elucidate what is obscure. Although they may involve the principle to be explained, they are not always applied to it with such directness and particularity as to make it clear to the reader. Thus in chapter second of part third, Dr. Smith states a distinction between the love of praise, and the love of praise-worthiness, and endeavors to shew in what manner a fact, in its first aspect so adverse to his theory, may be reconciled with it. This distinction he proceeds to illustrate and explain at great length; yet in the multiplicity of examples, and from neglecting to apply them as he goes along, he seems to lose sight of the great difficulty in the case; and although the reader, when he finishes the chapter, will be fully satisfied that the difference exists, he will be at a loss to say in what manner the author accounts for it.

We notice these defects, not as critics, but philosophers. They are not mere errors of style;

they lead to errors of reasoning; and explain we think the fact, that so many rise from the perusal of Dr. Smith's work with the conviction that it cannot be true, without being able to point out where the fallacy lies. In disquisitions of so subtile a character, definitions and formal propositions are sometimes indispensable. It is necessary that the principle should first be clearly stated, and afterwards the facts distinctly applied. The reader will thus be able to judge as he goes along, how far each particular case supports the position it was introduced to prove.

It may naturally enough be asked, if the theory of Dr. Smith does not furnish the true solution of the moral problem we have stated, how it happens that he has been able, in so many particulars, to point out a coincidence between his principles, and the facts to be explained? We answer, this is equally the case with those, who resolve all virtue into self-love, or benevolence, or regard to utility, or the sense of justice. These are all principles of human nature, and under certain restrictions, coincide in their operation with the laws of rectitude. This is one among innumerable instances of the provident wisdom and goodness of the great Author of all. Every principle which he has implanted in the heart of man, in its regulated tendency,

prompts him to the noblest and best aims. What then is the just conclusion? That rectitude is not founded exclusively in sympathy, or self-love, or benevolence; but is that principle which controls and directs them all. It is in the moral, what attraction is in the natural world; it regulates and guides the whole system of our affections and powers, preserves each in its proper sphere and due subordination to the rest, and conducts man to the proper end of his being; the highest perfection, dignity, and happiness, of his own nature, and the widest display of the glory of his Creator.

Remarks

ON THE

RIGHT AND DUTY OF GOVERNMENT

TO PROVIDE FOR THE

SUPPORT OF RELIGION BY LAW.

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THE inquiry into the right of government to support religion by law, will probably be found to resolve itself entirely into a question of expediency. As, however, in the recent discussions of this subject, in application to the third article of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, two great questions have been made;—*first*, has civil government a right to provide by law for the support of religion? and *secondly*, is it expedient to exercise this right? —I shall follow the same distribution in the remarks I now offer.

First. As to the right of government. It is objected in the first place, that religion is a matter entirely between every man and his Creator, and, of

course, that civil authority can have no concern with it. This objection arises from a misapprehension of the distinction between those objects, which are the proper concern of government, and those which are not. Society is not a being, which can think and feel; but a relation of individuals, and is affected only as individuals are affected. Obvious as this truth is, a practical inattention to it has been the cause of many mistakes in political reasoning. It cannot, therefore, be the difference of public and private, that makes the distinction in this case, but it is created by considerations of practicability, expediency and justice. There are many subjects, which government cannot regulate, and there are others, where its interference would, on the whole, be prejudicial, or violate the essential principles of equity; but wherever the control of government is at once possible, useful and just, that control may be properly exerted. Surely the province of government is not merely to provide directly for the security of the persons and property of the citizens; its proper sphere is whatever can promote the peace and happiness of society, in the widest view of the subject. Why else does it encourage institutions for education, for the diffusion of knowledge, the suppression of vice, and the advancement of good morals? It is true, there are various means of

promoting important ends, with which it does not intermeddle; not on account of any thing in the abstract nature of these ends, which renders them improper objects of legislation; but because legislation cannot reach them; or its interference would produce more mischief than advantage. Such are those charities and duties, which belong to the intimate relations of life. These are not made the subjects of law, because they are either affections which laws cannot command, or offices so indeterminate that laws cannot define them beforehand; and, more especially, from the vexatious character of all attempts at such particular regulation. Could laws make good husbands and wives, good parents and children, good neighbours and friends, would it not be the duty of legislatures to enact them? Could they, in short, inspire the breast of every citizen with the very spirit of true religion, with those principles of obedience to the commands of God, of submission to his will and trust in his promises, which are the only sure foundations of present peace and immortal hopes, how pitiful, as well as unnecessary, would a great portion of that mass of provisions, which now crowds our statute-books, become? But what legislatures, for the reasons mentioned, cannot do directly, they can and ought indirectly

to attempt; and in no way can they so effectually accomplish this, as by securing the diffusion of religious instruction.

But it is not merely from this enlarged view of the objects of government, that its right to support religion results; religion is also absolutely necessary to the attainment of those ends, which are universally acknowledged to fall within its legitimate province; the preservation of social order, and its own permanency.

It is not upon the sanctions of civil law, that the rights of person and property, that faith in promises, that the mutual reliance and sense of security, which enter into all the transactions and intercourse of social life, and bind the members of a community together, principally depend. Take away the silent and private influences of religion and conscience, which come in upon a man in his retirement, and break off his schemes of fraud, of injustice, and treachery; and the arm of law could place but a feeble check upon human selfishness. Or rather, crimes are guarded against, not so much by those fears, which hold back the villain from perpetrating what he has conceived, as by the production of those moral habits and feelings, which prevent the very formation of guilty designs. Nor can it be too deeply realized, of what vital

importance is the operation of religious principle to the very existence of political freedom; because, where the people are generally corrupt, nothing but a system of minute inspection, of universal regulation and restraint, utterly irreconcileable with the spirit of freedom, can save the state from the most thorough licentiousness and anarchy.*

*For a clear and forcible developement of this topic, the social character of religion, I beg leave to refer to the sermon of the Rev. Dr. Channing on this subject, recently published; where the reader will find some views of government not commonly to be met with;—a sermon, of which it is praise enough to say, that it is such as would be expected from its author. No apology is necessary for subjoining the following extract:

'Few men suspect, perhaps no man comprehends, the extent of the support given by religion to every virtue. No man perhaps is aware, how much our moral and social sentiments are fed from this fountain; how powerless conscience would become without the belief of a God; how palsied would be human benevolence, were there not the sense of a higher benevolence to quicken and sustain it; how suddenly the whole social fabric would quake, and with what a fearful crash it would sink into hopeless ruin, were the ideas of a Supreme Being, of accountableness, and of a future life, to be utterly erased from every mind. Once let men thoroughly believe that they are the work and sport of chance; that no superior intelligence concerns itself with human affairs; that all their improvements perish forever at death; that the weak have no guardian, and the injured no avenger; that there is no recompense for sacrifices to uprightness and the public good; that an oath is unheard in heaven; that secret crimes have no witness but the perpetrator; that human existence has no purpose, and human virtue no unfailing friend; that this brief life is every thing to us, and death is total, everlasting extinction; once let men *thoroughly* abandon religion, and who can conceive or describe the extent of the desolation which

Has not government a right to provide for its own permanency, and the integrity of its agents? And without religion where would be the security of oaths, where the incorruptibleness and fidelity of officers, which are the foundation of all civil institutions and rights? It is not merely the religious principles of rulers themselves, by which they are guided and restrained. A magistrate without religion is kept in awe; those sentiments of honor and reputation, which are sometimes a sort of substitute for conscience, are preserved in vigor and activity by the atmosphere of moral purity, created by a religious community. This is true of all governments, and it is especially true of a government like ours, which has its basis in the popular will. If there be any force in what

would follow? We hope perhaps that human laws and natural sympathy would hold society together. As reasonably might we believe, that were the sun quenched in the heavens, *our* torches could illuminate, and *our* fires quicken and fertilize the creation. What is there in human nature to awaken respect and tenderness, if man is the unprotected insect of a day? and what is he more, if atheism be true? Erase all thought and fear of God from a community, and selfishness and sensuality would absorb the whole man. Appetite knowing no restraint, and poverty and suffering having no solace or hope, would trample in scorn on the restraints of human laws. Virtue, duty, principle, would be mocked and spurned as unmeaning sounds. A sordid self-interest would supplant every other feeling, and man would become in fact, what the theory of atheism declares him to be, a companion for brutes.'

has been said, those who deny to government the right to support religion by law, cannot do it on the general and abstract ground. It must then be, because it is supposed to imply in it the right of enforcing error, or involve the violation of the private rights of conscience.

The second objection, then, to the existence of this right in government is, that it implies the right of enforcing error. To every Christian it might be a sufficient answer to this objection to say, that our constitution does not require instruction in any particular form of Christianity, but only in Christianity itself. I am aware, however, it may be said, that although it does not do this directly, yet it authorizes particular societies to do it, by giving them the power to raise taxes for that purpose. But the principle of this objection, if admitted any farther than as a circumstance of expediency, requiring consideration, would put an end to all instruction whatever. Shall no professor of a college or master of a school demand the attention of his pupils to one word of moral or religious doctrine, because he may be found teaching error instead of truth? May no parent gather his offspring around him, and instill into their tender minds some notions of God, of duty, and of responsibility; must he leave them to grow up without any bias in favor

of religion, or one thought of a judgment to come, because it is possible, nay in many cases certain, that pernicious errors may be imbibed in the lessons they receive? The adoption of this principle would shut up every book, that did not claim to be infallible, would close the mouth of every teacher, who did not know that he was right.

Does then, in the third place, the supposition of this right in government involve the violation of the private rights of conscience?

The rights of conscience may be supposed to have relation either to opinions, to the expression of opinions, or to actions.

1. Of opinions. We readily admit that government has no right to command or forbid the exercise of certain opinions, nor is this peculiar to religious opinions, but is common to all: and for this plain reason, that the enactments of law cannot reach opinions; and while they hold out inducements to prevarication and insincerity, belief can neither be enforced nor changed by the sanctions of civil authority. Yet there are cases of expediency, in which particular religious opinions may very justly be considered as a disqualification for office. Thus, it would have been no violation of the rights of conscience, for the first princes of the house of Hanover, during the contests with the Pretender,

to have required of every candidate for an important office, either in the state or the army, an abjuration of the supremacy of the Pope.

2. What are the rights of government in regard to the public expression and dissemination of doctrines in religion? Here, too, we admit that it is rarely expedient, and of consequence rarely right, for government to interfere. Not, that such interference, although by producing a powerful reaction, it may sometimes serve to extend, instead of checking, the obnoxious opinions, would generally be ineffectual; but because the truth is most successfully discovered and propagated by an honest and free avowal of sentiments, and an independent and unrestrained discussion of opposite arguments; while such discussions are conducted with moderation and decency. This principle, however, is not without its limitations. Doctrines have been taught, and may again be taught, as the precepts of religion, which strike at the very foundations of social order. Thus, when the Catholics inculcated upon their hearers, that no allegiance was due to a protestant ruler, and that even to assassinate such a one was doing God service, it cannot be doubted, that such preaching might not only be forbidden, but punished by the civil power,

however sincerely the plea of conscience might be urged in justification.

3. In regard to actions, the sphere of government is more extensive. If any one should maintain, that government has no right to prohibit and punish actions, which are prompted by a sincere conscience, or even in some cases to require those which the conscience of the individual may forbid; —let him well consider to what consequences, such a principle might sometimes lead. When the fanatical guides of the mob at Munster led their followers to such enormities of indecency and extravagance, had the civil arm no right to interfere? And when Ravaillac raised his hand against the life of Henry IV. of France;—when the Catholics of the Netherlands were taught, that the assassination of the Prince of Orange, the gallant defender of the cause of protestantism and liberty, would be a deed most acceptable in the sight of God, and was a solemn duty of every Papist; had the civil arm no right to interfere? When many of the deluded followers of George Fox went naked through the streets, and into the assembled religious congregations of several of the principal cities of England, for a sign to the people; some of them at least were undoubtedly actuated by motives the most conscientious;—and had the civil

arm no right to interfere?—Nay, more; this very plea of conscience would destroy itself. The bloodiest persecutors, and many of them no doubt with sincerity, have professed the commands of conscience, no less than their victims. If conscience called the martyr to the stake, it was conscience also that bound him to it, and lighted the fagots which were to consume him. It was the conscience no less than the cruelty of Philip II. which filled the prisons of the inquisition and kindled the fires of the auto da fé. Even the Apostle of the Gentiles thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth.

But it may be objected; Has not a man a right to act in obedience to the dictates of his conscience? Undoubtedly, he has not only a right, but it is his duty so to do. Conscience may be erroneous, but it is our only guide, and we are bound to follow it. Can then opposite rights exist; can I have a right to act in a certain way, and at the same time government a right to punish me for it? Not in the abstract nature of things;—but in relation to human agents, with limited intelligence, it cannot be otherwise. If you think it your duty to take the life of your neighbour, without the forms of law, you are bound to do it; and it is the no less solemn duty of the law, to hang you for it; or should you be

acquitted, it would not be on the ground of conscience, but of insanity. The guilt is in a vincible error. Nay, this same conscience itself, sincere as it may be, is often founded on the habitual indulgence of the very vilest passions of our nature. What then is the conclusion? That even in matters of conscience, government must possess the abstract right to interpose its authority; and that the practical right of actual interposition depends not on the scrupulosity, or sincerity of the conscience of the subject; but on the nature and circumstances of the case, or in other words, on expediency. I am aware, that in these remarks upon the general rights of conscience, I shall seem to many to have been laboring to prove some of the plainest and most acknowledged principles of civil polity; and I have been thus particular, not because they appear to me to be necessarily connected with the question in debate; for I am unable to perceive that any provision of the third article of the Bill of Rights can be considered a violation of a conscience the most scrupulous; but because they have been so often introduced in the discussion.

Do you believe in any religion? If you do not, conscience has nothing to do with the subject; if you do, do you conceive your religion to be of any importance to society? If so, you must think

it, in the same proportion, important that a knowledge of it should be diffused; and of consequence, that it is your duty, in proportion to your means, to aid in this diffusion. Or, will you say that this is a duty of religion, and therefore government has no right to interpose additional sanctions to those of the divine law. But are you not aware, that the principle of this argument would bear equally against all human means; that it denies the right of government to forbid or to command a single act, that is forbidden or commanded by the law of God? The law of God has said, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill: has civil law, then, no right to punish theft or murder? Perhaps you will say, this principle is true only in relation to those acts, which are peculiarly of a religious nature. Is it wrong then for government to punish profaneness or blasphemy, because it is written, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain?

But the Bill of Rights may in its operation require you to assist in the support of a form of religion, in which you do not believe; nay, more, which you may think positively pernicious. It would here perhaps be enough to answer, that this is by no means a necessary or a frequent case, that it is only one of those accidental evils, which must sometimes follow from the operation of the most

wholesome general rules; but we are willing to meet the objection in its full force. When, therefore, you say *positively pernicious*, you probably mean in comparison with the religion which you believe to be the true: since you will not, it is thought, deny, that any religion which recognizes the great doctrine of retribution, and teaches a correct system of morals, is better than absolute atheism. Did the establishment of the legal teacher take from you the liberty of propagating your own opinions in the parish, there would be something in the objection. But you may labor by every means in your power, both by yourself and the preachers of your sect, to make proselytes of those around you, and should you succeed in gaining a majority, you become entitled to all the privileges of the prevailing party. You are not, therefore, required to aid in the support of a positive evil, but only of an inferior good; nor does even this preclude you from adopting every proper means, which you could otherwise use, for substituting what you believe to be the truth in the place of delusion. Let me ask any conscientious opposer of the principles I am supporting, should an estate in some Catholic country be devised to you, encumbered with the regular tithes to the Catholic bishop, or an annuity to a convent, would you on this account

hesitate to accept it? Yet were this same devise accompanied with a condition, that you should profess the religion of the Pope, you would undoubtedly reject the gift. What then is the difference, but that in the latter case, there is a direct violation of conscience required, while in the former, there is none. If, then, under such circumstances, it would be no violation of conscience to pay the tithes or the annuity, when called upon by the law of the land; how can it be a violation of conscience, to require you to contribute your proportion to the support of a form of religion, differing far less materially from your own?

You probably admit it to be the legitimate province of government, to secure to every religious assembly the peaceable worship of God in their own way; and is not this an ordinance of government for the support of religion? and may it not impose restraints upon some, as burthensome and as directly conducive to what they may conceive the advancement of error, as the requisition made in the former case of you? Consider the suspension of the occupations and labors of busy life upon the sabbath. This is absolutely necessary, that Christians may peaceably worship God on that day; yet might not the Jew urge every argument against it, which you can bring forward in the present case?

You may say the Bill of Rights gives facilities for the propagating of the orthodox or the unitarian heresy, and takes from you the dollar, which you have earned. The Jew may say, the christian sabbath gives facilities for spreading the christian heresy, and takes from him the opportunity of acquiring the dollar, he might otherwise have earned. The establishment of public schools by law is as truly a violation of conscience, as the Bill of Rights; unless there were appended to every such law a positive prohibition, that any master of such school should either pray with his pupils, or give them any instruction touching religion.

I shall now make some remarks upon the second question, the only one, as it seems to me, upon which a reasonable doubt can be entertained. Is it then to be expected, that religion will be more widely disseminated and better taught, when supported by government, than if left to the voluntary contributions of the citizens?

A strong presumption in favor of the affirmative of this question arises from the universal practice of governments in this respect. Statesmen of all ages have considered the influence of the motives of religion essential to the support of civil laws; and that civil laws were no less necessary to the support of the influence of religion. So remarkable is this

universality, that Bishop Warburton, as is well known, considers it a sufficient evidence of the divine legation of Moses, that he did not avail himself of the sanctions of a future state, to give authority to the Jewish law.

But here will be urged the old objection, the corruptions of religion, the persecutions, and the tyranny that have so generally attended the union of church and state. As well might we argue, that because most of the governments of the old world have been oppressive, therefore government itself is an evil and to be abolished. To show the utter inapplicability of the objection, let us consider for a moment in what this union has consisted, and whence its evils have arisen. Take, for illustration, the establishment of the English church, the purest perhaps, which has been formed. It has a clergy consisting of different ranks, the higher orders of which are possessed of great wealth and power, and in a great degree dependent on the government, not merely for support, but for their appointment and rise in the church; and all this patronage is confined to a single sect, guarded by creeds and subscriptions. What are the consequences? That freedom of inquiry is greatly restricted; that the valuable livings of the church are often made either the consideration or the reward of political

subserviency, and that the whole weight of ecclesiastical influence and ambition is brought to aid the measures of the ministry.

I would be understood to speak here, not of the necessary, but the natural consequences. To these consequences there have been and are many noble exceptions. Now let me put it to any man's conscience, to say, if either of these tendencies is to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights. So far from giving to any one sect the preponderance over another, it is expressly declared that no such preponderance ever shall be given. In freedom of inquiry and judgment, neither the minister nor his people are under any other restraint than that which arises from their mutual influence and from general opinion. Neither the legislature nor the executive have at their disposal the meanest parish in the Commonwealth. They cannot deprive a single minister, increase his salary, or advance him to a higher station in the church. For every thing he is dependent on his parish. They elect him to his office, fix the measure of his support, and, when they please, will dismiss him from both. Under such circumstances, even were our executive a monarch, and a portion of our legislature an hereditary aristocracy, there could be nothing to fear. But when it is further recollected, that the whole body

of the government proceed annually from the bosom of the people, and by the free votes of the people, he, who talks of the dangerous union of church and state, must be either himself deluded by a name, or seek to impose that delusion on others.

Again, an argument against the necessity of the aid of government in the support of religion, is drawn from the history of the dissenters in England, and of several sects in our own country, and from the practice of some of the larger towns in the Commonwealth. These facts may be readily admitted, and as easily explained.

As to dissenters, two general observations may be made. In the first place it may be remarked, that those who vary from the prevalent form of religion, still feel all the influence of the sentiments and habits which are created by that form. In such circumstances, the relation of the establishment to dissent, is precisely the same with that of Christianity to deism; and as well might you reason from the decent morals of many deists in christian countries, against the uses of Christianity, as from the conduct of dissenters, where an establishment exists, against the necessity of such an establishment. I use this comparison merely as an illustration, without the slightest intention of exciting

odium toward any class of Christians. Beside, in our own Commonwealth, the dissenter well knows, that what he does voluntarily, he might otherwise be compelled to do by law.

In the second place, there is always a presumption, that such as depart from the common usage of those around them, have thought more of the subject, and feel a deeper zeal, than many, whom they leave behind. The great mass of those, who have no strong interest in religion of any form, naturally fall into the ranks of the establishment, and it is for such that an establishment is peculiarly necessary; while the very act of dissent implies a more lively engagedness, and calls for a display of more devotion to the cause; and the zeal of the partizan is added to that of the Christian.

In several of the most populous of our towns, public instruction in religion is supported by assessments on the pews; and as no one is required to become a pew-holder, this practice is represented as affording a strong presumption, that voluntary contributions would, throughout the state, be completely adequate for this purpose. To this presumption there are two answers. In the first place, the utility of the practice may reasonably be doubted, even in the places referred to; and in the

second, we cannot reason from what is expedient in towns crowded with inhabitants, to the scattered population of the country.

My first objection to this practice is, that it distributes the burthen of supporting religious instruction very unequally. The amount of the assessment in any case depends, not upon the ability of the pew-holder, but on the situation of his pew; nor is the difference between the highest and lowest assessment upon pews, by any means proportionate to the wealth of those who occupy them. The necessary consequence is, that while by the rich, the pew-tax is scarcely felt, to many, even of the middling classes, it is a burthen they can ill sustain; and not a few very respectable citizens, who might afford to hire and even to own a pew, cannot afford to pay the tax upon it. Were the advantages derived from the institutions of religion merely personal, there might be some justice in this; but they are of a public nature; and in the general security they give to property, are even more important, than the establishment of laws and magistrates. But the evil does not stop here. Is it not to be feared that many masters of families, in Boston, for instance, who think they cannot afford to pay the pew-tax in our congregational societies, and who are too proud to

take their seat in the common galleries, either absent themselves from the public services, or go where they can find a cheaper religion? Look into our principal houses of worship; where is that well-dressed assemblage of the poorer mechanics, laborers and apprentices, who usually appear in the galleries of country churches? They would willingly pay a small tax; and were they, in consequence of such tax, warned to parish meetings, called upon to vote in the settlement of ministers, erection of meeting houses, &c. would they not feel themselves to be members of a religious community, and instead of wasting their sabbaths in idleness or in low dissipation, be found decent worshippers in the temples of God? These views might be pursued much farther; and it is a subject which demands more consideration, than it has yet received.

But if the evils I have stated are all imaginary, or more than balanced by opposite advantages, still it seems to me, that no argument can be drawn from this usage of the towns to what would be expedient in the country. Were two thirds of the whole population of Boston to withdraw their aid from the support of public worship, public worship would still be supported, and respectably supported. But it is not so in a large proportion of

parishes in the country. In very many of these latter, from the extent of territory which a parish must necessarily comprehend, the loss of a very few members would destroy the society, or, at least, render the support of a minister extremely difficult to those who should remain. Proofs of this, even under the operation of the present system, are within the knowledge of every one. It is believed, that in Massachusetts, the proportion of ministers to the number of inhabitants, in the country, will be found considerably to exceed the same proportion in the metropolis; but that in those states, where religion has not been supported by law, this proportion will be found reversed. How is this to be explained but upon the principle just mentioned? The history of dissenters, and the practice of our large towns, therefore, afford a presumption rather in favor of the support of religion by law, than against it.

It becomes those, who would tear away the existing foundations of our religious institutions, to consider well what they will place in their stead. Where are we to look for the motives, which are to induce those voluntary contributions, which are to be substituted for the requisitions of law? Is it to the sentiments and habits of the people? But these, it is to be feared, will gradually cease with

the causes that produced them. Is it to the convictions of duty, and a sense of the vast importance of religion? But that is a dangerous experiment, which places an imagined interest in opposition to duty; and will the support of religion be generally believed more essential to the well being of society, than the erection of public buildings, the maintaining of roads, the support of schools, and finally even of civil government itself? And yet, who would think of leaving these objects to the chance of voluntary contribution? Or is it to pride, to an apprehension of the charge of meanness? But a pretext will never be wanting to justify the individual, who refuses his contribution, at least to himself.—He does not like the preacher, or he has received from him some affront, or he has been left out of some committee in which he should have been included, or he has not in some way or another had that influence in the parish, which his standing demanded. It is true, the motives of principle or decency enumerated, will operate, and permanently operate, with very many, perhaps a majority; and this will be sufficient in the large towns, but not so in the country. There, for the reasons already given, the loss of a few will destroy the parish.

It is an important feature of the present system, that it assumes every member of the community, as belonging to some parish, while it is only by a positive act of his own, that this connexion can be annulled. Men, like material bodies, have a tendency to continue as they are, and will hesitate to undo what they never would have done. Strangers are continually coming to reside within the precincts of different parishes, young men are coming forward into life; many in each of these classes might, from various causes, delay attaching themselves to the religious society, till they began to doubt whether it were necessary to do it at all. Especially would this be the case, should they see others around them in the same situation, to countenance this neglect.

The simple fact, that a man is called upon to pay for the support of the minister of the parish, is itself, it is believed, no inconsiderable inducement to attend on his ministrations. Men love to have their money's worth. It has been used as an argument against the establishment of a school-fund, that it would diminish the interest of the people in their schools. The argument is not without its weight, and is equally applicable to the subject under consideration. Let it not be said, that one who is led to the house of God by so low

a motive, might as well have remained at home. From whatever principle he may attend in the sanctuary, he will, at least, be in the way of good impressions; and if he be not made better, he may be prevented from growing worse. He will carry with him his wife and children, and will set a beneficial example to those around him. The advantage of the weekly services of public worship are not to be estimated solely by the positive amount of sincere piety, of which they are the means in the hand of God; but also by the evil they prevent. The weekly summons to lay aside the business, the pleasures, and the passions of the world, the regularly repeated enunciations of the rules of moral duty, and the great doctrines of the presence of God, and the sanctions of a future retribution, keep alive something like conscience even in the most obdurate heart, and prevent the decaying sparks of serious sentiment from utterly going out. The vast influence of these causes can only be appreciated by observing the downward progress, that is insensibly made in new settlements, where 'the sound of the church-going bell' is never heard, and the returning sabbath calls to no appropriate services.

Much has been said of the ill-blood and heart-burnings, to which the present system has given

rise. But were it executed uniformly and uprightly, would not its tendency be rather to prevent than to occasion such effects? The connexion of a minister and his people has been often compared to the marriage relation; and has not the common argument against divorce, that the difficulty of separation prevents the desire of it, a pertinent application to the present case? The habitual feeling, that the tax must be paid, produces a ready acquiescence in it. In proof of this, it is well known that there are many towns in the Commonwealth, where, in consequence of the original division of the parishes, a considerable portion of the citizens vote in one parish and worship in another; and this without any contentions or considerable difficulties. But grant the liberty of transferring the tax at pleasure, and preaching will be literally an article in the market, and men will chaffer for it at the cheapest rate. It would give to a few wealthy individuals the entire control in every parish; and have a most degrading tendency to destroy the independence and fidelity of the clergy. Is it not a fact, that very many of the law-suits and animosities which have existed, have arisen from the facilities to the practice of '*signing off*,' as it is called, afforded by those very persons, who most loudly lament these effects; and

that, too, where there was scarce a pretence of a change of opinions, and where little or nothing has been actually paid to that parish, to which the relation of the individual was professedly transferred? By the mention of this fact, it is by no means my intention to intimate a wish, that the liberty, now granted by the constitution in this respect, should be taken away. The evil alluded to is, probably, the inseparable concomitant of a greater good. But I do mean to say, that there are not a few Baptists and Episcopalians among us, who, but for this liberty, would have remained contented and determined Congregationalists all their days; and I advert to the circumstance merely as an illustration of the principle stated above.—It will be perceived, that in these last remarks, principal reference is had to the public advantages of religion, and to that method of supporting it, which is most conducive to this end. So far as the individual is concerned, he is, and ought to be, left at perfect liberty to attend on those ministrations, which are most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.

But after all, it is to experience we are to look for the most interesting instruction on this subject. What then are the lessons of experience? For forty years, we might rather say, for two centuries,

has this system been in operation in our own Commonwealth. And where, let me ask, has freedom of inquiry been less restricted, where has persecution or oppression been less felt; where are the institutions of religion more respected, the sabbath better observed, where is sincere piety more prevalent, or the christian virtues more faithfully practised? In New England, generally, till of late, the same system has existed, and has any region of our country, or of the world, for so long a period been distinguished by a higher tone of moral and religious principle? So true is this, that in the new settlements of the west, if the traveller find a village with its meeting house, and its minister, may he not fairly presume beforehand, that its inhabitants are principally emigrants from New England? Will it be said that these effects are to be ascribed to the peculiar character and circumstances of the first settlers of this part of our country? I believe it. But will any one maintain that the habits and sentiments of our forefathers have been transmitted without the aid of means; or must it be confessed, that their permanency is the natural consequence of the institutions they established, and handed down to us? Has the number of settled ministers been increased, or are the meeting houses more crowded in Rhode Island or New Hampshire, since these states

departed from the system of their ancestors ; or does any one expect that the sentiments and virtues of Christianity will henceforth start up with a more vigorous growth in Connecticut, now that the shades of a legal establishment have been swept away ? In the Southern States religion has been long left to take care of itself, and has it flourished more than in New England ? It is invidious to institute particular comparisons. Every one may be safely left to draw his own conclusions from facts the most notorious. There is one circumstance, however, already noticed, to which I must be allowed again to refer, as bearing forcibly upon several of the points under discussion. While in the capital of Massachusetts the proportion of settled ministers to the population is one third less than in the state at large ; in the Southern States this proportion between the large towns and the country is more than reversed.

It is a maxim in politics, that the actual results of any important change often differ most widely from the anticipations of theory ; and of course that innovations, though sometimes necessary to be made, are always experiments of hazard. This consideration ought to have the greatest weight in the present instance, because we may have all the advantage of the experiment without any of the

danger. The existing system is believed by many to have produced incalculable benefits; and by none will it be maintained to be an evil so intolerable as to demand an immediate alteration. In the neighbouring states, the experiment of the change is now making. If, upon full trial, this change should not be found to occasion the mischiefs that are apprehended from it, still more, if it should appear positively beneficial, we may at any time imitate their example, and reap all the advantages of their experience. But if, as is most solemnly feared by some of our wisest and best men, the reverse of all this should be proved by the event; if we should see in these states, notwithstanding the protracted operation of established sentiments and habits, one after another of the citizens, under various pretexts, withdrawing their aid from the support of religion, or neglecting to attach themselves to any society for that purpose, till the countenance of numbers shall take away the disgrace of singularity; if, as a necessary consequence of this, we should see parishes broken up, the clergy, from the poverty and precariousness of their support, losing their respectability, and men of talents no longer entering the profession; if we should see youth growing up without the regular instructions of the sabbath, the general sense of the sanctions of futuri-

ty disappearing, and the tone of morals universally relaxed ; what reason shall we have to bless God, that we have been saved from evils so deplorable. Nor let it be thought, should we follow in this dangerous path, we might at any time retrace our steps. It is easy to relax existing obligations ; but to bind them again upon men, when they have been once loosened, is at all times most difficult, and would in this case be impossible ; since the very causes which would require such a measure—the increase of irreligion and vice—would most effectually prevent its adoption. Enthusiasm and fanaticism might still occasionally shoot over the multitude, and shed on crowds of gazers a glare of wild and useless excitement ; but a system of rational and regular instruction and worship could not be restored. That steady light, which shines into every man's dwelling, and guides him to his daily occupations and duties, which ripens the fruit and tinges the flowers of the earth, and spreads its brightness over a serene and glorious heaven, will have gone down upon us.

Extracts

FROM

MANUSCRIPT NOTES

OF

LECTURES.

ON RIGHT,

AS A QUALITY OF ACTIONS.

SECTION I.

RIGHT may be distinguished into absolute and relative; the former referring to the nature of actions considered in themselves; the latter to actions, considered relatively to the principles and motives of the agent.

Those actions are absolutely right, which, under all the circumstances of the case, a perfectly well-informed moral agent is morally obliged to perform. When an agent, determined to do his duty, is at a loss how he ought to act in a given instance, the object of his inquiry is the absolute right of actions.

Those actions are relatively right, which proceed from a conscientious principle of duty in the agent.

Hence the same action may be absolutely right and relatively wrong, and *vice versâ*. Thus, if I relieve distress from a principle of humanity, the

action is both absolutely and relatively right; if that I may bind the man to my interest for some criminal purpose, the act is absolutely right and relatively wrong. The conduct of St. Paul, when he persecuted the Christians from a false notion of duty, was relatively right, and absolutely wrong.

SECTION II.

ABSOLUTE RIGHT.

I. In what does absolute right consist, or what is that in actions, which we approve?

1. Is it their tendency to promote the good of the agent?

2. Is it their general utility, or tendency to promote the greatest good of the whole?

3. Is it their conformity to the will of God?

4. Or, is it somewhat of which our idea is simple, and cannot be defined, a fitness, a propriety?

II. How do we become acquainted with this quality, or by what part of our constitution are we informed of it?

1. Is it by sympathy, according to A. Smith?

2. Is it by a moral sense, according to Hutchinson?

3. Is it by the understanding, according to Price?

First, then, in what does absolute right consist? If absolute right be a tendency, according to the two first systems, it is evident, that it is by reason, guided by experience and observation, that we judge of the tendency of means to an end. The question then arises, how are we informed of the value of the end, that is, the ultimate end?

If the end be our own happiness, we learn its value from self-love. If the end be the general happiness, we learn its value either from the experience, that it gives us an agreeable feeling, or from perceiving somewhat excellent in the thing itself. That is, our idea of it is simple, and is either a feeling, or a perception of the understanding. If, according to the third system, right be a conformity to the will of God; conformity to a rule is judged of by the understanding. But the idea of right, though it may arise from this conformity, is distinct from it, and must depend either on the sanctions of the rule, and is to be referred to the first system; or, as in the second, be a simple idea; either a feeling, or a perception of the understanding.

Thus it will appear, that the knowledge of right must be founded either on an ultimate reference to

the happiness of the agent; or, if not, it is a feeling produced in us by certain actions; or it is a direct perception of the understanding of some excellence in actions, not to be defined.

The question will then arise, is the idea of right a mere feeling, resulting from an arbitrary constitution of our nature, whereby certain actions affect us in a particular way; or is it a perception of the understanding, discerning a quality really in actions, and which must be the same to every intelligent being, contemplating them under exactly the same circumstances, and perceiving precisely the same relations?

SECTION III.

ON THE THEORY OF SELF-LOVE, OR PRUDENCE.

Is right the tendency of actions to the highest good of the agent?

Some, considering virtue as distinct from this tendency, have yet resolved moral obligation into prudence; but there is no foundation practically for this distinction.

The argument for the theory under consideration is principally *a priori*, founded on the presump-

tion, that nothing is valuable in itself, or can be desired by an individual, but happiness.

I. Let us consider this principle. We cannot act to attain an end, except we desire that end. The principle stated supposes that no end is desirable but happiness; and it, therefore, follows from it, that we cannot act except with our own happiness in view, as the end for which we act. But is this true? We desire knowledge. Is a man in his scientific and literary inquiries prompted to every effort, by considering to what account he may turn his knowledge when obtained? True, knowledge may be thus sought. But is not curiosity a principle, which terminates in knowledge itself, as an ultimate end? Does it not operate thus in children? So too with the desire of esteem. Do we necessarily consider the various uses to which the good opinion of others may be turned; or do we not rather prize esteem itself, more than all the advantages that flow from it; and this without any thought of profit or pleasure? In benevolence and friendship, do not our wishes rest as ultimately in the good of the object, as in our selfish purposes, they do in our own good? The primary desires must exist and operate, before self-love can make use of them.

These facts it has been attempted to explain in two ways.

1. The Epicureans explain them by association. But if an end may become ultimate by association, without any consideration of our own pleasure, it follows we may act without such consideration, and the original position falls. But if it be said;

2. That by association, the pleasure of the end is transferred to the means; or that, by the constitution of our nature, knowledge and esteem originally give us pleasure; and that this pleasure is our motive and object; here we must appeal to experience.

It is true that knowledge, and the esteem of the wise and good, give us pleasure when attained; but in their pursuit, do we fix our thoughts on this pleasure, or on the knowledge and esteem themselves? The benevolent man is gratified with promoting the good of others; but in doing this, is his motive this gratification, or the good of others? So far from always acting with a direct view to our own pleasure, is it not the fact, that even in pursuits the most entirely selfish, where there are various means to be used, this pleasure is scarcely ever the immediate motive to any one act? The ultimate end, some personal pleasure, is determined upon,

and a series of means suited for its attainment; the end is then laid out of view, and every separate means becomes the immediate object of desire,—a motive; and the whole mind is for the time engrossed by it. I wish for the pleasure of seeing a friend at a distance. Various arrangements must be made for the journey. I pack my trunk, see that my horse is ready, attend to his baiting, &c. In all these steps, do I necessarily think of the ultimate end, or does every separate means become, for the time, itself an end, and wholly engage my mind? If it be answered, that, in such cases, a regard to our own happiness is what first puts us in motion; this may be granted; and still it will follow that we may act without a regard to our own happiness, as the motive; which is all I wish here to prove. Does it not appear then, that this *a priori* argument, upon which I am inclined to think the theory of prudence principally rests, is not well-founded?

II. If we had no other desire than that of happiness, we could never be happy. We must have an appetite before it can be gratified; we must love money before its accumulation can yield us pleasure. So too of knowledge, esteem, and the other objects of desire. And we must love virtue before it can make us happy. For the principal happiness of virtue consists not in any ulterior good, to be

obtained from it, but directly in the very love of it. Thus the pleasures of friendship consist not in the good our friend may do us, but in the exercise of friendly affections and the good we can do him. In performing the offices of friendship, our own happiness is an indirect result; but our direct motive is a desire of the good of our friend; and it is from the gratification of this desire that our pleasure arises. The same may be said of benevolence; we must have a taste for the happiness of others, before it can give us pleasure.

III. The *relative* character of an action depends solely upon the motive from which it proceeds. If a man act from a regard to duty, though he may mistake the *absolute* nature of the action, still he is an object of approbation. Can we say the same of one, who acts from a regard to his own happiness, but, from a wrong judgment, places it in the unlimited indulgence of his appetites and passions? Are there no arguments to be used, to persuade a man to the cultivation of moral taste, different in their nature from those which may be urged for the cultivation of some innocent appetite; as for example, the taste for olives? There is no clear duty, however slight its pleasure, to be omitted without blame; but who condemns a man for neglecting a sensual gratification? The proposition, that right consists in the

tendency of actions to our own happiness, leads to such propositions as the following: It is right to prefer two degrees of pleasure to one: It is virtuous to eat venison rather than more cloying food.

IV. It is a fact, of which I think we are all conscious, that we estimate virtue in proportion to the weakness of the selfish motives for its performance, and the strength of the selfish motives against it; and the criminality of any action, on the other hand, by the strength of the resisted, and the weakness of the inducing motives. If a man act virtuously, when by the contrary conduct he would not expose himself to civil law, to the loss of credit or property, and perhaps might even gain in all these respects; we consider him much more meritorious than if these subsidiary motives were added. And, on the other hand, when added, much more vicious if he resist them. Now if the sole principle of virtue be a regard to our own happiness, how is it possible that what causes this principle to operate with more strength, can diminish our virtue, and *vice versa?*

V. In all languages, the tendency of actions to the advantage or disadvantage of the agent is denoted by one set of terms; and their moral character by another set entirely different. Now, if their moral character is precisely the same thing with their tendency to the happiness of the agent,

how does this happen? That the ideas of prudence and virtue are as distinct as the terms, seems obvious from the fact, that the terms cannot be confounded in use, without its being immediately perceived and exciting surprise. Should I say of a merchant, that he had made a very virtuous voyage, I should be thought to talk nonsense. When I say of an action, it is prudent, I am understood to mean, that it is adapted to promote the advantage of the agent; when I say, it is virtuous, do I convey the same idea, or no idea at all, or some one different, and yet perfectly intelligible? If the latter, what is it? Should it be alleged, that after declaring an action to be prudent, when I add further, it is virtuous, the term *virtuous* expresses no idea not included in the term *prudent*, but only farther developes it, as if I should say of an action, it is virtuous and praiseworthy; we may answer, 1. The terms, prudent and virtuous, are sometimes used in contradistinction to each other. 2. When an action is said to be virtuous and praiseworthy, although the idea of praiseworthiness is really included in virtue; yet when we use both the adjectives, we mean by the word *virtuous* to denote the quality of the action considered in itself; by *praiseworthy*, how it ought to be viewed by spectators. But if prudence and virtue are the

same, how can one term develope the other? It is obvious in what sense I have here used the word *prudent;* as denoting that which tends to the advantage of the agent.

VI. Prudence and imprudence do not excite in the well-informed spectator the same sentiments with virtue and crime. The kind of approbation we feel for the successful prosecution of schemes entirely selfish, is rather an approbation of the foresight, sagacity, or skill of the agent, than of his principles or motives. And when these schemes are in any degree incompatible with equity or benevolence, though the motive continue the same, they are viewed with indignation, and the sagacity itself is denominated cunning. On the other hand, plans of kindness and generosity are approved, not only when managed with judgment, but even when unsuccessful and conducted with rashness and folly. Nay more, a thoughtless improvidence and extravagance are less odious, than a spirit over careful and calculating. We are conscious ourselves that we reflect with the truest satisfaction upon those actions, in which we have least reference to self. So certain is this, that Belsham himself objects the fact to Paley's definition of virtue. He tells us that the essence of virtue is its tendency to promote the happiness of the agent,

and at the same time, that the highest virtue implies a disregard to this tendency.* It is the common sense of men, that the best actions are those which proceed from a regard to virtue itself; but it is the sense of Mr. Belsham, that those actions are the most virtuous, in which there is the least reference to what, according to him, is the very nature and essence of virtue.

* [Mr. Belsham's definition of virtue is as follows:

"Virtue is the tendency of an action, affection, habit or character to the ultimate happiness of the agent." *Elements*, p. 371.

The following is Dr. Paley's definition.

"Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

Mr. Belsham's remarks upon it, referred to above, are these.

"But this definition, also, excludes from the class of virtues, the most excellent moral habits, when they have attained their disinterested, that is, their highest state. For, according to this account, no action is virtuous, which is not prompted by rational self-interest. But though rational, and even gross self-interest, may be the necessary motives to virtuous actions previous to the generation of virtuous habits; yet when these affections are thus formed and advanced to maturity, they do themselves furnish a sufficient stimulus to virtuous actions, without any explicit regard even to this most refined and rational self-interest. And the expectation of future reward is so far from being essential to the existence of human virtue, that an explicit regard to it as a motive, is even inconsistent with a state of complete, that is, of absolutely disinterested virtue. Self annihilation, as was before observed, being essential to perfect virtue and perfect happiness." *Ibid.* pp. 435, 436.]

SECTION IV.

THEORY OF UTILITY.

This theory comprises three propositions:

1. That the essence of right, or, as the schoolmen say, the *formal nature* of right, is utility, or a tendency to produce happiness.

2. That in particular cases, where acts of injustice, ingratitude, &c. seem to the agent, in that instance, adapted to produce a preponderance of good, the only reason why he may not perform them, is, that others, in different circumstances, may, in consequence of his example, produce evil, which would more than counterbalance the good produced by him; or, in other words, that he would violate a general rule of action, on the whole useful, and the weakening of the authority of which would be an evil, exceeding the good which might follow from its violation in a particular instance.

3. That the moral habit of acting conformably to certain rules, as right, without reference to the consequences, good or bad, is the effect of association, education, custom, &c.

Prop. 1. The essence of right is utility.

If not, then something else is essential to right; which is contrary to the theory.

If it be, then, wherever we see a tendency to good on the whole, there is virtue.

I. Why then do we not view with moral approbation, natural good, as a fruitful field &c.? It may be said, that it is undesigned good; but the only moral excellence of design is its general tendency, which, if found without design, amounts to the same thing. If it be further urged, that the field is only the instrument, not the cause of good, which is God; I answer, though this is true, yet the ancients did not thus trace all natural good to the first cause, nor do the mass of mankind now do this, so habitually, as to counteract the association of the principle maintained, in respect to inanimate objects, if this principle were just.*

II. There are instances of intellectual causes of good, not morally approved, as a genius for useful inventions. Though the motive may be entirely selfish, yet the object and uniform tendency

* [The fairness of mind, with which Professor Frisbie examined every subject, may appear from the following note upon the above argument, written at a subsequent period.

'May not the reason, why inanimate and unconscious causes of utility are not approved, be this? Approbation implies merit in the object, and merit, reward; now that which is unconscious cannot be sensible of reward, or receive pleasure from approbation, and may not the conviction of this fact be the reason, why we do not feel it toward such causes of utility?']

are utility. Why then have we not a moral approbation of the author of useful inventions? Is it because there is no design to do good? But what constitutes the excellence of virtuous design, but its tendency to utility? Now if this same general tendency be found in a genius for useful inventions, and if the essence of right be utility, it should seem to be a proper object of moral approbation; and yet we never so regard it. The only answer that can be given seems to be this, that a disposition to do good, being the most common and universal cause of utility, this has so fixed our associations of right with such a disposition, that in singular instances where the disposition does not exist, though the same degree of good uniformly results, the same sentiments are not felt. Are we not then reduced to this dilemma, viz. either that utility is not the ultimate object of moral approbation, or that there is no distinction in the nature of things between a disposition to virtue, and a genius for useful inventions; only in the former case, a far more extensive influence has led us to form associations, which are wanting in the latter?

III. An act is not morally right, which is not judged to be morally right by the agent who performs it. If utility constitute right, and the utility of an action be not perceived by the agent, then the

rectitude of that action is not perceived. What then shall we say of those who do not adopt this theory, and act because they believe the act to be right, not useful, and sometimes even in opposition to their opinion of utility? What of the great mass of men, who do not take these large views, or reason about the good of the whole?

IV. It is the perception of mind discerning the rectitude of actions tending to good, and choosing them as agreeable to an intelligent nature, that gives to the spectator the sentiment of moral approbation. Acting in conformity to this perception is acting from moral principle; and in proportion to the strength of this principle, and not at all in proportion to the good produced, is the degree of approbation. Thus in painting, the object to be achieved is resemblance, yet resemblance, although generally pleasing, is not the principal source of pleasure, but the skill of the artist. It is not the good actually done, as may be shown by innumerable instances, but the disposition to do good, which we approve. And it cannot be the utility of this disposition alone; because if it were, we must in the same manner approve according to its degree, whatever is thus useful. The highest utility of virtue is to the agent himself, yet it is not, as we have seen, on this account that we approve it.

V. According to the third proposition included in this theory, as before stated, it is admitted that there are many common judgments of mankind, inconsistent with the theory of utility, by which actions are approved or censured without reference to their tendency to produce happiness. This is supposed to be explained by association.

If so, these judgments must follow the common laws of association; and the factitious approbation will be in proportion to the degree and frequency of the association of utility with actions of the kind supposed.

But what virtues, both in degree and uniformity, are so useful as industry, frugality, and common honesty? They, in some degree, are absolutely essential to the very existence of any society; and where they most abound, there is uniformly the most public and private happiness. Were they universally and perfectly prevalent, scarce any other virtue would be necessary in the world; yet these are not the virtues most highly approved. Rare and splendid instances of magnanimity, generosity, and self-devotion, though far less useful, are far more highly approved. Not only in life, but in fictitious representations of it, these latter qualities throw such a splendor over character, that we are ready to pardon not merely the neglect, but even the violation of the useful virtues.

There is nothing with which a child so early and constantly associates utility, as with parental affection; yet it is hardly esteemed a virtue. Filial duty, on the contrary, though much less associated with utility, is much more esteemed.

It is admitted that there are mistaken judgments from association; not however with the *useful*, but with the *honorable*, or what was called by the ancients *honestum*. They appear, for instance, in the false estimate which was formed by the Romans of the virtue of patriotism; and in the sentiments of the North American Indians respecting the endurance of torture, and its infliction upon their captives.

VI. According to the second proposition embraced in this theory, our duties are referred immediately to the observance of general rules. But this principle is set aside by Dr. Paley himself, in his argument against a moral sense. He says;

"Another considerable objection to the system of moral instinct is this, that there are no maxims in the science which can well be deemed *innate*, as none, perhaps, can be assigned, which are absolutely and universally *true;* in other words, which do not *bend* to circumstances. Veracity, which seems, if any be, a natural duty, is *excused* in many cases, towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman.

The obligation of promises, which is a first principle in morality, depends upon the circumstances under which they were made; they may have been unlawful, or become so since, or inconsistent with former promises, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cases, instances may be suggested, where the obligation to perform the promise would be very dubious; and so of most other general rules when they come to be actually applied."

No one can doubt from the paragraph and the example, viz. veracity, that by maxims he means *general rules*, and by circumstances, *utility*. Does not this concession at once overthrow all his reasoning respecting the obligation to observe general rules? There are, according to him, circumstances of utility sometimes so strong against a general rule, that it is right for the agent to violate it. And who but the agent is, or ever can be, the judge when these circumstances exist? Is he not, therefore, set loose at once from the restraint of general rules, and left to act agreeably to his own notions of general utility?

VII. There are cases, in which, by the common judgment of mankind, a man is not bound to act from a naked consideration of utility. There are many cases, in which he is not bound to sacrifice personal advantage, nor the good of friends, to the

greater perceived good of others. In a shipwreck, he would be justified by the common sentiments of men, in preserving his own life, or that of his wife or son, or benefactor, in preference to the life of a man of far more importance to the community. But if utility were the standard of right, he could not innocently make this preference.

VIII. Beside those already stated, the theory is exposed to the following objections.

1. The impossibility of determining what will promote the greatest good.

2. The universal language of men distinguishes the useful from the right.

3. If utility be the *final*, it is contrary to all analogy to conclude it the *efficient* cause of virtue; but of this when we speak of motives.

4. The doctrine leaves untouched the very difficulty, it is introduced to remove. It is right to produce the greatest good. The question recurs, why is it right? We understand the subject of the proposition; but what is meant by the predicate? Do they both signify the same thing? Are the terms equivalent? If so, the proposition is identical, and amounts only to this; 'that to produce the greatest good is to produce the greatest good.' But if the terms are not equivalent, then we have still to inquire what is *right?* So after all our

wanderings to escape from it, we are led back at last to this same unexplained simple idea of right.

IX. Respecting the theory under examination, it may be further observed;

1. That it seems to explain very imperfectly the duties of piety.

2. That it annihilates the virtue of justice as it respects the Deity. According to this theory, if the same amount of happiness be actually produced in the universe, it is of no consequence either how it is produced, or how it is distributed. If it be necessary that a certain quantity of misery should exist; the whole misery may be inflicted upon one portion of God's creatures; and the whole happiness given to another portion, without reference to any good or ill desert in either; since, according to this theory, the only rule of right is the production of happiness. It thus opens the way for all the obnoxious doctrines of Hopkins.

[Respecting the theory which makes virtue consist in obedience to the divine will, I omit what I have found in manuscript, on account of its brief and imperfect expression; and because the manner in which Professor Frisbie would reason upon this subject, may sufficiently appear from what precedes and follows.]

SECTION V.

RIGHT, A SIMPLE IDEA.

RIGHT is something of which our idea is simple; or in other words, something which we cannot describe but by synonymous words; which is what it is by its very nature, independently of any tendency or consequences.

It is that, which under all the circumstances of a case gives us the belief that an action should be performed.

It is that, which we approve in the actions of others, and reflect upon with satisfaction in our own.

This theory is recommended to us by its conformity to the general language and common sense of mankind; and to the Scriptures.

By its freedom from those practical embarrassments and contradictions, which encumber the other theories which we have examined.

By its explaining, with a good degree of satisfaction, most of those phenomena which we observe in the moral history of man.

Upon this theory, the question arises, by what part of our constitution is this simple idea perceived? by what part of our constitution do we be-

come acquainted with right and wrong? is it by a feeling, or by the understanding?

The perception of right is often accompanied with a feeling of pleasure; but it is not uncommon for intellectual exercises and feelings to be conjoined.

Do virtuous actions, then, give us pleasure because we perceive them to be right; or do we judge them to be right, because they produce in us a specific agreeable feeling?

The latter has been supposed to be the case;

1. Because right is a simple idea.

But to this it may be answered, that there are simple ideas of the understanding, as, for example, equality, similarity, dissimilarity, &c.

2. Because accompanied by feeling.

Answer.

1. So are other intellectual perceptions and judgments. The perception of the most abstract truths of science, and still more those which affect our happiness, is often accompanied by strong feeling.

2. Moral perceptions and judgments may exist without feeling.

3. They may exist with various degrees of feeling, at different times, and in different persons; the judgment continuing the same.

4. They may be reasoned about, and changed by reasoning.

5. The perception of merit or demerit, accompanying that of right or wrong, necessarily implies a judgment.

The question is, whether right and wrong are like sweet and bitter, merely affections of our own minds, denoting nothing in the objects to which they are referred, but the power of affecting us in a certain way; or whether they are essential properties of actions? The consequences of the former supposition are the following.

1. If right and wrong are mere feelings, they depend upon an arbitrary constitution of our nature; and we might have been made to condemn right and approve wrong.

2. Morality would depend on sensibility, fashion, custom, &c.

3. No moral character could be ascribed to God.

If right be directly perceived by the understanding, it does not follow that it must be perceived in all cases, or by all men, equally. The perception of right may imply previous knowledge; for example, gratitude is right; this may be directly perceived; but its perception implies the previous knowledge of what is meant by a favor; that one may affect the happi-

ness of another, and by what means this may be done. Justice is right; this implies a knowledge of the rights of others, and how they may be affected by actions. Again, the perception of right may imply reasoning and judgment An action, in itself an expression of gratitude, may be unjust. Here then is occasion for comparison, reasoning and judgment. If it be admitted, that it is intuitively perceived, that a man ought to promote the interest of his family and his country; it does not follow, that it must be also intuitively perceived, how these ends are to be accomplished, or how reconciled, when they seem incompatible, or which is to yield when they are really so.

This is not peculiar to morals. Suppose that a sovereign sets out with determining to make his subjects wealthy; will he find no use for reasoning and judgment in comparing and reconciling the different means; will he make no mistakes; and will all sovereigns, who proceed on the same fundamental rule, proceed in the same way?

Mathematical axioms are admitted to be intuitive; yet considerable intellectual improvement is necessary to understand them in their simplest forms; and in their various applications to the relations of quantity and number, what sagacity, what power of reasoning is required.

Neither does it follow from the doctrine, that virtue is intuitively perceived, that it must be always perceived. Whether it shall be observed or not, will depend upon the attention of the mind, and this attention is much affected by habit, custom of the country, fashion, &c. In this respect, the perception of right is exactly analogous to the perception of other intuitive truths. We may attend to one relation of actions, without observing others, as we may to the relations of numbers. A man may, for years, add 2, 4 and 8, and perceive that their sum is equal to 14, without ever observing, what is intuitively true, that these numbers are in geometrical ratio. All the relations of quantity, in respect to their equality or difference, are deduced ultimately from intuitive perceptions; yet there is an immense variety in different minds in their capacity of observing these relations, according to their different habits of attention, and their different degrees of cultivation.

The wrong judgments of men upon the morality of actions, are not so extensive as we may, at first thought, imagine. Many, and, in corrupt states of society, the majority, are not controlled by their moral judgments, but merely by public sentiment. All the latitude which this will give, they are sure to take, without any consideration of right.

When was ever a society more corrupt than that of Rome during the reigns of Tiberius and Nero? Yet where in all antiquity do we find more correct moral views, than in the writings of Seneca and Tacitus? So, too, the age of Louis XIV. produced a Fenelon.

It is admitted, that there have been, in different ages and nations, many false moral judgments; but I think it will be found that a large proportion of these refer to actions which virtue is conceived to permit, not to require, in which her office is to limit, not to forbid. Many of these false judgments have related, for example, to indulgence in the pleasures of the senses. Other false judgments refer to actions which involve various and remote principles, actions which are complex, combining good and evil, which have different relations, and may be viewed in different lights. In all the cases which have been mentioned, it is not in the least inconsistent with the principle we have maintained, that men should be misled by ignorance, passion and custom. In approving or condemning such actions, the dispute would not be so much concerning first principles, as their application.

The fact that many actions are complex and mixed, and may be regarded in different relations,

is very important to be attended to, in reference to the present subject. An action may be, in some of its relations, undoubtedly innocent or virtuous; while in others it is undoubtedly wrong. To relieve a worthy person in distress is right; not to pay my debts, when I have the means, is wrong; may I then relieve such distress with the money promised to my creditor? To determine questions of this sort, many circumstances are sometimes to be taken into view, some of which may be overlooked by one, which are observed by another.

We must likewise remember the influence of association in varying moral judgments. In complex impressions, the character of the whole is derived from the character of the most striking parts. Our moral taste is thus affected in the same manner as our literary taste.

If these considerations be well attended to and applied, will there be any greater difficulty in reconciling the variety in the moral judgments of mankind with the theory of intuitive perception, than with any other? That surely can be no objection to an hypothesis, which it might be proved, *a priori*, would follow from the hypothesis itself.

To a being of perfect knowledge and wisdom, all moral, as well as all other truth, must be intui-

tive, because all possible relations are completely present to his mind at once; but by finite minds, as some of these relations may be either unknown or unattended to, and different relations observed by different persons, there will be different judgments.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES RESPECTING RIGHT ACTIONS.

1. The general tendency of right actions is to produce good or happiness; but the perception of right is distinct from the perception of utility.

2. Though right leads to good, it is not always the greatest good; as it would be, if utility alone were the rule of right; but it is often the good of particular individuals, rather than the general good; according as such individuals stand related to the agent, or have certain rights in regard to him.

3. All men have certain rights, either natural or adventitious; and actions are wrong which violate these rights; and actions are right, which are conformable to them.

4. There are relations which do not give the perfect rights just referred to, which yet render those actions right, that tend to prevent harm, or to

produce good, to one rather than another, without considering the general consequences.

5. There is therefore another principle of action, by which good is to be distributed, beside a regard to the greatest good. This principle we call rectitude, or, in a broad sense, justice.

6. Those actions are right, which on the whole tend to produce good or prevent harm, under the control of the principle just stated. Or, in other words, we should have a general regard to the greatest good, modified by a regard to the rights of individuals, and the relations in which we stand. And absolute right is acting conformably to this rule.

7. Of this absolute right, our idea is simple and intuitive.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

All the theories on this subject may be resolved into two: that which refers it to *Prudence*, and that which refers it to *Conscience*, or a perception of Right.

For when I ask, why I am obliged to perform a particular act of benevolence; if it be answered, because it will promote the general good; the question returns, why I am obliged to promote the general good; there are then three answers which may be given; either 1. to promote indirectly my own good; or, 2. because it is the command of God; or 3. because it is right.

If again I ask, why I am obliged to obey the command of God; only two answers can be given. 1. Because he will reward me, if I do, and punish me, if I do not; or 2. because it is right. Thus we come at last to *Prudence* and *Right*.

Is moral obligation, then, a motive arising from self-interest?

We may use the word *motive* in one of two senses. 1. That which affects the will. 2. That which has a general adaptation to affect the will of that kind of beings, to whom it is presented.

All men have a desire of happiness; but no object or course of conduct can act on this desire,

or become a motive in the first sense, till the agent is convinced that it will promote his happiness. Now if an agent do not believe in a future retribution, and is not convinced that virtue will promote his happiness in this life, he can have no motive to virtue, and of course no obligation. If motive be used in the second sense, then it must mean, either that the object or action is such, as will affect the will of many, perhaps of most beings of the kind to whom it is addressed; which is only saying, that it is to these many or most, a motive of the first kind, and to the remainder no motive at all; or we may mean that the motive is such, that it would be better for the agent to be influenced by it. This is our opinion; but who is to be the judge, we or the agent? Prove it to be so to him, and it becomes a motive of the first kind. Otherwise, it is no motive at all. For how can one be worthy of praise or blame, for not being affected by what he does not perceive? Or, lastly, we may mean by motive that by which the will of the agent ought to be affected. And this I am ready to think is precisely what we intend by moral obligation. If it be said, as in the last case, that this cannot affect the will where it is not perceived, it is admitted. But we say, it is of the very nature of right; and the faculty of perceiving it, is what constitutes a moral agent.

If obligation might be resolved into prudence, or a regard to our own gratification, there would be no distinction between moral pleasures and other pleasures, except in degree. A regard to the former could be urged on no other grounds, than a regard to the latter. Nor would there be any proper moral distinction in motives; since self-interest is supposed by this theory to be the motive of every act.

The very notions of reward and punishment presuppose obligation;* and that which renders us obnoxious to punishment, is not the foreknowledge of it; but the violation of some known obligation.† Sanctions are distant, in order that an opportunity may be given to moral principle to act.

Our idea of moral obligation then is this: we judge certain actions to be *right*, others, *wrong*; and this judgment is accompanied with the belief; or rather in this judgment is implied the belief, that the former should be performed, and the latter avoided.

Let any man analyze his principles of conduct, and he will find after enumerating all the motives of interest to virtuous conduct, a sense of duty still left.

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* Stewart. † Butler.

[I am again compelled to omit what I find on the subject of *Approbation* and *Merit*, as too imperfectly expressed in the very brief notes which are before me. I subjoin one detached remark upon a passage in Brown's lectures, which, as I have formerly stated, were read by Professor Frisbie a short time before his death.]

"To feel," says Brown, "the character of *approvableness*, in an action, which we have not yet performed, and are only meditating on it as *future*, is to feel the *moral obligation*, or moral inducement to perform it;—when we think of the action, in the moment of volition, we term the voluntary performance of it *virtue*,—when we think of the action as already performed, we denominate it *merit*;—in all which cases, if we analyze our moral sentiment, we cannot fail to discern, that it is one constant feeling of moral approval, with which we have been impressed, that is, varied only by the difference of the time, at which we regard the action, as *future*, *immediate*, or *past*."*

There is some question, says Professor Frisbie, of the truth of this as to obligation. Are there not many actions, which seem to us to have very little

* Brown iv. 149.

virtue or merit, yet by which the feeling of obligation is very strongly excited ; nay is not the obligation often inversely as the merit, as for example, in regard to the payment of honest debts ?

ON THE

Moral Constitution

OF MAN.

We must examine the nature and faculties of man, in order to determine for what he is destined, and of what regulation he is susceptible. Man is an intellectual and active being. In the former character, he is endowed with perception, consciousness, and the power of thinking, reasoning, judging, &c.; in the latter he has will, appetites, desires, &c.

His intellectual nature belongs to the ideologist; but actions and the principles from which they proceed, fall within the province of the moralist.

My object then is to take a survey of the active principles of man, to describe their distinctive features, to examine their nature and tendency, and thus to discover their final cause, or the design for which they were given us. From a careful reference to this design in each individual principle, as well as their mutual relations, we shall be able to deduce those practical rules, by which they are to be regulated

and directed, in mutual subserviency, to the production of the highest perfection and happiness, of which beings endowed at once with intelligence and feeling are susceptible. I say their mutual relations, as well as the design of each, because it does not follow that we are to obey every principle really natural to its full extent. Each would in this case interfere with the exercise of others, no less natural. Each, therefore, is to be exercised in subordination to all.

In the prosecution of what I have proposed, there are two reflections to which I shall aim frequently and forcibly to conduct your thoughts. In the first place, to lead you to observe in the constitution of our active powers, indications of wise and benevolent design, no less admirable than in the mechanical contrivance of our bodies, and in the accommodations and arrangements of the material world; and thus to excite in your hearts a profound sentiment of adoration and love for the Father of our spirits, as well as the Framer of our bodies.

And secondly, as you contemplate the various springs of action, the appetites, desires, affections and rational principles, which compose our moral constitution, it is my wish that you may be impressed with a deep conviction, that the true dignity and happiness of man can result only from their harmo-

nious cooperation; from keeping each in its proper sphere and due degree; and thus that you may be inspired with a generous love of moral excellence, and an ardent desire of its attainment, so as, in this manner, to accomplish the end of your being.

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INSTINCT.

INSTINCT is a blind impulse to certain actions, which have a direct tendency to important ends, without any knowledge originally in the agent of those ends, or reference to their attainment.

It is observed principally in brutes. In man, instincts are so few, and so soon affected by experience, that their distinctive character is not so easily discerned.

Instinct is principally distinguished from reason by its uniformity in all animals of the same species; whereas reason is infinitely varied in degree and mode of operation in different individuals; and secondly, by the certainty of its operations, prior to all experience; while reason often fails in its purposes, and founds all its calculations on previous knowledge.

In man, the most obvious instances of instinct, are the first exercise of the appetites.

To these, Dr. Reid adds those cases, in which, although we will the ultimate effect, yet all those intermediate motions of the muscles, which are necessary for its accomplishment, take place without our design or knowledge, as, for example, swallowing and speaking. In this view of the subject, every muscular motion must be considered as instinctive.

Other instances of instinct usually given are the instantaneous motion, by which we balance ourselves against a fall, or ward off a blow, the sudden winking of the eye at the approach of harm, &c. Whether they are justly so considered, must be determined by the definition. The true character of instinct seems to be this; it leads directly and certainly to an end, of which the agent is unconscious.

The necessity of this principle in brutes is obvious; since to accomplish the same ends without it, would require not only the reason of man, but all those powers of sociability and improvement, by which he is distinguished. This would unfit them for the rank they hold in the scale of being, and for the general purposes of their creation.

In man, instinct supplies the place of reason and experience, before they can act, or when they have not time to interfere.

Instinctive imitation is seen early in children. They do many things, at which it can hardly be supposed they aim. And in mature life, we involuntarily fall into the peculiar manners and language of those with whom we live. Instinct is thus useful in producing assimilation. In its operation both in the inferior animals and in man, it illustrates the designing wisdom and goodness of God.

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APPETITES.

APPETITE, in an extensive sense, denotes any strong desire. Philosophically speaking, appetites are thus distinguished:

1. They take their rise from the body.

2. They are periodical, or destroyed for the time, by gratification.

3. They, at least originally, imply an uneasy sensation, afterwards, upon experience, a desire of their appropriate objects.

They are properly three—hunger, thirst, and the sexual appetite.

The final causes of the appetites are the preservation of the individual, and the continuation of the species. Reason alone would, in many cases, be found insufficient to effect these ends. According to the remark of Paley, the goodness of God is shown in connecting pleasure with the exercise of the appetites, when the impulse of pain might alone have been sufficient to effect their direct purposes.

The wisdom and goodness of God are further shown in this, that every original principle of human nature has not only its proper direct end, highly important; but has also various relations, connexions and indirect influences, whereby it produces much good. Thus the uses of the appetites are not merely the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the species. A little reflection will show, that no inconsiderable portion of the activity and happiness of mankind depend upon them. The enjoyments they put us directly upon seeking, may not be great in themselves; but they are the occasion and nucleus of a thousand pleasures and virtues, which spring from and cluster around them.

How much of the prudence, sagacity and enterprise of the great mass of men is exercised in

procuring food, and furnishing a provision for marriage? How many distinct and even refined satisfactions are connected with the family and social board, which, were the appetites annihilated, would die with them. In like manner, the sexual appetite is, in a greater or less degree, the occasion of all the delights and virtues of domestic life. While then the immediate gratifications of the appetites are insignificant and transient; yet they indirectly become the occasions of some of the best sympathies and purest enjoyments of our nature. Instead therefore of considering man as degraded by his appetites, let us consider them, as they really are, striking instances of the goodness of our Creator, who has given us power thus to purify and extend the influence of principles, which, in their first aspect, seem but the humble and necessary means of preservation. It is not the legitimate use, but the abuse of the appetites, by which man is degraded.

The moral character of the appetites, in themselves considered, is indifferent. The province of virtue is in their regulation. They are restrained;

1. By a counter impulse, in brutes as well as men.

2. By reason and duty. The rule being taken principally from their final cause.

I have thus attempted to explain to you the nature and uses of the appetites. Their highest satisfactions are, as we have seen, indirect and associated. The specific pleasure attached to them can, from its very nature, occupy but a small portion of existence. In themselves considered, they involve none of those intellectual and moral exercises, which constitute the peculiar excellence and happiness of man. Nay more, in their excess, they are inconsistent with all those tranquil and refined delights, which can be diffused through the whole of life, and enjoyed with increasing purity and relish. The wise Author of our being has therefore provided, in the very constitution of things, the most powerful as well as salutary restraints upon the inordinate indulgence of these animal principles. Hunger and thirst are intended to invigorate the body and the mind; but immoderate eating and drinking enfeeble and oppress both, and lead to those confirmed habits of gluttony and drunkenness, which efface every feature of virtue and intelligence from the soul, and bear down the body, loaded with disease, to an untimely grave. The sexual appetite, which, within the limits of reason and religion, is the foundation of the various domestic relations, and of all those ties and sympathies, which grow out of those relations; what are

its consequences, when set loose from these restraints? Would you know? Imagine then a young man of ingenuous feelings and promising talents, just entering one of our public seminaries. His parents, with strong solicitude, but still stronger hope, place him in a situation, where so much must be trusted to his own discretion and virtue. His heart however is full of good resolves and animating expectations. For a time he succeeds well, and promises much. But he is assailed by the temptations of the profligate; his imagination is polluted, and his desires inflamed; conscience, and his early impressions, struggle against temptation; and had the thought of his parents come over his mind, he might have been saved. But the promptings of passion and the solicitations of the seducer prevail. He visits the haunts of debauchery; but still he does not intend that his health shall be impaired, his studies neglected, or his prospects obscured. He is resolved to be discreet, secret and moderate. But indulgence does but inflame his desires; his fancy is crowded with licentious images; his thoughts perpetually wander to scenes of illicit pleasure. All moderate enjoyments lose their relish; his studies become irksome; the rewards of intellectual exertion no longer excite him. At first his heart could not

but recoil with strong loathings of disgust from the degraded instruments of his gratification. But it is the peculiar nature of this, more than of any other vice, to spread its pollution over the whole character. By degrees his moral sensibility is destroyed; and he is no longer offended by obscene jests and vulgar profaneness, even from a woman's lips. Thus are wasted in the alternations of riot and depression, those hours and opportunities which might have made him the ornament and support of society. He goes forth into the world; perhaps he may now reform; if he does, with what bitter compunction will he look back on the past; but it is more probable that he will not. The force of habit and an incapacity for sober enjoyments are now added to the temptations that first led him astray. His constitution is gradually undermined; paleness spreads over his cheek; he becomes the prey of feebleness and disease; and the scene is closed by the dreadful alternative of early death, or the lingering infirmities of a premature old age, unsoothed by the consciousness of respectability or the voice of real affection.

It is by these dreadful evils, that the Almighty has clearly expressed his displeasure at the abuse of those appetites, which he intended for the wisest and kindest purposes. The picture is not overcharg-

ed. I have said that sensuality destroys the capacity for intellectual exertion, and the relish for tranquil and refined enjoyments; and when have you known the votary of licentious pleasures, who could bend down his mind to resolute study, or find satisfaction in literary pursuits, or rational conversation? Or, is it possible that he who is familiar with the most degraded of his species, and whose only intercourse with the sex is that of appetite, can have any taste for purity, and modesty, and moral beauty? Has he any thing left in his heart, which can delight in the interchange of sentiment, and the endearments of affection? I have said that sensuality enfeebles the body, and brings on disease and death. And has not your observation constantly taught you, that the haggard countenance, and the emaciated and tottering frame, sooner or later, mark its victim?

[I have not been able to arrange any portion of the notes, relating to the *Desires*, in a proper form for publication.]

AFFECTIONS.

An affection is a mental exercise, known only by experience; yet it may be so described as that those, who know it from this source, may distinguish it from others, which are common to their nature.

Affections, then, are excitements of mind, which have sentient beings, more commonly persons, for their objects. They are, therefore, distinct from mere complacency or displacency, which may exist toward inanimate things, and from desires, which have things, not persons, for their objects. In desires also, the cause and the object are generally identified; in the affections, with the exception, perhaps, of general benevolence, their cause and their object are different.

The affections have been generally divided into benevolent and malevolent; because, considered as active principles, they have a general tendency to communicate pleasure or pain to their object. Yet there are states of affection which do not necessa-

rily imply a disposition to produce good or evil to the object; or, at least, can easily be conceived of as distinct from it. All the affections, however, are either agreeable or disagreeable to their subject. The agreeable seem to me to be, esteem, love, and benevolence, in different degrees, and variously compounded; the disagreeable, disesteem, hatred, and malevolence.

Esteem is founded on the moral qualities of the object considered in himself. When these qualities have in them somewhat more elevated, esteem becomes respect; when they are uncommon and truly great, admiration or veneration. The opposites of these are disesteem, disrespect, and contempt.

Love is that to which the name of affection is more peculiarly appropriated in the common use of language. It is founded on the amiable qualities of the object, real or apparent, and more generally implies some particular relation of that object to ourselves. We often call it, attachment. It is that intimate feeling, which binds us together in the closer ties of sympathy and communion. The opposites of love are dislike, aversion, hatred.

Benevolence is a disposition to communicate good to the object; and malevolence, evil.

The particular affections in these two classes are often confounded ; but are easily distinguishable from each other. Thus strangers, those of whom we have only read, may be the objects of esteem ; while we are unconscious of love or benevolence. Unamiable or repelling qualities are sometimes so blended with those which are truly estimable, that we say we respect such a man, but can never love him. We highly esteem many around us, whom we know, or of whom we have heard ; but unless there subsist some relation between us and them, some intercourse, and reciprocation of regard, love, if it exist at all, exists in a very low degree. In like manner, love is often found without esteem ; as in the attachment of parents to unworthy children. Amiable features of character may interest our hearts, where we cannot but condemn the character on the whole. Esteem generally leads to benevolence, and love always implies it ; yet benevolence may often exist in a high degree without either. Thus the most worthless and unamiable are never excluded from the benevolence of the good.

Benevolent Affections.

THE benevolent affections imply a desire of the happiness of their object, as an ultimate end, not as a means of our own happiness.

They are originally agreeable; but it does not follow from this, that they are selfish.*

They are given us with a direct view to the good of the species; as the appetites are to that of the individual.

They are particular, or general. The particular, point to the good of some one rather than another, in consequence of particular relations. The general is the affection more commonly designated by the term *benevolence;* and regards the happiness of others, not as they are related to us, but as they happen to fall within the sphere of our action.

The benevolent affections are not estimated in proportion to their utility; since the particular affections are more directly and perceptibly useful, than the general; yet general benevolence is esteemed more highly in the scale of virtue, than the particular affections.

The distinction between the doctrine of Hutchinson and Paley respecting the benevolent affections

* Butler.

is this:—according to the former, benevolence is in itself and directly agreeable, when perceived or contemplated, without a view to its consequences; according to the latter, it is the utility of benevolence alone that causes it to be approved.

General benevolence has been heretofore shown not to include the whole of virtue.

Malevolent Affections.

We may be ill-affected toward others, either on account of their good or bad qualities. The good qualities of others, when considered in their own nature, or in their direct and immediate relation to us, are never the causes of ill-affections. If it be said that uncommon generosity, or ready forgiveness in return for injury, sometimes excites hatred in the breasts of the malignant and depraved, I am inclined to think, that in these feelings, there is a secret reference to the impressions and judgment of the impartial spectator, and to the unfavorable comparison which will in such case be made by him.

The good qualities of men, when considered in their influence on others, may excite in us jealousy and envy.

Jealousy has reference to the end pursued by another in common with us, rather than to the means of its attainment which he may possess; and to the end considered as uncertain. The end, when attained, as well as the qualities by which it is obtained, may be the cause of envy. These principles have in them more or less of malevolence.

Jealousy and envy, in their specific character, have always reference to the cause which excites them; but when long indulged, they settle into a principle of ill-will, which has no such necessary reference. This principle is hatred.

The bad qualities, which we observe in those around us, when considered in themselves, produce dislike, disrespect, contempt, disgust, &c.; when in their operation upon ourselves, resentment; when in their operation upon others, a sympathetic resentment, which, when exercised in a considerable degree, we call indignation. Indignation and resentment are malevolent affections, and, like jealousy and envy, lose in time their specific character, and become hatred.

Emulation is a desire of superiority, attended with an uneasiness at being surpassed.

The primary principle is properly a desire, rather than an affection; since its object is not a person; but as this object can be obtained but by one, there

is necessarily implied in it a malevolent affection toward the rival competitor, viz. a wish that he may be disappointed. Thus far, emulation is essentially malevolent. Yet this affection may easily be distinguished from envy, which is too naturally its concomitant. Emulation rests in the evil of disappointment. Envy would punish, with other mischief, a successful competitor. Emulation would rejoice that he should not gain the prize; envy, that some accidental evil should destroy the advantage and pleasure of victory, when gained. Emulation strives to rise above every rival; envy is satisfied, if it can bring its rivals below its own level.

Emulation has a most powerful influence, as a principle of action, in every rank of life. It is a most interesting question, how far it may be employed in education. There are two evils attending its use.

1. It tends to make the excellence aimed at, comparative, not positive.

2. It tends almost inevitably to generate envy, and produce a habit of associating our own disappointment with the success of others, and *vice versa*. Thus, in time, the prosperity and advancement of others, even when in no degree connected with ourselves, become occasions of repining and uneasiness.

It is an error, as fatal as it is common, to substitute the means of happiness for happiness itself. Thus parents, if they can secure to their children those intellectual talents and attainments, which may render them distinguished, are not sufficiently cautious, lest in doing this, those feelings and dispositions are generated, which are equally incompatible with virtue or happiness. Yet as, from the very constitution of society, the principle of emulation will be excited, the only thing we can do, is to repress, rather than to stimulate it, and to cherish those benevolent affections, which may neutralize the bad tendencies of the spirit of competition. The rewards and punishments of children should rather be positive and independent, than comparative.

Emulation sometimes produces a universal and inordinate desire of distinction; and thus gives rise to *vanity*, or love of display; or by creating in us an undue estimate of those qualities in which we think we excel, generates *pride*. Mr. Hume, however, conceives the love of approbation to be founded on pride, and not pride on the love of approbation. The truth perhaps is, that they are reciprocally cause and effect. Yet pride seems to have its origin in the desire of superiority; since it is always founded on qualities

which we believe distinguish us from others. Pride and vanity, though often united, are sometimes entirely separate; and seem to have in their nature even some opposition to each other. Self-conceit may produce indifference to the opinion of others; and, on the other hand, self-distrust may produce an intemperate desire of their approbation.

Pride, I have observed, always fixes on somewhat discriminating. We are never proud that we are not brutes, nor humble that we are not angels. Thus a traveller, when abroad, is disposed to depreciate what he sees in comparison with what is to be found in his own country, and to do the contrary on his return.

It makes no important difference, whether this discriminating quality depend on ourselves or not. Pride and humility are excited no less by natural and accidental distinctions, than by those which are the result of personal effort. Thus beauty, genius, hereditary wealth or rank, are even more frequently the occasions of pride, than learning, or than property acquired by our own exertions. The reason is, that they seem to create a more unattainable distinction. This principle may be applied to illustrate the natural effect of the doctrines of depravity and election. Conformably to what has been stated, their obvious tendency will

be to produce, not humility, but pride, in those who believe themselves the subjects of election.

Pride is sometimes used in a good sense. The most generalised notion of pride is self-estimation; and this may be well or ill-founded. It is a sentiment, that is, a feeling connected with and founded on a judgment. From our natural bias to excessive self-appreciation, the word, when used without qualification, is commonly used in a bad sense.

[I have been unable to extract any thing proper for publication from the notes on *Resentment* and *Indignation;* except the following remarks.

'Resentment and anger are no less important in the moral economy, than love and benevolence; and equally show the goodness of God. They are necessary restraints upon vice and cruelty. But nature has provided a check upon these affections in their painful nature and unamiable character.'

* * * * * *

'The pleasure of love is as far from being the cause of love, as the pain of hatred is from being the cause of hatred. We must love, before we can know love to be agreeable; as we must hate, before we can learn the painful nature of hatred.']

Revenge.

If revenge be so decidedly criminal, as is taught in the Christian Scriptures, how can we explain the approbation of it, common among the ancients, and among barbarous nations, and, indeed, the too prevalent countenance it receives in civilized countries in modern times?

It may be remarked, that in ancient times and among barbarous nations, where instances of atrocious revenge have been most frequent, rights were not legally defined and secured, with that certainty and precision, which exists under the governments of civilized and modern nations. Hence that degree of personal retaliation, which is necessary for self-defence, could not be clearly distinguished from vindictive cruelty; and indulgence, and even approbation, would naturally be extended from the former to the latter.

The malevolence of revenge is often contemplated in combination with qualities in themselves estimable, or which are objects of respect; and it is a law of our nature, that qualities presented to us intimately connected, receive a common character from the character of those to which our notice is most attracted. Thus a popular writer may

corrupt the literary or the moral taste of his contemporaries, so that even his faults may be admired.

Respecting those atrocities which the clans of the Highlands of Scotland, and the savages of North America, have often inflicted upon their enemies and prisoners, it may be remarked, that the limits of necessary severity toward enemies were not settled; that these cruelties were considered as strong expressions of attachment to their clan, to their tribe, and to their friends who had perished; that they were evidences of their own courage in battle, of their skill and address in circumventing the foe, and of victory. Among our own Indians, his tormentors afford to the prisoner, in the tortures which they inflict, an opportunity of displaying those qualities in which they most glory, courage in provoking, and fortitude in enduring suffering. How little of malignity enters into their revenge, is shown by the fact, that it often depends on some slight circumstance, whether the captive shall be sacrificed as a victim, or adopted in the place of a relation lost in battle.

Private revenge is considered as expressive of a high sense of character, of a deep sensibility of disgrace, and of courage. Mere wrongs, which imply no disrespect, and inflict no disgrace, are not

the occasions of revenge among those called men of honor; nor would assassination or secret vengeance be sanctioned by the approvers of duels. Any circumstance, considered as marking cruelty or malice, would be as much condemned by the advocates of *honorable satisfaction*, as by the christian moralist. When, to the indignation which is naturally felt against the authors of injury, we add the influence of the circumstances we have just mentioned, it is no wonder that revenge has been regarded with sentiments very different from those, which, when it appears in its naked deformity, it is adapted to excite.

Could the christian virtue of forgiveness be placed in fair contrast with any form of revenge, each of them stripped of all accidental associations, the natural conscience of man, I am pursuaded, would not hesitate in its decision. Whenever, in fact, instances of revenge have presented to the observer the malevolence of this passion, undisguised by the mixture of sentiments honorable in themselves, it naturally excites abhorrence in every one; and on the other hand, when forgiveness cannot be suspected to spring from mean-spiritedness or timidity, no quality is felt to be more truly expressive of magnanimity.

The christian precept, when fully understood in its nature and consequences to the happiness of individuals, and peace of society, cannot but be approved.

EMOTIONS.

The word *emotion* is used in two senses.

1. Desires and affections are continued states of the mind; a single impulse or momentary excitement of these is called an emotion. Here, however, it must be observed, that these impulses, in order to receive this name, must be considerably vivid. Desires and affections are supposed to have an existence, even when they are not active. An emotion is always in action. An affection may be compared to the blood flowing from the heart over the system; emotions, to the sensible pulsations in which it flows; an affection, to the continued harmony of a tune; emotions, to the individual notes which compose it.

2. There is another use of the term. There are exercises of an agreeable or painful nature, which have a cause, but no object. These are

called emotions. The gratification or disappointment of any desire is attended with agreeable or painful emotions, which, heightened and continued, become joy and grief.

From the union of anticipated joy and grief in different proportions, are formed, as either predominates, hope and fear. Hope and fear are not active. It is the desire or aversion associated with them, which is active, greatly enlivened by the uncertainty, and the vibratory state of the mind.

PASSIONS.

All mental excitements are often called passions. They are distinguished from the other mental excitements, by degree rather than kind. A degree of affection or desire implying perturbation, constitutes passion. Terms denoting mental excitement are not used with precision; because they are so much employed in common life.

Passion is most commonly used in a bad sense. This name is particularly given to the malevolent affections; because they are usually attended with perturbation. Passion takes from the mind that self-possession which admits the control of reason and duty; and thus lays us open to temptation.

Uses.

The affections, in that calm state, in which the term is indiscriminately applied, rarely become powerful principles of action. Hence passion, in a good cause, and well directed, is often necessary in difficult cases, to give activity, resolution, and perseverance.

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DISPOSITION.

Disposition is not so much a distinct principle, as a modification of those already mentioned. Choice, inclination, and disposition are often confounded. *Choice* has relation to the will; *inclination*, to the occasional state of the appetites, desires, or affections; *disposition*, to their prevalent state. For example, a child solicits some pernicious indulgence of a kind and wise parent; the parent's disposition is affectionate; his inclination, to indulge; his choice, from prudence, to refuse. Cæsar's disposition was ambitious; his inclination, to accept the crown when offered him; his choice, to refuse.

Disposition is an aptitude of mind to exercise one class of affections &c. rather than another. Thus;

Good temper is an aptitude to the quiet and calm affections, in opposition to the irritable and passionate.

Good humor, to the cheerful, in opposition to the sullen and morose.

Good nature, to the kind and obliging, in opposition to the malevolent and envious.

Dispositions may be divided into natural and acquired. What are called natural, are either cognate, or dependant on very early impressions. If cognate, they may arise from physical temperament, or, perhaps, from mental.

Acquired dispositions are the effect of accident or discipline.

Discipline requires attention to the laws by which the affections, and, consequently, dispositions, are governed.

1. Actions and words which are the natural signs of certain affections, tend to continue and reproduce those affections.

To act or talk out, as it is called, an evil affection may, perhaps, dissipate the affection for the time; but it strengthens the disposition. We often speak of men's talking or acting themselves into a passion. The mind insensibly assumes a tone, corresponding to the external deportment. Thus under any strong exercise of affliction or

anger, the mind often acquires calmness and even cheerfulness, in consequence of being restrained in the expression of those feelings by the presence of strangers. The feeblest child often becomes a mother's favorite, because it requires more expressions and acts of care and affection.*

2. There is an affinity of all the agreeable affections with each other, and also of the painful with each other.†

Thus an unexpected instance of success puts us in good humor with all around us; and ill accidents have a tendency to produce a contrary effect. Any one agreeable feeling opens the door for the whole family, and they mingle with and enliven each other. Thus a fine evening and beautiful scenery render poetry or music more delightful. The singing of birds in a cage affords us little pleasure, compared with their warbling in the woods, when it comes to us mingled with the rustling of

* ["Have I not nursed, for two long wretched years,
That miserable hope, which every day
Grew weaker, *like a baby sick to death*
Yet dearer for its weakness, day by day."—Southey.]

† [It seems to me that we can hardly estimate too highly the importance of attending to this principle in the discipline of education.]

leaves, the murmur of streams, and the hum of insects.

"How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank."

* * * * * *

"I think the nightingale, if she should sing by day,
When every goose is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than a wren."

In conformity with this law of our nature, the tendency of health, is to produce cheerfulness and benevolence; and one natural tendency of sickness is to produce ill-temper.

How is it then that sickness and sorrow have a tendency to improve the character?

Answer. They soften the heart, by rendering us more dependant on the good offices of others; they make us feel the necessity of effort; and they serve to introduce religious thoughts and sentiment. When these effects are not produced, sickness tends to sour the affections.

3. The changes from one affection to another should be gradual, as strong contrasts produce reaction.

HABIT.

HABIT sometimes denotes an *effect*, sometimes a *cause*. When an *effect*, it is a facility of acting in a particular way, together with a propensity so to act, produced by frequent repetition. When signifying a *cause*, it denotes this frequent repetition itself. Habit is of incalculable use in the arts, and in the animal and moral economy. In mechanical processes, in walking, sitting, playing on an instrument, &c. it teaches us to use those muscles only which are necessary, and produces a facility of operation, which is continued with little conscious interference of the will. In the animal and moral economy, it creates new appetites and desires, and strengthens the old. Its power is not sensibly felt but in resistance; as we do not perceive the strength of a current, till we attempt to stem it. Considered as an effect, its physical causes are unknown, its laws are all which we can discover.

The great law of habit, as stated by Butler, is this; it strengthens active propensities, and weakens passive impressions. Thus, whatever we have been accustomed to do at certain hours, and under certain circumstances, we continue to do from habit, although the original motive may have

ceased to operate. A merchant, who has given up business, may often be found on change at the regular hour. Passive impressions, like animal stimuli, lose their effect by repetition. Novelty is necessary to excite emotion. Scenes of distress, for instance, whether real or fictitious, touch our feelings less, in proportion as we are accustomed to their contemplation.

One use of habit may be thus explained. The great design of strong impressions is to put us in motion; but, at the same time, they embarrass us in action. Habit strengthens their good, and counteracts their bad effect.

Passive impressions that lead to wrong actions, if resisted, soon lose their power. Those which lead to good actions, if yielded to, acquire more operative strength. In good or evil habits, as the propensity to act is continually increased, so the influence of counteracting motives is continually diminished. Thus both virtue and vice are in their nature progressive. Wicked men grow worse and worse, and gradually seem removed beyond the reach of virtuous motives. *The path of the good is as the rising light, shining more and more to the perfect day.*

Many things are to be done, not on their own account, considered in themselves, but merely for the sake of forming habits.

* * * * * * * * *

The principles, hitherto explained, are called *animal*. Their operation, however, is very different in man, and in the inferior animals, so far as they are possessed by the latter. In the latter, they fix on what is present; in the former, on what is future also. In the latter, they are more simple, and opposed by each other only; in the former they are mixed and associated together; and are modified, controlled, and opposed by *rational principles*.

RATIONAL PRINCIPLES.

REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS ON THE WHOLE, OR SELF-LOVE.

MAN resembles the brutes in the possession of the appetites, and most of the desires and affections, already described. These do not necessarily tend to the good of the individual on the whole; but often to its destruction. He differs from them in SELF-LOVE, which is not seen in the inferior animals or infants. Self-love is a rational principle. Its office is to provide for our good on the whole, by the regulation, balancing, and use of the primary appetites, desires, and affections. It is distinct from these, and subsequent to them in its operation. Those desires, which terminate in some good for ourselves, may be, and often are, inconsistent with rational self-love. It requires, on the contrary, the strongest exercise of the benevolent affections. Benevolence and self-love are equally important, the former to the individual, and the latter to society. For it is essential to society, that each individual should take a reasonable care of himself; and we

accordingly approve such rational regard to one's self, and condemn the want of it.

Selfishness is wholly distinct from, and opposed to, rational self-love; as tending to degrade us and destroy our happiness. It consists in an exclusive regard to that class of desires, which terminate in some good for ourselves.

SENSE OF DUTY.

We perceive certain actions to be right; others, wrong. This perception is accompanied with a belief of obligation. This belief is a principle of action. Acting therefore from a regard to the rectitude of actions is acting from a sense of duty. This principle differs entirely from those already considered. It may be viewed as natural; since that may be called natural, which is developed, when its proper objects are presented.

Almost every right action has its appropriate sentiment, which leads to its performance. These are subsidiary to a sense of duty; and the office of a sense of duty is to supply the defects of these, and to regulate or check their operation. It becomes then an important question; When are we

to be actuated by these sentiments, and when by a sense of duty?

In relation to the appetites; the sense of duty is the principle by which they are to be regulated; not a motive to their gratification.

In regard to those actions, which may be performed from various motives, the sense of duty leads us to give a decided preference to the benevolent affections over those desires which terminate in our own good. Thus an act of beneficence done from the mere desire of esteem is but little approved. We are willing that there should be a general regard to the good opinion of others, but it must be a sort of condiment, rather than a substantial motive.

In regard to the benevolent affections; the approved office of a sense of duty is rather to control, and if the case require, to restrain them, than to prompt to the actions which they naturally produce. Thus we should not approve so highly a parent or friend, who needed a sense of duty to lead him to perform kind offices. We should, on the contrary, prefer that a sense of duty should be called in to check the excess of fondness and partiality.

On the other hand, in regard to those actions which cause pain to others, such as the infliction

of punishment, they become objects of moral approbation solely in proportion as they proceed from a sense of duty.

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PIETY.

All the principles we have mentioned, may be considered as laws of God, as they are parts of the constitution he has given us, and obviously tend to the best ends.

Piety is a sentiment implying certain feelings, as well as perceptions of the understanding. There have been two erroneous extremes respecting its nature. Some have considered it as a mere feeling; and others have explained it as a mere intellectual exercise.

Piety, philosophically considered, is distinct from the preceding principles, even from a sense of duty. The sense of duty existed in the minds of Heathens without reference to the will of God. At the present day, however, with the light which Christians enjoy, piety enters into, sanctifies, and elevates all the principles of right action. It is founded in the natural sentiments of the heart. Our

idea of the moral character of God is nothing but the perfection and union of all which we love and venerate. Benevolence, veracity, and justice are qualities agreeable to us from their very nature, as their opposites are odious; and power and wisdom, united with goodness, form the proper and peculiar object of the sentiment of veneration. Piety, therefore, is natural to man.

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MORAL TASTE.

Sensibility to beauty is in some degree common to all; but it is infinitely varied, according as it has been cultivated by habit and education. To the man whose taste has been formed on just principles, and who has been led to perceive and relish what is truly beautiful, a new world is opened. He looks abroad over nature, and contemplates the productions of art, with sentiments, to which those, who are destitute of this faculty, are strangers. He perceives in the works of God, and in the contrivances of man, all the *utility* for which they were destined and adapted, in common with others; but besides this, his heart is filled with sentiments of the *beautiful* or the *grand*, accord-

ing to the nature of the object. The qualities, which are the occasion of this sentiment, may be ascertained and classed; and the laws of its operation settled; but the sentiment itself can be known only from experience, and cannot be defined. It is in literature, that taste, in the more common use of the word, has its most extensive sphere, and most varied gratifications; yet whether it be exercised on nature, the fine arts, or literature, we are aware how much depends on associations with life, feeling, and human character. Why does the traveller wander with such peculiar interest over the mountains and plains of Italy and Greece, but because every spot is consecrated by the memory of great events, or presents to him the memorials of departed genius? It is for this reason, that poetry peoples even solitude and desolation with imaginary life; so that in ancient days, every forest had its Dryads, every fountain its nymphs, and the voice of the Naiades was heard in the murmuring of the streams. It is partly in reference to the same principle, that deserts and mountains, where all is barrenness and solitude, raise in the mind emotions of sublimity. It is a feeling of vastness and desolation that depends in a great degree on the absence of every thing, having life or action. The mere modifications of nature are beautiful; the

human form, from its just proportions, the human face, from the harmonious combination of features and coloring; but it is only when this form is living and moving, and when this face is suffused with emotion, and animated with intelligence, when the attitude and the look alike express the workings of the heart and mind, that we feel the perfect sentiment of beauty.

Thus inanimate nature, and literature in its transcripts of the aspects of nature, become most interesting by association with life and action, and above all with man. It is from descriptions of man, considered as a moral being, that even literary taste receives many of its highest gratifications. There is a moral as well as natural beauty and grandeur. A rational agent, animated by high principles of virtue, exhibiting the most generous affections, and preferring on all occasions what is just to what is expedient, is the noblest picture which the hand of genius can present. Very few indeed are insensible to those fine touches of moral feeling, which are given in our best writers; but their full effect requires not only an improved mind, but a heart in harmony with whatever is most excellent in our natures, and a lively susceptibility to moral greatness. This susceptibility is *moral taste*.

Moral taste, then, is a quick sensibility to right and wrong. It perceives and enjoys whatever is generous, elevated, or true in character and conduct, especially in their more refined and uncommon displays; and is offended with all that is selfish, debasing, or false. Its province is not merely the observation of the actions of others; it is at once the watchful guardian and the highest reward of personal virtue. It often anticipates the decisions of reason, and gives the alarm, especially in minor duties, when conscience perhaps would be hardly sensible of danger. It secures us, in many instances, from temptation, by turning with disgust from much, that otherwise might have a tendency to seduce and corrupt. A true moral sense is offended, not only by absolute injustice or malignity, but by whatever, either in manner or the expression of sentiments, may have any remote influence unfavorable to virtue. In a word, the advances which one may have made in moral worth, may be in a great measure graduated by the sensibility and refinement of this faculty. But this moral taste is not only a security to virtue, it affords its highest and most appropriate reward. The happiness of virtue consists not in any ulterior good it may procure, but in the very love and practice of it. It consists not in the dowry which virtue brings, but in herself

with all her loveliness. The satisfactions of a heart overflowing with kind affections, harmonized to a love of order, delighting in whatever is pure and excellent, constantly seeking and acquiring new degrees of goodness, in short, being and doing good; these are the true, the essential rewards of virtue. When we say that God has established a connection between virtue and happiness, vice and misery, it is not only a consequential, but an essentions connection, of which we speak. Virtue *is* happiness, and vice *is* misery.

Moral taste is easily distinguished from those principles before mentioned. The object of benevolence is the happiness of others, that of moral taste is their actions, and the feelings, and principles which produce them. A sense of duty is a conviction that we are bound to conform to the laws of rectitude; moral taste delights in this conformity. Approbation is a sentiment, implying a judgment of the understanding, a judgment that we cannot but pronounce, when we perceive what is right. But the pleasure with which this judgment is accompanied, in a greater or less degree, is moral taste. This taste, as it may enter into, is the consummation of all our moral principles.

It is then a most important inquiry; How may this principle be developed and cultivated, and by what is it impaired or destroyed?

A literary taste, while it has its principles in the nature of the mind, is formed by the study and imitation of the best models, and by having the attention habitually directed to what is truly beautiful. Moral taste is founded, in like manner, in our constitution, is cherished and cultivated by familiarity with moral beauty, and by avoiding whatever has a tendency to impair the love of what is right, and the aversion to what is wrong.

As our opinion of duty is greatly influenced by our moral taste, so, on the other hand, moral taste is much affected by our judgment of what is right. Hence it is above all things necessary, that this taste should be founded in just notions of rectitude, and supported by virtuous conduct. It is impossible that he should long love virtue, whose actions are habitually at variance with her principles and rules. But it is to influences more remote and indirect, influences less suspected, and therefore more to be feared, that I would call your attention. There are many circumstances, which do not solicit us to violate our sense of duty, which yet lessen our reverence for virtue, and abhorrence of vice, and thus fatally break down the barriers to practical aberrations from the course of rectitude.

The first I shall mention, is intimacy with such individuals, as combine amiable qualities, intelli

gent minds, and cultivated manners, with a disregard of principle and corrupt morals. As bigotry, cant and superstition often give a disgusting, ridiculous, or repulsive air even to true piety, which it requires no small effort of the mind to separate from it; in like manner, vice is often so united with engaging qualities, that it is either "pardoned for the association, or lost in the assemblage." The ingenuous and well educated youth is at first, perhaps, offended, and even pained by the indecent allusion or profane jest; but they are uttered in such good company, and seasoned with so much wit, that they are forgiven, as the venial errors of a good heart. When this is the case, it is too certain, they will soon be heard with indifference, and at last joined in without compunction.

The same effect is produced by two classes of books. The one, where the power of the writer has concealed the deformity of vice under refinement of expression, or confounded its nature by associating it with qualities, which are interesting and amiable. Here perhaps the *delicacy* of taste is not so much impaired, as its *correctness* perverted; it is not insensibility, but error, which is produced. The warmth of genius, like that of the tropical sun, has called up a luxuriance of vegetation and; the unwary observer is unconscious of the poison that

is breathed from flowers so sweet, or the reptiles that hide under foliage so beautiful.

But there is another class of books, in which there is no disguise ; and profligacy and vice appear without a veil ; although perhaps their names may be a little changed. Drunkenness is conviviality, and libertinism, warmth of constitution. Yet there is so much to awaken curiosity in the narrative, so much of humor, of truth, and of human nature in the characters and incidents, that by many, the faults are pardoned for the sake of the excellencies, till these very faults increase the relish of the whole ; '*rancidum aprum laudant.*' I have heard the putting of such books into the hands of the young defended by an argument like this ; that they are a sort of preparatory discipline for the temptations of real life ;—that in the commerce of the world, the young cannot but be exposed to the seductions of vice, and it is best they should know before hand something of its nature and power, that they may be the better able to withstand them. In answer to this, it may, I think, be said, that those circumstances, which impair the delicacy of moral feeling, and silently seduce the imagination and passions, without directly leading to conduct, are more dangerous in their effects, than temptations, which immediately allure us to act wrong ; because

the former, calling for no resistance, and producing no reaction, leave the principles of virtue enfeebled; whereas the latter, requiring an active determination of the will, the same mind would recoil from them with abhorrence. Impressions merely passive steal upon the heart and pollute the sources of moral health; while temptations, counteracted by positive resistance and opposite conduct, produce a salutary exercise, by which the moral powers are invigorated.

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POETRY.

Morning Hymn.

While nature welcomes in the day,
My heart its earliest vows would pay
To Him, whose care hath kindly kept
My life from danger, while I slept.

His genial rays, the sun renews;
How bright the scene with glittering dews!
The blushing flowers more beauteous bloom,
And breathe more rich their sweet perfume.

So may the Sun of Righteousness,
With kindliest beams, my bosom bless,
Warm into life each heavenly seed,
To bud, and bear some generous deed.

So may the dews of grace distil,
And gently soften all my will;
So may my morning sacrifice
To heaven, a grateful incense, rise.

Wilt thou this day my footsteps guide
And kindly all I need, provide ;
With strength divine my bosom arm,
Against temptation's powerful charm.

Where'er I am, oh, may I feel,
That God is all around me still ;
That all I say, or do, or mean,
By his all-searching eye is seen.

Oh, may each day my heart improve,
Increase my faith, my hope, my love ;
And thus its shades around me close
More wise and holy than I rose.

Evening Hymn.

My soul, a hymn of evening praise
To God, thy kind preserver, raise,
Whose hand, this day, hath guarded, fed,
And thousand blessings round thee shed.

Forgive my sins this day, O Lord,
In thought or feeling, deed or word;
And if in aught thy law I've kept,
My feeble efforts, Lord, accept.

While nature round is hush'd to rest,
Let no vain thought disturb my breast;
Shed o'er my soul religion's power,
Serenely solemn, as the hour.

Oh, bid thy angels o'er me keep
Their watch to shield me, while I sleep,
Till the fresh morn shall round me break,
Then with new vigor may I wake.

Yet think, my soul, another day
Of thy short course has rolled away.
Ah, think, how soon in deepening shade,
Thy day of life itself shall fade.

How soon death's sleep my eyes must close,
Lock every sense in dread repose,
And lay me mid the awful gloom,
And solemn silence of the tomb.

This very night, Lord, should it be,
Oh, may my soul repose in thee,
Till the glad morn in heaven shall rise,
Then wake to triumph in the skies.

TRANSLATION.

HOR. OD. XI, B. I.

Tu ne quæsieris, scire nefas, &c.

Seek not Leuconöe, with anxious care,
To know what fate the gods prepare
For me or thee ; nor vainly try,
By magic charms, the future to descry.

But wiser far, receive with dauntless breast
Whate'er each hour may bring, as best ;
Whether great Jove shall grant thee more,
Or thy last winter lash the Tuscan shore.

Then quaff your wine, contract your hopes, be wise;
E'en while we speak, the moment flies ;
Trust not the morrow, seize today,
And pluck life's flowers e'er they fade away.

IMITATION

OF THE SAME ODE.*

Ah, do not seek, my dearest friend,
With anxious care to know,
Or how, or when, thy life shall end,
Or what thy fate below.

The same kind Power, that gave thee breath,
Still holds thee in his hand;
And when he bids thee sleep in death,
All wise is his command.

The power, whose watchful goodness feeds
The warblers of the air,
And clothes with flowers the smiling meads,
Shalt thou not be his care?

If lengthen'd years thy life should crown,
Then be his praise expressed;
Or if in this he cut thee down,
Still what he does is best.

* [All the smaller pieces of poetry here republished, appeared at different times in the Monthly Anthology. Of this imitation, the author says: 'To the Epicureanism of the preceding Ode, I have endeavoured to give a Christian turn in the following imitation.']

The bounties, every hour supplies,
Receive with grateful mind;
And when thy fairest pleasure dies,
Be humble and resigned.

Contract your hopes; how short at best
The term of earthly bliss!
Let brighter worlds fill all thy breast;
We are but born in this.

How swift our moments steal away;
E'en while we speak they fly;
Trust not the morrow, seize to day,
And only live to die.

Epistle

OF

HORACE TO JULIUS FLORUS.

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE GENERAL REPOSITORY AND REVIEW, FOR JANUARY 1812.

FLORUS, the illustrious Nero's* faithful friend,
What if some one, who wished a slave to vend,
Should with you thus about the purchase treat?—
"He's a fine lad, from head to foot complete;
"Eight thousand sesterces, and he's your own,
"Quick at a nod, at once your will is done;
"Talks Greek, learns any thing you wish, with ease,
"Just like moist clay, you'll mould him, as you please,
"Then he's a singer too, his voice is fine,
"And tho' untaught, will charm you o'er your wine.
"But why this praise; 'tis but the common tale
"Of pedlars, seeking for their wares a sale.
"I under no necessity am laid,
"And though not rich, yet all my debts are paid.
"No dealer e'er would sell him half so low,
"And 'tis not every one, should have him so.
"I own that once he made a trifling slip,
"And hid himself, as usual, from the whip.

* Tiberius, the successor of Augustus, one of whose names was Nero.

AD JULIUM FLORUM.

HOR. LIB. II. EPIST. II.

Flore, bono claroque fidelis amice Neroni,
Si quis forte velit puerum tibi vendere natum
Tibure vel Gabiis, et tecum sic agat : Hic et
Candidus, et talos a vertice pulcher ad imos,
Fiet eritque tuus nummorum millibus octo :
Verna ministeriis ad nutus aptus heriles,
Litterulis Græcis imbutus, idoneus arti
Cuilibet ; argillâ quidvis imitaberis udâ :
Quin etiam canet indoctum, sed dulce bibenti.
Multa fidem promissa levant, ubi plenius æquo
Laudat venales, qui vult extrudere, merces.
Res urguet me nulla : meo sum pauper in ære.
Nemo hoc mangonum faceret tibi : non temere a me
Quivis ferret idem. Semel hic cessavit, et, ut fit,
In scalis latuit metuens pendentis habenæ.

"That he wont run away I dont pretend;
"In all things else, I'll warrant and defend."
If then with open eyes, you bought the slave,
It seems to me, that you can fairly have
No claim for damages; yet you dispute,
And vex the seller with a tedious suit.
All blame, before you left me, to prevent,
I told you I was dull and indolent.
Yet say, of what avail was this to me,
If still you murmur at so just a plea;
Nay more, complain, because I did not send
Th' expected poems, I've deceived my friend?
One of Lucullus' soldiers, as 'tis said,
By service hard a little sum had made.
One night, as weary, fast asleep he lay,
Some pilfering scoundrel stole the whole away.
He, with himself and foes alike enraged,
Fierce as an hungry wolf, in fight engaged,
Dislodged a garrison well fortified,
And took the place with richest stores supplied.
The man, praised loudly for a feat so bold,
Received besides a good round sum in gold.
About this time, the Prætor wished to storm
A certain fort, ('twas dangerous to perform;)
When thus the daring hero he addressed,
In words, that might have fired a coward's breast:—
"Go, go, my friend, where valor leads the way,
"And large rewards shall your deserts repay;
"Go, and may victory on your footsteps wait;
"Astonishment! and do you hesitate?"

Des nummos, excepta nihil te si fuga lædat :
Ille ferat pretium, pœnæ securus, opinor.
Prudens emisti vitiosum : dicta tibi est lex :
Insequeris tamen hunc, et lite moraris iniquâ.
Dixi me pigrum proficiscenti tibi ; dixi
Talibus officiis prope mancum ; ne mea sævus
Jurgares ad te quod epistola nulla veniret.
Quid tum profeci, mecum facientia jura
Si tamen attentas ? Quereris super hoc etiam, quod
Expectata tibi non mittam carmina mendax.
Luculli miles collecta viatica multis
Ærumnis, lassus dum noctu stertit, ad assem
Perdiderat : post hoc, vehemens lupus, et sibi et hosti
Iratus pariter, jejunis dentibus acer,
Præsidium regale loco dejecit, ut aiunt,
Summe munito, et multarum divite rerum.
Clarus ob id factum, donis ornatur honestis ;
Accipit et bis dena super sestertia nummûm.
Forte sub hoc tempus castellum evertere prætor
Nescio quod cupiens, hortari cœpit eundem
Verbis, quæ timido quoque possent addere mentem :
I, bone, quo virtus tua te vocat ; i, pede fausto,
Grandia laturus meritorum præmia. Quid stas ?

Whom the shrewd rustic drily answer'd thus :—
" He, he will go, who's lately lost his purse."
Brought up at Rome, it chanced I there was taught
What ills on Greece Achilles' anger brought.
Athens, the seat of every art refined,
Then gave a little polish to my mind ;
Taught me geometry, and bade me rove,
In search of truth, through Academus' grove.
But ah, unhappy times soon called me far
From these sweet scenes ; the rage of civil war
Drove me, unskilled, to arms, that strove in vain,
The unequal fight with Cæsar to maintain.
But when Philippi clipt my soaring pride,
And sent me home, with ruin by my side,
Compelled by want, I tried to court the muse ;
But now, when blest with more than I can use,
What dose would cure a madness so absurd,
Unless my ease to writing I preferred ?
The years, revolving, steal from us our powers ;
My jests, loves, sports, my taste for festive hours,
They've torn away ; and now my poems too
They strive to wrest. What would you have me do ?
In fine, with various humors men admire ;
You love the measure suited to the lyre ;
He most is pleased with the Iambic strain ;
A third delights in Bion's bitter vein.
Thus I've three guests of different tastes to dine,
How shall I suit you ? That, which you decline,
Another calls for ; and what pleases you,
Is sour and odious to the other two.

Post hæc ille catus, quantumvis rusticus, Ibit,
Ibit eo, quo vis, qui zonam perdidit, inquit.
Romæ nutriri mihi contigit, atque doceri
Iratus Graiis quantum nocuisset Achilles.
Adjecere bonæ paulo plus artis Athenæ ;
Scilicet ut possem curvo dignoscere rectum,
Atque inter silvas Academi quærere verum.
Dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato ;
Civilisque rudem belli tulit æstus in arma,
Cæsaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.
Unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,
Decisis humilem pennis, inopemque paterni
Et laris et fundi ; paupertas impulit audax,
Ut versus facerem : sed, quod non desit, habentem,
Quæ poterunt unquam satis expurgare cicutæ,
Ni melius dormire putem, quam scribere versus ?
Singula de nobis anni prædantur euntes :
Eripuere jocos, venerem, convivia, ludum :
Tendunt extorquere poemata : quid faciam vis ?
Denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque :
Carmine tu gaudes ; hic delectatur iambis ;
Ille Bioneis sermonibus, et sale nigro.
Tres mihi convivæ prope dissentire videntur,
Poscentes vario multum diversa palato.
Quid dem ? quid non dem ? Renuis tu, quod jubet alter ;
Quod petis, id sane est invisum acidumque duobus.

Beside, mid all the cares and toils of Rome,
Can I write verses? One entreats I'd come,
And be his bail; another humbly prays,
Business I'd quit, and listen to his lays.
And, though they live at different ends of town,
(A special distance, you must surely own,)
Both must I see. "Still in the streets there's nought,
"That as you walk need interrupt a thought."
Here drives a builder with his busy throng
Of mules and porters; there an engine strong
Heaves a vast stone or beam; in sad array,
Funerals contend with wagons for the way;
Next a mad dog, or miry pig you meet;
Now go, compose me verses in the street.
Votaries of Bacchus, poets ever love
To shun the crowd and court the shady grove.
In such a din can I then hail the muse,
Or trace the path of beauty, she pursues?
Even at Athens, calm as it appears,
A genius who has studied seven long years,
If through the streets, with books and cares grown grey,
Profoundly lost in thought, he bend his way;
Mute as a statue, as he walks along,
He shakes with laughter all the gathering throng.
Shall I then, mid this ocean of affairs,
This very storm of business and of cares,
To modulate harmonious strains aspire,
And suit their measure to the sounding lyre?
Two brothers, one for rhetoric renowned,
The other in the wiles of law profound,

Præter cætera, me Romæne poëmata censes
Scribere posse, inter tot curas, totque labores ?
Hic sponsum vocat, hic auditum scripta, relictis
Omnibus officiis : cubat hic in colle Quirini,
Hic extremo in Aventino ; visendus uterque :
Intervalla vides humane commoda. Verum
Puræ sunt plateæ, nihil ut meditantibus obstet.
Festinat calidus mulis gerulisque redemptor ;
Torquet nunc lapidem, nunc ingens machina tignum ;
Tristia robustis luctantur funera plaustris ;
Hâc rabiosa fugit canis ; hâc lutulenta ruit sus.
I nunc, et versus tecum meditare canoros.
Scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus, et fugit urbes,
Rite cliens Bacchi somno gaudentis et umbrâ.
Tu me inter strepitus nocturnos atque diurnos
Vis canere, et contracta sequi vestigia vatum ?
Ingenium, sibi quod vacuas desumpsit Athenas,
Et studiis annos septem dedit, insenuitque
Libris et curis, statuâ taciturnius exit
Plerumque, et risu populum quatit : hic ego rerum
Fluctibus in mediis, et tempestatibus urbis,
Verba lyræ motura sonum connectere digner ?
Frâter erat Romæ consulti rhetor, ut alter

Conspired at Rome, by unremitting praise,
In every speech, each other's fame to raise ;
The one, a perfect Mutius to the other,
And he, in turn, a Gracchus to his brother.
An equal folly fires the poet's brain;
I strike the lyre, soft elegy his strain ;
What wonderous genius glows in every line !
'Twas surely polished by the tuneful nine.
Now mark with what parade and pride we claim
Apollo's temple to enshrine our fame ;
Then following after, learn, if time allows,
Why we the wreath intwine around our brows.
Like Samnites,* who engage by candle light,
We deal alternate blows in harmless fight.
In his opinion I, Alcæus shine,
And he, at least Callimachus in mine.
If more than this his high ambition claim,
I swell his pride with great Mimnermus' name.
Thus while I court the public with my muse,
To soothe each rival every art I use ;
My studies done, my rhyming phrenzy o'er,
Against the scribbling tribe I shut my door.
Bad poets are to all a standing jest ;
And yet they write with self-complacence blest,
Admire the jingle of their senseless lays,
And if you're silent, they, themselves, will praise.
But he, who would a well wrought poem make
Must with a censor's mind, his tablets take ;

* One kind of gladiators.

Alterius sermone meros audiret honores ;
Gracchus ut hic illi foret, huic ut Mucius ille.
Qui minus argutos vexat furor iste poëtas ?
Carmina compono, hic elegos, mirabile visu,
Cælatumque novem Musis opus. Aspice primum,
Quanto cum fastu, quanto molimine circum-
Spectemus vacuam Romanis vatibus ædem.
Mox etiam, si forte vacas, sequere, et procul audi
Quid ferat, et quare sibi nectat uterque coronam.
Cædimur, et totidem plagis consumimus hostem,
Lento Samnites ad lumina prima duello.
Discedo Alcæus puncto illius : ille meo quis ?
Quis nisi Callimachus ? si plus adposcere visus,
Fit Mimnermus, et optivo cognomine crescit.
Multa fero, ut placem genus irritabile vatum,
Cum scribo, et supplex populi suffragia capto :
Idem, finitis studiis, et mente receptâ,
Obturem patulas impune legentibus aures.
Ridentur, mala qui componunt carmina : verum
Gaudent scribentes ; et se venerantur, et ultro,
Si taceas, laudant quicquid scripsere, beati.
At qui legitimum cupiet fecisse poëma,
Cum tabulis animum censoris sumet honesti :

Such terms, as but with little splendor shine,
Such as enfeeble, or degrade the line,
He, resolute, will from his work erase,
Howe'er reluctant they may quit their place ;
From uncouth phrase, and long oblivion take
Words, our old Catos and Cethegi spake ;
To these, new terms of sanctioned usage join,
And ancient force with modern grace combine :
Thus, full and flowing, pour his verse along,
And Latium bless with a rich tide of song :
Polish the rough, the exuberant confine,
And blot the unmeaning ; till the perfect line,
Wrought with laborious patience into ease,
By graceful negligence, shall seem to please.
Hard task ! as his, who trained by toilsome art,
Now plays the Satyr's now the Cyclop's part.
Stupid I'd rather seem, a thousand times,
While still delighted with my own dull rhymes,
Than, cursed with finer taste, forever be
Tortured to mend the many faults I see.
An Argian once, of no mean name, deceived
By a strange frenzy of his brain, believed,
While in the empty theatre, he heard
Fine tragedies, and all delight appeared.
And still, in other things, was sound of mind,
A worthy neighbour, as a husband kind,
A master not severe, enough of wit
To shun a precipice or open pit.
His friends to cure him every means explored,
And hellebore at length his wits restored.

Audebit quæcunque parum splendoris habebunt,
Et sine pondere erunt, et honore indigna ferentur,
Verba movere loco, quamvis invita recedant,
Et versentur adhuc intra penetralia Vestæ.
Obscurata diu populo bonus eruet, atque
Proferet in lucem speciosa vocabula rerum,
Quæ priscis memorata Catonibus atque Cethegis,
Nunc situs informis premit, et deserta vetustas :
Adsciscet nova, quæ genitor produxerit usus :
Vehemens et liquidus, puroque simillimus amni,
Fundet opes, Latiumque beabit divite linguâ :
Luxuriantia compescet ; nimis aspera sano
Lævabit cultu ; virtute carentia tollet :
Ludentis speciem dabit et torquebitur, ut qui
Nunc Satyrum, nunc agrestem Cyclopa movetur.
Prætulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,
Quam sapere, et ringi. Fuit haud ignobilis Argis,
Qui se credebat miros audire tragœdos,
In vacuo lætus sessor plausorque theatro ;
Cætera qui vitæ servaret munia recto
More, bonus sane vicinus, amabilis hospes,
Comis in uxorem, posset qui ignoscere servis,
Et signo læso non insanire lagenæ :
Posset qui rupem et puteum vitare patentem.
Hic, ubi cognatorum opibus curisque refectus,
Expulit helleboro morbum bilemque meraco,

Come to himself, "By heavens, my friends," he cried,
"Is this to cure? 'Twere better I had died,
"Than thus to lose, by your officious love,
"Those sweet illusions, that my fancy wove."
In truth, 'tis wise no longer to engage
In trifles suited to a younger age.
No more the concord of sweet sounds to swell,
But learn the harmony of living well.
Thus then I oft commune with my own mind;
If, from repeated draughts, you could not find
The burning fever of your thirst allayed,
You'd tell your doctor, and implore his aid;
But when the more you gain, you crave the more,
Say is there none, whose aid you dare implore?
You'd throw aside prescriptions that you found
Of no avail, to soothe an aching wound.
Perchance some one has told you, folly flies
The man, whom Jove with store of wealth supplies;
But when with added treasures, you receive
No added wisdom, will you still believe?
If gold, with prudence, could your breast inspire,
Could calm anxiety, subdue desire;
Well might you blush, if in the search of pelf,
One lived on earth, more eager than yourself.
If that is ours, for which our gold we pay,
And use gives property, as lawyers say;
That field is yours, whose fruits supply your board,
And Orbius' steward owns you as his lord.
You give him money, and receive its worth,
In wine, grapes, eggs, in pullets, and so forth;

Et redit ad sese ; Pol, me occidistis, amici,
Non servastis, ait ; cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.
Nimirum sapere est abjectis utile nugis,
Et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum ;
Ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis,
Sed veræ numerosque modosque ediscere vitæ.
Quocirca mecum loquor hæc, tacitusque recordor :
Si tibi nulla sitim finiret copia lymphæ,
Narrares medicis : quod, quanto plura parasti,
Tanto plura cupis, nulline faterier audes ?
Si vulnus, tibi monstratâ radice vel herbâ
Non fieret levius, fugeres radice vel herbâ
Proficiente nihil curarier. Audieras, cui
Rem Dî donarent, illi decedere pravam
Stultitiam ; et cum sis nihilo sapientior, ex quo
Plenior es, tamen uteris monitoribus îsdem ?
At si divitiæ prudentem reddere possent,
Si cupidum timidumque minus te ; nempe ruberes,
Viveret in terris te si quis avarior uno.
Si proprium est, quod quis librâ mercatus et ære est,
Quædam, si credis consultis, mancipat usus :
Qui te pascit ager, tuus est ; et villicus Orbî
Cum segetes occat, tibi mox frumenta daturas,
Te dominum sentit : das nummos, accipis uvam,
Pullos, ova, cadum temeti : nempe modo isto

Thus by degress a farm you may possess,
Bought at three hundred pieces, more or less :
The same, whether at once the fee you buy,
Or daily what may each day's wants supply.
Thus he, who long since paid the purchase down
Of all the lands, he fondly calls his own,
The fruits that feed him, and the wood that warms,
Still buys, though proudly boasting of his farms :
As if to any here belonged the power
To call his own, that which each fleeting hour,
Sold, given, or torn by force or death away,
May change its owner, and new lords obey.
If then earth's strongest tenure is so frail ;
What can your houses, what your stores avail ?
Why add, with anxious labor, field to field ?
Will death, subdued by gold, to bribery yield ?
Heir treads on heir, as wave rolls over wave,
And all distinction's levelled in the grave.
Gems, Tuscan statues, marble, ivory,
Plate, paintings, vests of rich Getulian dye,
Though these the objects, most with ardor crave,
There are, who have not, nor desire to have.
Why of two brothers, one more dearly loves
Perfumes, ease, pleasures, than all Herod's groves,
Though rich, the other with incessant toil,
From dawn till evening, strives to tame his soil ;
That Genius knows, who rules our natal star,
Fashions our tempers, makes us what we are,
Bids, at his pleasure, still new humors rise,
Lives in our life, and only with us dies.

Paulatim mercaris agrum, fortasse trecentis,
Aut etiam supra, nummorum millibus emptum.
Quid refert, vivas numerato nuper, an olim ?
Emptor Aricini quondam Veientis et arvi,
Emptum cœnat olus, quamvis aliter putat; emptis
Sub noctem gelidam lignis calefactat ahenum :
Sed vocat usque suum, quâ populus adsita certis
Limitibus vicina refugit jurgia, tanquam
Sit proprium quidquam, puncto quod mobilis horæ,
Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc vi, nunc sorte supremâ
Permutet dominos, et cedat in altera jura.
Sic, quia perpetuus nulli datur usus, et hæres
Hæredem alterius, velut unda supervenit undam ;
Quid vici prosunt, aut horrea ? quidve Calabris
Saltibus adjecti Lucani, si metit Orcus
Grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro ?
Gemmas, marmor, ebur, Tyrrhena sigilla, tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Gætulo murice tinctas,
Sunt qui non habeant, est qui non curat habere.
Cur alter fratrum cessare, et ludere, et ungui,
Præferat Herodis palmetis pinguibus ; alter,
Dives et importunus, ad umbram lucis ab ortu,
Sylvestrem flammis et ferro mitiget agrum ;
Scit Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum,
Naturæ deus humanæ, mortalis in unum-
Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus, et ater.

Careless of what a thankless heir may say,
My little store shall bless the passing day.
Yet the distinction shall in me be seen
The social, open-hearted man between,
And prodigal; the frugal, and the mean.
For wide the difference is to waste profuse
The wealth you want the wit to turn to use;
And without grudging to enjoy your store,
Nor meanly pinch yourself, to make it more;
But, like a boy, some fleeting holiday,
To seize each moment, as it wings its way.

Avert, ye gods, forever from my door
Those loathsome miseries that haunt the poor.
Myself unchanged, 'tis all the same to me,
If boat or barge convey me o'er life's sea.
What, though the north wind rarely swell our sails,
We do not always buffet southern gales:
Last of the first, first of the last, in health,
In genius, beauty, virtue, birth, and wealth.

You say you're free from avarice; grant it true;
Have all your other vices fled you too?
Does vain ambition never swell your breast;
No rage, no fear of death, disturb your rest?
Smile you at witches, prodigies, and dreams,
And ghosts, that vex the midnight air with screams?
Can you, on each returning natal day,
With grateful calm your added years survey?
Do you the errors of your friends forgive?
And as you longer, better learn to live?
As age approaches, do your passions cease;
And milder feelings soothe your soul to peace?

Utar, et ex modico, quantum res poscet, acervo
Tollam ; nec metuam, quid de me judicet hæres,
Quod non plura datis invenerit : et tamen idem
Scire volam, quantum simplex hilarisque nepoti
Discrepet ; et quantum discordet parcus avaro.
Distat enim, spargas tua prodigus, an neque sumptum
Invitus facias, neque plura parare labores ;
Ac potius, puer ut festis quinquatribus olim,
Exiguo gratoque fruaris tempore raptim.
Pauperies immunda domu procul absit : ego, utrum
Nave ferar magnâ an parvâ, ferar unus et idem.
Non agimur tumidis velis aquilone secundo ;
Non tamen adversis ætatem ducimus austris :
Viribus, ingenio, specie, virtute, loco, re,
Extremi primorum, extremis usque priores.
Non es avarus : abi. Quid ? cætera jam simul isto
Cum vitio fugere ? caret tibi pectus inani
Ambitione ? caret mortis formidine, et irâ ?
Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala rides ?
Natales grate numeras ? ignoscis amicis ?
Lenior et melior fis accedente senectâ ?

What boots it to extract a single thorn,
If by so many still your breast be torn ?
If ignorant to act, resign your part
To those, who'll play it with more taste and art.
You've sported, eat, and drank enough; now quit
The table, sober; lest the taunting wit
Of sportive youth, absurd with better grace,
Should jeer, and drive you reeling from your place.

Quid te exempta juvat spinis de pluribus una ?
Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis.
Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti :
Tempus abire tibi est ; ne potum largius æquo
Rideat, et pulset lasciva decentius ætas.

DREAM.

——— AN ME LUDIT AMABILIS
INSANIA?

TO * * *

Stay, stay, sweet vision, do not leave me;
Soft sleep, still o'er my senses reign;
Stay, loveliest phantom, still deceive me;
Ah! let me dream that dream again.

Thy head was on my shoulder leaning;
Thy hand in mine was gently pressed;
Thine eyes, so soft, and full of meaning,
Were bent on me, and I was blest.

No word was spoken, all was feeling,
The silent transport of the heart:
The tear, that o'er my cheek was stealing,
Told what words could ne'er impart.

And could this be but mere illusion?
Could fancy all so real seem?
Sure fancy's scenes are wild confusion;
And can it be I did but dream?

I'm sure I felt thy forehead pressing,
  Thy very breath stole o'er my cheek;
I'm sure I saw those eyes confessing
  What the tongue could never speak.

Ah! no! 'tis gone, 'tis gone, and never
  Mine such waking bliss can be:
Oh! I would sleep, would sleep forever,
  Could I thus but dream of thee.